Lieutenant General Jubal Anderson Early C.S.A.
Autobiographical Sketch and
Narratve of the War Between the States:

Jubal Anderson Early, 1816-1894

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LC Subject Headings:

• Early, Jubal Anderson, 1816-1894.
• Generals -- Virginia -- Biography.
• Generals -- Confederate States of America -- Biography.
• Confederate States of America. Army. Virginia Infantry Regiment, 24th.
• Virginia -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Personal narratives.
• Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1864 (May-August) -- Personal narratives.
• Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1864 (August-November) -- Personal narratives.
• United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Military life.
• United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns.
• United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Personal narratives, Confederate.

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GENERAL JUBAL ANDERSON EARLY
[Frontispiece Image]

[Title Page Image]

Lieutenant General
Jubal Anderson Early
C. S. A.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH AND NARRATIVE
OF THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

With Notes by
R. H. Early

Philadelphia & London
J. B. Lippincott Company
1912

COPYRIGHT, 1912, BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
PUBLISHED NOVEMBER, 1912

PRINTED BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
AT THE WASHINGTON SQUARE PRESS
PHILADELPHIA, U.S.A.

EDITOR'S NOTE

        IT becomes my duty and privilege to undertake the publication of General Early's narrative of the war left in manuscript form at the time of his death, March 2, 1894. Its preparation covered the term of years beginning immediately after the close of the war and continuing to the end of his life. Impressed with the belief that "truth crushed to earth will rise again," he labored conscientiously at his task, the motive of his writing being the wish that a detailed history, accurate as far as lay within his compassing, might be handed down to posterity. He was well equipped for the work undertaken and his efforts met with the encouragement of his former comrades. In submitting to the public the result of his long labor, I feel confident of its being accorded the just consideration for which he strove.

R. H. EARLY

PREFACE

        WHEN the question of practical secession from the United States arose, as a citizen of the State of Virginia, and a member of the Convention called by the authority of the Legislature of that State, I opposed secession with all the ability I possessed, with the hope that the horrors of civil war might be averted and that a returning sense of justice on the part of the masses of the Northern States would induce them to respect the rights of the people of the South.

        While some Northern politicians and editors were openly and sedulously justifying and encouraging secession, I was laboring honestly and earnestly to preserve the Union.

        As a member of the Virginia Convention, I voted against the ordinance of secession on its passage by that body, with the hope that even then, the collision of arms might be avoided and some satisfactory adjustment arrived at. The adoption of that ordinance wrung from me bitter tears of grief; but I at once recognized my duty to abide the decision of my native State, and to defend her soil against invasion. Any scruples which I may have entertained as to the right of secession were soon dispelled by the unconstitutional measures of the authorities at Washington and the frenzied clamor of the people of the North for war upon their former brethren of the South. I recognized the right of resistance and revolution as exercised by our fathers in 1776 and without cavil as to the name by which it was called, I entered the military service of my State, willingly, cheerfully, and zealously.

        When the State of Virginia became one of the Confederate States and her troops were turned over to the Confederate Government, I embraced the cause of the

whole Confederacy with equal ardor, and continued in the service, with the determination to devote all the energy and talent I possessed to the common defence. I fought through the entire war, without once regretting the course I pursued, with an abiding faith in the justice of our cause.

        It was my fortune to participate in most of the great military operations in which the army in Virginia was engaged both before and after General Lee assumed the command. In the last year of this momentous struggle, I commanded, at different times, a division and two corps of General Lee's Army in the campaign from the Rapidan to James River, and subsequently, a separate force which marched into Maryland, threatened Washington City and then went through an eventful campaign in the valley of Virginia. No detailed reports of the operations of these different commands were made before the close of the war and the campaign in Maryland and the Valley of Virginia has been the subject of much comment and misapprehension. I have now written a narrative of all my commands before and during the closing year of the war and lay it before the world as a contribution to the history of our great struggle for independence. In giving that narrative, I have made such statements of the positions and strengths of the opposing forces in Virginia and such reference to their general operations as were necessary to enable the reader to understand it, but I do not pretend to detail the operations of other commanders.

        My operations and my campaign stand on their own merits. And in what I have found it necessary to say in regard to the conduct of my troops, I do not wish to be understood as, in any way, decrying the soldiers who constituted the rank and file of my commands. I believe that the world has never produced a body of men superior, in courage, patriotism, and endurance, to the private soldiers of the Confederate armies. I have repeatedly seen those soldiers submit, with cheerfulness,

to privations and hardships which would appear to be almost incredible; and the wild cheers of our brave men, when their thin lines were sent back opposing hosts of Federal troops, staggering, reeling and flying, have often thrilled every fibre in my heart. I have seen, with my own eyes, ragged, barefooted, and hungry Confederate soldiers perform deeds which, if performed in days of yore by mailed warriors in glittering armor, would have inspired the harp of the minstrel and the pen of the poet.

        Having been a witness of and participant in great events, I have given a statement of what I saw and did, for the use of the future historian. I have not undertaken to speculate as to the causes of our failures, as I have seen abundant reason for it in the tremendous odds brought against us. Having had some means of judging, I will say that, in my opinion, both Mr. Davis and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did all for the success of our cause which it was possible for mortal men to do and it is a great privilege and comfort for me so to believe. In regard to my own services, I have the consciousness of having done my duty to my country, to the very best of my ability.

        During the war, slavery was used as a catch-word to arouse the passions of a fanatical mob, and to some extent the prejudices of the civilized world were excited against us; but the war was not made on our part for slavery. High dignitaries in both church and state in Old England, and puritans in New England, had participated in the profits of a trade by which the ignorant and barbarous natives of Africa were brought from that country and sold into slavery in the American Colonies. The generation in the Southern States which defended their country in the late war, found amongst them, in a civilized and Christianized condition, 4,000,000 of the descendants of those degraded Africans. The Creator of the Universe had stamped them, indelibly, with a different color and an inferior physical and mental organization. He had not done this from mere caprice

or whim, but for wise purposes. An amalgamation of the races was in contravention of His designs or He would not have made them so different. This immense number of people could not have been transported back to the wilds from which their ancestors were taken, or, if they could have been, it would have resulted in their relapse into barbarism. Reason, common sense, true humanity to the black, as well as the safety of the white race, required that the inferior race should be kept in a state of subordination. The conditions of domestic slavery, as it existed in the South, had not only resulted in a great improvement in the moral and physical condition of the negro race, but had furnished a class of laborers as happy and contented as any in the world, if not more so. Their labor had not only developed the immense resources of the immediate country in which they were located, but was the main source of the great prosperity of the United States, and furnished the means for the employment of millions of the working classes in other countries. Nevertheless, the struggle made by the people of the South was not for the institution of slavery, but for the inestimable right of self-government, against the domination of a fanatical faction at the North; and slavery was the mere occasion of the development of the antagonism between the two sections. That right of self-government has been lost, and slavery violently abolished.

        When the passions and infatuations of the day shall have been dissipated by time, and all the results of the late war shall have passed into irrevocable history, the future chronicler of that history will have a most important duty to perform, and posterity, while poring over its pages, will be lost in wonder at the follies and crimes committed in this generation.

        Each generation of men owes the debt to posterity to hand down to it a correct history of the more important events that have transpired in its day. The history

of every people is the common inheritance of mankind, because of the lessons it teaches.

        For the purposes of history, the people of the late Confederate States were a separate people from the people of the North during the four years of conflict which they maintained against them.

        No people loving the truth of history can have any object or motive in suppressing or mutilating any fact which may be material to its proper elucidation.

        The sole merit I claim for the narrative now given to the public is its truthfulness. In writing it, I have received material aid from an accurate diary kept by Lieutenant William W. Old, aide to Major General Edward Johnson, who was with me during the campaign in Maryland and the Shenandoah Valley until August 12th, 1864; and the copious notes of Captain Jed. Hotchkiss, who acted as Topographical Engineer for the Second corps and the Army of the Valley District, and recorded the events of each day from the opening of the campaign on the Rapidan in May, 1864, until the affair at Waynesboro, in March, 1865.

J. A. EARLY

CONTENTS

• EDITOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE . . . . . v
• PREFACE . . . . . vii
• AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . . . . . xvii
• THE INVASION OF VIRGINIA . . . . . 1
• FIGHT AT BLACKBURN'S FORD . . . . . 6
• EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS . . . . . 15
• DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS . . . . . 31
• OPERATIONS ALONG BULL RUN . . . . . 47
• MANOEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA . . . . . 58
• BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG . . . . . 68
• BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND . . . . . 74
• BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN . . . . . 92
• OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK . . . . . 104
• CAPTURE OF MANASSAS JUNCTION . . . . . 114
• THE AFFAIR AT GROVETON . . . . . 119
• SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS . . . . . 122
• AFFAIR AT OX HILL OR CHANTILLY . . . . . 129
• MOVEMENT INTO MARYLAND . . . . . 134
• BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM . . . . . 139
• PREPARATIONS ABOUT FREDERICKSBURG . . . . . 162
• BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG . . . . . 167
• OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-63 . . . . . 184
• BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE . . . . . 193
• INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA . . . . . 236
• CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER . . . . . 240
• AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE . . . . . 253
• BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG . . . . . 266
• RETREAT TO VIRGINIA . . . . . 276
• TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, WOUNDED AND DEAD . . . . . 287
• ON THE RAPIDAN . . . . . 302
• DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY . . . . . 307
• SKIRMISHING AT MINE RUN . . . . . 319
• AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN . . . . . 326
• FROM THE RAPIDAN TO THE JAMES . . . . . 343
• BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS . . . . . 346
• BATTLES AROUND SPOTTSYLVANIA . . . . . 352

  ---

  Page xiv

• OPERATIONS NEAR HANOVER JUNCTION . . . . . 359
• BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR . . . . . 361
• CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA . . . . . 366
• PURSUIT OF HUNTER . . . . . 371
• OPERATIONS IN LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND . . . . . 380
• BATTLE OF MONOCACY . . . . . 387
• IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON . . . . . 389
• RETURN TO VIRGINIA . . . . . 396
• BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN . . . . . 399
• THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG . . . . . 401
• RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL . . . . . 406
• BATTLE OF WINCHESTER . . . . . 420
• AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL . . . . . 429
• THE MARCH UP THE VALLEY . . . . . 432
• BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE . . . . . 437
• CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN . . . . . 453
• OPERATIONS IN 1865 . . . . . 459
• CONCLUSION . . . . . 466
• APPENDIX . . . . . 470
• INDEX . . . . . 481

ILLUSTRATIONS

• GENERAL JUBAL ANDERSON EARLY . . . . . Frontispiece
• GENERAL JUBAL ANDERSON EARLY (Profile) . . . . . 16
• GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE ON HIS HORSE, "TRAVELLER," 1867. (By permission of A. H. Plecker) . . . . . 74
• MAJOR ANDREW L. PITZER (On General Early's Staff) . . . . . 106
• MAJOR SAMUEL HALE (On General Early's Staff) . . . . . 144
• CAPTAIN SAMUEL H. EARLY (On General Early's Staff) . . . . . 186
• MAJOR JOHN WARWICK DANIEL (On General Early's Staff) . . . . . 188
• WALL (ON THE LEFT OF ROAD) AT MARYE'S HEIGHTS. CHANCELLORSVILLE AND FREDERICKSBURG BATTLEFIELDS . . . . . 206
• LEE'S HEADQUARTERS--THE WILDERNESS . . . . . 348
• CEDAR CREEK BATTLEFIELD . . . . . 438
• GENERAL EARLY, DISGUISED AS A FARMER, WHILE ESCAPING TO MEXICO, 1865 . . . . . 464
• MAJOR THOMAS P. TURNER, COMMANDANT OF LIBBY PRISON, AND GENERAL EARLY IN HAVANA, 1865 . . . . . 464
• JEFFERSON DAVIS, PRESIDENT C. S. A., AND MRS. DAVIS . . . . . 472

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

        ACCORDING to the record in the family Bible, I was born on the third day of November, 1816, in the County of Franklin, in the State of Virginia. My father, Joab Early,¹ who is still living, is a native of the same county, and while resident there, he enjoyed the esteem of his fellow-citizens and held several prominent public positions, but in the year 1847, he removed to the Kanawha Valley in Western Virginia. My mother's maiden name was Ruth Hairston, and she was likewise a native of the County of Franklin, her family being among the most respected citizens. She died in the year 1832, leaving ten children surviving her, I being the third child and second son. She was a most estimable lady, and her death was not only the source of the deepest grief to her immediate family, but caused universal regret in the whole circle of her acquaintances.

        Until I was sixteen I enjoyed the benefit of the best schools in my region of country and received the usual instruction in the dead languages and elementary mathematics. In the spring of 1833, while General Jackson was President, I received, through the agency of our member of Congress, the Hon. N. H. Claiborne, an appointment as cadet in the United States Military Academy at West Point.

        I repaired to the Academy at the end of May and was admitted about the first of June in the same year. I went through the usual course and graduated in the usual time, in June, 1837. There was nothing worthy of particular note in my career at West Point. I was never a very good student, and was sometimes quite remiss, but I managed to attain a respectable stand in all

        1 Died at the home of his son, Robert H. Early, in Lexington, Mo., 1870.

my studies. My highest stand in any branch was in military and civil engineering and that was sixth. In the general standing on graduation my position was eighteenth in a class of fifty.

        I was not a very exemplary soldier and went through the Academy without receiving any appointment as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the corps of cadets. I had very little taste for scrubbing brass, and cared very little for the advancement to be obtained by the exercise of that most useful art.

        Among those graduating in my class were General Braxton Bragg, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, Major Generals Arnold Elzey and Wm. H. T. Walker, and a few others of the Confederate Army; and Major Generals John Sedgwick, Joseph Hooker, and Wm. H. French and several Brigadier Generals of minor note in the Federal Army. Among my contemporaries at West Point were General Beauregard, Lieutenant General Ewell, Major General Edward Johnson and some others of distinction in the Confederate Army; Major Generals McDowell and Meade and several others in the Federal Army.

        The whole of my class received appointments in the United States Army shortly after graduation. By reason of the Indian War in Florida, there had been a number of resignations and deaths in the army and very few of the class had to go through the probation of brevet lieutenants. I was appointed Second Lieutenant in the Third Regiment of Artillery, and was assigned to Company "E," which afterward became celebrated as Sherman's battery. We did not enjoy the usual leave of absence, but in August, 1837, a number of my class, myself included, were ordered to Fortress Monroe to drill a considerable body of recruits which were in rendezvous at that place, preparatory to being sent to Florida, where the Seminole War was still in progress. From Fortress Monroe, with several other officers, I accompanied a body of recruits which sailed for Florida,

and we landed at Tampa Bay in October, 1837. From Tampa Bay I went to Gary's Ferry, on Black Creek, and there joined my company, which was comprised almost entirely of recruits recently joined. My Captain (Lyon) was an invalid from age and infirmity, and both the First Lieutenants were absent on special duty, so that being the senior Second Lieutenant, I was assigned to the command of the company. In that capacity I went through the campaign of 1837-8 under General Jessup, from the St. John's River south into the Everglades, and was present at a skirmish with the Indians on the Lockee Hatchee, near Jupiter Inlet, in January, 1838. This was my first "battle," and though I heard some bullets whistling among the trees, none came near me, and I did not see an Indian.

        The party of Seminoles with which we had the skirmish was subsequently pursued into the Everglades and induced to come in and camp near us at Fort Jupiter, under some stipulations between General Jessup and the chiefs, about which there was afterwards some misunderstanding which resulted in the whole party being surrounded and captured; and my company was employed with the rest of the troops in this work. This was my last "warlike exploit" for many years. After this we remained near the sea-coast, inactive for the most of the time, until late in the spring, when, as all active hostilities had ceased, we were marched across to Tampa Bay, from whence my company, with some other troops, was shipped to New Orleans, and then sent up the Mississippi, Ohio and Tennessee Rivers to Ross' Landing (now Chattanooga) to report to General Scott, who had charge of the removal of the Cherokees, with whom some difficulty was apprehended. My company was stationed near Ross' Landing, and it was soon discovered that there would be no trouble with the Indians.

        It had not been my purpose to remain permanently in the army, and, as there was to be no difficulty with the Cherokees, and the Seminole War was thought to be

at an end, I determined to resign for the purpose of going into civil life. I tendered my resignation and received a leave of absence until it could be acted on. Under this leave I started from Ross' Landing, on July 4, 1838, for my home, by the way of Nashville and Louisville. Upon arriving at Louisville, I found from the papers that the army had been increased, and that I was made a first lieutenant in my regiment. Had this news reached me before the tendering of my resignation, that resignation might have been withheld, but it was now too late to alter my plans.

        In the fall of 1838, I commenced the study of law in the office of N. M. Taliaferro, Esq., an eminent lawyer residing at the county seat of my native county, who some years afterward became a judge of the General Court of Virginia. I obtained license to practise law in the early part of the year 1840, and at once entered the profession. In the spring of the year 1841, I was elected by a small majority, as one of the delegates from the County of Franklin, to the Virginia Legislature, and served in the session of 1841 and 1842, being the youngest member of the body.

        In the following spring, I was badly beaten by my former preceptor in the law, who was a member of the Democratic Party, while I was a supporter of the principles of the Whig Party, of which Mr. Clay was the principal leader.

        My political opponent, though a personal friend, Mr. Taliaferro, held the position of prosecuting attorney in the circuit courts of several counties, and as these offices were rendered vacant by his election to the Legislature, I received the appointments for the Counties of Franklin and Floyd, having previously been appointed prosecuting attorney in the county court of Franklin. These appointments I held until the reorganization of the State government under the new constitution of 1851.

        In the meantime, I continued the practice of law in

my own and the adjoining counties, with very fair success until the breaking out of the war between the United States and Mexico, consequent upon the annexation of Texas. Though I had voted, in the presidential election of 1844, for Mr. Clay, who opposed the annexation of Texas, yet, when war ensued, I felt it to be my duty to sustain the government in that war and to enter the military service if a fitting opportunity offered. When the regiment of volunteers from Virginia was called for by the President, I received from the Governor and Council of State the appointment as Major in that regiment, and was mustered into service on the 7th of January, 1847. Colonel John F. Hamtramck, of the County of Jefferson, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Randolph, of the County of Warren, were the other field officers. The regiment was ordered to rendezvous at Fortress Monroe and the superintendence of the drilling there and the embarkation for Mexico were entrusted to me. Two extra companies were allowed to the regiment, and, on account of some delay in the organization of them, I did not sail from Fortress Monroe with the last detachment of these companies until March 1st, arriving at Brazos Santiago on the 17th, to learn, for the first time, the news of General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista. We proceeded up the Rio Grande at once and the whole regiment was assembled at Camargo, under the command of the Colonel, the day after my arrival there.

        About the first of April the regiment moved from Camargo for Monterey, by the way of a little town called China, as an escort for a provision train. One-half of the regiment was left temporarily at China under Lieutenant Colonel Randolph, and the other half moved to Monterey under my command--Colonel Hamtramck having become too sick to remain on duty. We were encamped at the Walnut Spring near General Taylor's headquarters, and there I met, for the first time, Colonel Jefferson Davis, of the First Mississippi Regiment, who

has become illustrious as the President of the Confederrate States. I was struck with his soldierly bearing, and he did me the honor of complimenting the order and regularity of my camp. After being here a short time, the battalion under my command relieved an Ohio regiment, which had been garrisoning Monterey, but was going home, and for two months I acted as miltary governor of the city. It was generally conceded by officers of the army and Mexicans that better order reigned in the city during the time I commanded there, than had ever before existed, and the good conduct of my men won for them universal praise. Some time in the month of June, the whole regiment, under the command of the Colonel, moved to Buena Vista, a few miles from Saltillo, and joined the forces of General Wool, at that point. It remained near that locality for the balance of the war, for the most part inactive, as all fighting on that line, except an occasional affair with guerillas, ceased after the battle of Buena Vista. I had, therefore, no opportunity of seeing active service. For a short time I was attached, as acting Inspector General, to the staff of Brigadier General Caleb Cushing, who commanded the brigade to which my regiment was attached, until he was ordered to the other line. During this period I contracted, in the early part of the fall of 1847, a cold and fever, which eventuated in chronic rheumatism, with which I have ever since been afflicted. My condition became such that I received a leave of absence in the month of November, and returned to the States, on a visit to my friends in the Kanawha Valley.

        After improving a little I started back to Mexico, and on my way I had the luck to meet with that fate, which is very common to Americans who travel much, that is, I was on a steamboat which was blown up, the 8th of January, 1848, on the Ohio River, a few miles below the mouth of the Kanawha. I had a very narrow escape, as half of my state-room was carried off and some pieces of the boiler protruded through the floor,

cutting and burning my feet when I jumped out of the berth. The explosion took place about 1.00 o'clock at night, when it was very dark and extremely cold, and before the passengers, who were not killed, could get ashore and obtain shelter, they were very much exposed; but, after getting over the first effects of the slight injury received, I experienced a decided improvement in my rheumatism, though I would not advise blowing up in a western steamboat as an infallible remedy.

        I rejoined the regiment about the first of February, and commanded the greater part of it during the rest of the war-- three or four companies having been detached to the town of Parras--as Colonel Hamtramck had returned to Virginia on recruiting service. At the close of the war, I carried the regiment to the mouth of the Rio Grande, and had it embarked at Brazos for Fortress Monroe, going on one of the vessels myself. I was mustered out of the service with the rest of the regiment in the first part of April, 1848, being the only field officer on duty with it. It had no opportunity of reaping laurels during the war, but I can say that it had not sullied the flag of the State, which constituted the regimental colors, by disorderly conduct or acts of depredation on private property, and non-combatants. It had been my fortune to have the disagreeable duty of breaking in the regiment at the beginning and I had commanded it for a much longer time than any other field officer. Being rather a strict disciplinarian and, in consequence thereof, naturally regarded by inexperienced troops as harsh in my treatment of them, I was by no means popular with the mass of the regiment prior to the commencement of the return march from Saltillo, but I can safely say that, on the day they were mustered out of service at Fortress Monroe, I was the most popular officer in the regiment, and I had the satisfaction of receiving from a great many of the men the assurance that they had misjudged me in the beginning and were now convinced that I had been their best friend all the time.

        I returned to the practice of law and continued it until the commencement of the late struggle between the Southern and Northern States.

        After my return from Mexico, I was the only one of my name left in my county, as all the rest of my father's family had removed to the Kanawha Valley.

        In the year 1850 I was a candidate for the convention called to revise the constitution of Virginia, but I was defeated by an overwhelming majority, receiving only about two hundred votes in a district polling several thousand. I opposed firmly and unflinchingly all the radical changes, miscalled reforms, which were proposed, and as the people seemed to run wild in favor of them, not only was I beaten, but so were all other candidates professing similar sentiments.

        In the year 1853, I was again a candidate for the Legislature, but was badly beaten, as the county had become strongly wedded to the opposite party.

        My practice had become very considerable, and at the close of my professional career, I believe I was regarded as among the best lawyers in my section of the State. My most important contest at the bar and my greatest triumph was in a contested will case in Lowndes County, Mississippi, in the autumn of 1852, in which a very large amount of property was involved. I went to Mississippi to attend to this case specially, and I contended single-handed and successfully with three of the ablest lawyers of that State.

        I had in a very limited degree the capacity for popular speaking as generally practised in the States, and it was regarded that my forte at the law was not before a jury as an advocate, but on questions of law before the court, especially in cases of appeal.

        I was never blessed with popular or captivating manners, and the consequence was that I was often misjudged and thought to be haughty and disdainful in my temperament. When earnestly engaged about my business, in passing through a crowd I would frequently

pass an acquaintance without noticing him, because of the preoccupation of my mind, and this often gave offence. From all of which it resulted that I was never what is called a popular man. I can say, however, that those who knew me best, liked me best, and the prejudices against me were gradually wearing off as the people became better acquainted with me.

        My labors in my profession were rather spasmodic, and by procrastination, I would often have to compass a vast deal of work in a very short time, on the eve of or during the session of a court. I was careless in securing and collecting my fees, very often relying on memory as the only evidence of them, and the consequence was that my practice was never very lucrative.

        I have now given a sketch of my life up to the time of the beginning of the great struggle in the South for independence, and like most men, I had done many things which I ought not to have done, and left undone many things which I ought to have done, but I had done some good, and had not committed any very serious wrong, considering it in a mere worldly point of view. I would, however, by no means, commend my life as a pattern for the young, unless it be in the sincerity and integrity of purpose by which I claim to have ever been actuated.

        As there have been some descriptions of my person attempted, in which I have failed to recognize the slightest resemblance, I will state that, up to the time of my service in Mexico, I was quite erect and trim in stature. My average weight for many years was from 154 to 164 pounds--during the war it was about 170 pounds. The stoop with which I am now afflicted is the result of rheumatism contracted in Mexico, and when casual observers have seen me bent up, it has been very often the result of actual pain to which I have been very much subjected for the last nineteen years. One writer, who was actuated by the most friendly motives and ought to have known better, has described me as having a rough, curly head and shaggy eye-brows, whereas the

fact is that my hair always has been, and what is left still is, as straight as an Indian's, and my eyebrows are very moderate and smooth. Some writer, who certainly never put himself in a position to see me during the war, has described my dress as being habitually like that of a stage-driver. All tailors who have ever worked for me up to the present time will testify to the fact that I have always been one of the most particular men about the cut and fit of my clothes among their customers.

        During the war I was almost constantly in the camp or field, except when wounded, and I had no time to get new clothes if I had been able. My tastes would always have induced me to dress neatly and genteelly if I could have indulged them.

        So much for my life previous to the war. Henceforth it will be developed in my narrative.

THE WAR BETWEEN
THE STATES

CHAPTER I.

THE INVASION OF VIRGINIA.

        AFTER the fall of Fort Sumter, the Government at Washington commenced concentrating a large force at that city under the superintendence of Lieutenant General Scott of the United States Army, and it was very apparent that Virginia would be invaded.

        When the ordinance of secession had been passed by the Virginia convention, and the authority had been given to the Governor to call out troops for the defence of the State, Governor Letcher called for volunteers. The Navy Yard at Gosport, near Norfolk, and the arsenal and armory at Harper's Ferry were taken possession of by militia forces hastily assembled, but not until the United States officers had partially destroyed both.

        As soon as General Lee reached Richmond, which was very shortly after his appointment to the command of the Virginia forces, he entered actively on the work of reorganization.

        The day the convention took recess to await the result of the popular vote, I tendered my services to the Governor, and received from him the commission of Colonel in the volunteer service of the State. On reporting to General Lee, I was ordered to repair to Lynchburg, and take command of all the Virginia volunteers who should be mustered into service at that place, and organize them into regiments, as they were received by companies. I

took command at Lynchburg on the 16th of May, and proceeded to organize the volunteers, which were being mustered into the Virginia service at that point, by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Langhorne.

        While there, I organized and armed three regiments, to-wit: The 28th Virginia Regiment (Colonel R. T. Preston) and the 24th Virginia Regiment (my own), both as infantry, and the 30th Virginia Regiment (Colonel R. C. W. Radford), as cavalry. This latter regiment was subsequently designated the 2d Virginia Cavalry.

        On the 24th of May, the day after the election in Virginia ratifying the ordinance of secession, the Federal troops, under the command of Brigadier General McDowell, crossed over from Washington into Virginia, the bands playing and the soldiers singing "John Brown's soul goes marching on"; and John Brown's mission was, subsequently, but too well carried out in Virginia and all the Southern States under the inspiration of that anthem.

        The Confederate Government had sent some troops to Virginia, and a portion of them along with some of the Virginia troops were concentrated at and near Manassas Junction on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, about thirty miles from Washington. Brigadier General Beauregard was sent to take command of the troops at Manassas, and other troops had been sent to Harper's Ferry, to the command of which General Joseph E. Johnston was assigned. As soon as it was ascertained that the Federal troops had crossed over and occupied Alexandria, I commenced sending the regiments organized by me, as they were ready, to Manassas. The infantry was armed with smooth-bore percussion muskets, but there were no belts or bayonet scabbards or cartridge boxes for them, and they had to be supplied with cloth pouches for their ammunition. The cavalry regiment, consisting of nine companies, was armed principally with double-barrelled shot guns, and sabres of an old pattern which had been collected in the country

from old volunteer companies. The State had very few arms of any kind, and those furnished the infantry had been borrowed from North Carolina. There were no cavalry arms of any value.

        I also armed and sent off a number of companies to be attached to regiments already in the field.

        Having attended the convention when it re-assembled in June, as soon as the ordinance of secession was signed, I received orders to turn over the command at Lynchburg to Colonel Langhorne and join my regiment in the field. The Confederate Government had now reached Richmond, and that city became the capital of the Confederacy.

        I reached Manassas and reported to General Beauregard on the 19th of June. I found my regiment (the 24th Virginia) under Lieutenant Colonel Peter Hairston, located about four miles east of the Junction, for the purpose of watching the fords of Bull Run immediately above its junction with the Occoquon, and those on the latter stream above the same point. At this time no brigades had been formed, but in a few days the regiments under General Beauregard's command were organized into six brigades, as follows: a brigade of South Carolina troops under Brigadier General Bonham, a brigade of Alabama and Louisiana troops under Brigadier General Ewell, a brigade of South Carolina and Mississippi troops under Brigadier General D. R. Jones, a brigade of Virginia troops under Colonel George H. Jerrett, who was subsequently replaced by Brigadier General Longstreet, a brigade of Virginia troops under Colonel Philip St. George Cocke, and a brigade composed of the 7th and 24th Virginia, and the 4th South Carolina Regiments under my command, but the 4th South Carolina had been sent to Leesburg in Loudoun and did not join, it being subsequently replaced by the 7th Louisiana Regiment.

        After this organization the troops were located as follows: the 4th South Carolina Regiment and Wheat's Louisiana Battalion were at Leesburg under Colonel

Evans; Bonham's brigade was at Fairfax Court-House, Cocke's at Centreville, and Ewell's brigade at and near Fairfax Station, all in front of Bull Run; while D. R. Jones' brigade was encamped on the south of the Run near the railroad, at a place called Camp Walker, Longstreet's at the Junction, and the 7th and 24th Virginia Regiments of my brigade, camped separately, northeast and east of the Junction, from three to four miles distant. The cavalry, consisting of Colonel R. C. W. Radford's regiment of nine companies and several unattached companies, was employed mainly on scouting and picketing duty with Evans, Bonham, and Ewell, one company being on my right to watch the lower fords of the Occoquon, and the landings on the Potomac below the mouth of the Occoquon, where it was subsequently joined by another.

        It was my duty to watch the right of our line, and the two companies of cavalry on that flank, Eugene Davis' and W. W. Thornton's companies of Virginia cavalry, were placed under my command, and Captain John Scott was assigned to the immediate command of them.

        A few days after my arrival, under orders from General Beauregard, I made a reconnaissance to the village of Occoquon, near the mouth of the stream of that name, with the 24th Regiment, and examined the landings of the Potomac as far down as Freestone Point.

        Early in July General Beauregard summoned all his brigade commanders to a conference at Fairfax Station, and there disclosed to them, in confidence, his plan of operations in the event of an advance by the enemy, for which he had learned active preparations were being made.

        He anticipated that the enemy's main force would move on the road through Fairfax Court-House and Centreville toward Manassas, and his plan was, for all the troops on the north of Bull Run to fall back to the south bank of that stream. Bonham, in the centre on the

direct road to Manassas, to Mitchell's Ford; Cocke, on the left, to Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Pike; and Ewell, on the right, to Union Mills; and Evans was to retire from Loudoun and unite with Cocke; while Longstreet was to move up to Blackburn's Ford, about a mile below Mitchell's Ford; D. R. Jones to McLean's Ford, about a mile or two further down; and I was to move up to Union Mills in support of Ewell. His anticipation further was, that the enemy would follow up Bonham and attack him at Mitchell's Ford; in which event the rest of the troops were to cross Bull Run and attack the enemy on both flanks-- Longstreet crossing at Blackburn's Ford, and Jones at McLean's Ford, and attacking the enemy's left flank; Ewell at the same time moving up towards Centreville, on the road from Union Mills, and attacking the enemy on his left and rear; while I was to follow Ewell in support and look out for his right flank and rear, and Cocke, supported by Evans, was to come down on the enemy's right flank.

        The routes by which all these movements were to be made were pointed out and designated on maps previously prepared, and each brigade commander was instructed to make himself familiar with the ground over which he would have to operate. General Beauregard at the same time informed us that the returns showed an effective force under his command of very little more than 15,000 men.

        A few days after this, the 7th Louisiana Regiment, under Colonel Harry T. Hays, arrived, and was assigned to my brigade in lieu of the 4th South Carolina. The 7th Virginia was commanded by Colonel James L. Kemper, and the 24th by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Hairston.

        On the 12th of July I made another reconnaissance to Occoquon, with the 7th Virginia Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Williams, and a section of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans, under Lieutenant Squires, and returned to camp on the 14th.

CHAPTER II.

FIGHT AT BLACKBURN'S FORD.

        ON the night of the 16th information was sent from General Beauregard's headquarters that the enemy was advancing, and orders were given for moving early next morning in accordance with previous instructions.

        At daylight on the morning of the 17th, I commenced the movement of my brigade to its assigned position in rear of the ford at Union Mills, and on my arrival there I found General Ewell's force falling back to the same point. Under previous instructions four companies of the 24th Virginia Regiment had been left under Major Hambrick to guard the camp of the regiment and picket on the right of our line, and the two companies of cavalry under Captain Scott had also been left to watch our right. Three pieces of artillery, under Lieutenant Squires of the Washington Artillery, were attached to my brigade and joined it at the position near Union Mills. I remained there inactive during the rest of the day after my arrival, but on the morning of the 18th I was ordered further to the left, to Camp Walker on the railroad. On falling back, Ewell had burned the bridges on the railroad between Fairfax Station and Union Mills, and on this morning the bridge over Bull Run, at the latter place, was likewise burned.

        After remaining for some time at Camp Walker, I was ordered by General Beauregard to move my brigade to the gate in rear of McLean's farm on the road from Blackburn's Ford to the Junction, keeping it in the woods out of view. The General had now established his headquarters at McLean's house between my position and those of Generals Longstreet and Jones. From this last position taken by me, the open fields on the heights beyond Blackburn's Ford were visible, being between two and three miles distant. A little before

12 M. we discovered clouds of dust from the direction of Centreville and bodies of troops moving into the fields beyond the ford, and while we were speculating as to whether this was the enemy, we saw the smoke arise from his first gun, the fire from which was directed towards Bonham's position at Mitchell's Ford.

        After the firing had continued for a short time, I received an order from General Beauregard to move my command to the rear of a pine thicket between McLean's house and Blackburn's Ford, so as to be in supporting distance of Bonham, Longstreet or Jones. In order to do this I had to run through open fields in view of the enemy and this attracted his fire in our direction, but I reached the cover of the pines without any casualty, and I was here joined by Lieutenant Richardson, of the Washington Artillery, with two more pieces. The enemy's fire was continued for some time, and one or two shells passed through an out-house near General Beauregard's headquarters.

        In the afternoon the General rode towards Mitchell's Ford, and after he had been gone a short time a very brisk musketry fire opened at Blackburn's Ford. The enemy had attacked Longstreet at that point, and after the firing had continued for some time, I received a message from General Longstreet, through one of his aides, requesting reinforcements. I immediately put my whole command in motion towards the ford, but before arriving there, I received an order from General Beauregard to carry two regiments and two pieces of artillery to Longstreet's assistance. My command was then moving with the 7th Louisiana in front, followed immediately by the 7th Virginia, and I ordered the six companies of the 24th Virginia, which were bringing up the rear under Lieutenant Colonel Hairston, to halt, and directed Lieutenant Squires to move two pieces of artillery to the front and halt the rest. I found that General Longstreet's command had been hotly engaged and had just repulsed an attempt to force a crossing of the stream.

        The position occupied by our troops was a narrow strip of woods on low ground along the bank of the stream, with an open field in rear, while the enemy occupied higher and better ground on the opposite bank. Immediately on its arrival, the 7th Louisiana, Colonel Hays, was put in position in the strip of woods on the left of the ford, relieving the 17th Virginia Regiment and some companies of the 11th Virginia which had been actively engaged; and the 7th Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Williams commanding, was formed on the right of the ford, in rear of the strip of woods, and advanced to the bank of the stream, relieving the 1st Virginia Regiment.

        These movements were made under fire from the enemy on the opposite bluffs, and while the 7th Virginia was being formed in line, two volleys were fired at it by the enemy, throwing it into some confusion and causing it to begin firing without orders, while there were some of our troops in front of it. It, however, soon recovered from the momentary confusion and advanced with firmness to the front. Lieutenant Squires moved his pieces into the open field in rear of our line and to the right of the road leading to the ford, and opened fire without any guide except the sound of the enemy's musketry, as he was concealed from our view by the woods on the bluffs occupied by him. The six companies of the 24th Virginia Regiment and the remaining pieces of the Washington Artillery, including two pieces under Lieutenant Garnett which were attached to Longstreet's brigade, were sent for, and the companies of the 24th were put in position along the banks of the stream on Hays' left, while the rest of the artillery was brought into action on the same ground with Squires.

        Squires had soon silenced the enemy's infantry, which retired precipitately before his fire, but the artillery from the heights beyond the stream had opened on ours, which now responded to that of the enemy. An artillery duel was thus commenced which lasted for a considerable

time. The opposing batteries were concealed from each other's view by the intervening woods, and they were therefore compelled to regulate their fire by the sound of the guns. The enemy had the decided advantage of position, as he was on high ground, while our guns were located in a flat nearly on a level with the stream, thus giving them the benefit of a plunging fire. This duel finally ceased and the enemy retired, baffled in his effort to force our position.

        In his reports of this affair, the enemy represented our troops as being protected by rifle pits with masked batteries; whereas the fact was that we had nothing in the shape of rifle pits or breastworks, and our guns were in the open field, though concealed from the enemy's view by the intervening woods. These guns had been brought on the field along with my brigade, but were so brought as to elude observation. Before their arrival not an artillery shot had been fired by us from this quarter, and there had been only a few shots earlier in the day from the guns, with Bonham, at Mitchell's Ford above.

        As soon as it was ascertained that the enemy had retired, General Longstreet moved to the rear with his two regiments that had borne the brunt of the fight, and I was left to occupy his former position with my brigade and the 11th Virginia Regiment of his brigade. A few were wounded in my command, but I believe none killed. General Longstreet's loss was not heavy, but an examination of the ground on the opposite bank of the Run, next morning, showed that the enemy had suffered severely, quite a number of dead bodies being found abandoned. At one point, where it was apparent a regiment had been in line, over one hundred muskets and hats were found in a row, showing evidently that they had been abandoned in a panic, produced probably by the fire from Squires' guns. Many knapsacks, canteens, blankets and India rubber cloths were found scattered on the ground, proving that the enemy had retired in confusion.

        This fight was preliminary to the approaching battle, and its result had a very inspiring effect upon our troops generally. It was subsequently ascertained that the force engaged, on the part of the enemy, was Tyler's division of McDowell's army, which had been sent to the front for the purpose of making a demonstration, while McDowell himself was engaged in reconnoitring on our right, for the purpose of ascertaining whether that flank could be turned by the way of Wolf Run Shoals, just below the junction of Bull Run and the Occoquon. Tyler exceeded his instructions, it appears, and endeavored to gain some glory for himself by forcing our position at Blackburn's Ford, but he paid dearly for the experiment.

        During the 19th I continued to occupy the position at Blackburn's Ford, and occasionally small bodies of the enemy could be seen by scouts sent to the opposite side of Bull Run, on the heights where he had taken his position on the 18th, previous to the advance against Longstreet. During the day my troops, with a few rough tools and their bayonets, succeeded in making very tolerable rifle pits on the banks of the stream, and they were not molested by the enemy.

        About dark the brigade commanders were summoned to a council at McLean's house by General Beauregard, and he proceeded to inform us of his plans for the next day. He told us that, at his instance, the Government at Richmond had ordered General Johnston to move from the Shenandoah Valley with his whole force to co-operate with ours; and that the General was then on his march directly across the Blue Ridge, and would probably attack the enemy's right flank very early the next morning, while we were to fall upon his left flank. Before he finished the statement of his plans, Brigadier General Thomas J. Jackson, subsequently famous as "Stonewall Jackson," entered the room and reported to General Beauregard that he had just arrived from General Johnston's army, by the way of the Manassas Gap Railroad, with his brigade, about 2500 strong.

        This information took General Beauregard by surprise, and he inquired of General Jackson if General Johnston would not march the rest of his command on the direct road so as to get on the enemy's right flank. General Jackson replied that he thought not, that he thought the purpose was to transport the whole force on the railroad from Piedmont station on the east of the Blue Ridge. After General Jackson had given all the information he possessed, and received instructions as to the disposition of his brigade, he retired, and General Beauregard proceeded to develop his plans fully. The information received from General Jackson was most unexpected, but General Beauregard stated that he thought Jackson was mistaken, and that he was satisfied General Johnston was marching with the rest of his troops and would attack the enemy's right flank as before stated.

        Upon this hypothesis, he then decided that, when General Johnston's attack began and he had become fully engaged, of which we were to judge from the character of the musketry fire, we would cross Bull Run from our several positions and move to the attack of the enemy's left flank and rear. He stated that he had no doubt Johnston's attack would be a surprise to the enemy, that the latter would not know what to think of it, and when he turned to meet that attack and found himself assailed on the other side, he would be still more surprised and would not know what to do, that the effect would be a complete rout, a perfect Waterloo, and that we would pursue, cross the Potomac and arouse Maryland.

        General Johnston's attack, according to General Beauregard's calculations, was to begin next morning about or very shortly after daybreak. Having received our instructions fully, we retired, and I returned to my position at Blackburn's Ford, where I assembled my colonels, and was proceeding to explain to them the plans for the next day and instruct them to have everything

in readiness, when we were startled by a fierce volley of musketry on our immediate right. This of course put an end to the conference and every one rushed to his position in anticipation of a night attack.

        The 11th Virginia Regiment, Colonel Samuel Garland, was moved promptly to the rear of the point where the firing occurred, which was repeated, and after a good deal of trouble we succeeded in ascertaining that it proceeded from two of my companies, which had been posted in the woods on the bank of the stream to the right of my position, in order to cover some points where a crossing might be effected. The officers of one of the companies declared that a body of the enemy could be seen, stealthily moving down the opposite bank, and that the firing had been at that body and had been returned. The firing by this time had ceased and no movement of the enemy could be heard. This affair, however, kept us on the alert all night, but I became satisfied that it resulted from some mistake, caused perhaps by the movement of some straggling persons of our own command, in the darkness, in the woods. Such alarms were not uncommon, subsequently, when two opposing forces were lying on their arms at night in front of each other. A very slight circumstance would sometimes produce a volley at night from the one or the other side, as it might be.

        At light on the morning of the 20th, instead of our being required to advance to the attack of the enemy according to the programme of the night before, General Longstreet came in a great hurry to relieve me, and with orders for my brigade to move as rapidly as possible to a point on our right on the road leading from Yates' Ford, below Union Mills, to Manassas Junction. As soon as relieved, I moved in the direction indicated, and the head of my column was just emerging into Camp Walker, from the woods in rear of McLean's farm,--where I had been on the 18th, at the time the enemy opened his artillery fire beyond Blackburn's Ford,--when

I was met by a courier with orders to halt where I was, as the alarm, upon which the order to me had been founded, had proved false.

        As this false alarm was rather singular in its nature, but of such a character that any general might have been deceived by it, I will state how it occurred. A captain of General Ewell's brigade, who had been posted with his company on picket at Yates' Ford not far below Union Mills, retired from his post and reported in the most positive manner that the enemy had appeared in heavy force on the opposite bank of Bull Run and commenced building two bridges. He further stated that he had seen General McDowell on a white horse superintending the construction of the bridges.

        As there was no reason to doubt his veracity or courage, General Ewell, of course, sent at once the information to General Beauregard and hence the order for my movement. After the message was dispatched, something suggested a doubt as to the correctness of the report, and the officer making it was sent in charge of another to ascertain the facts. On arriving in sight of the ford he pointed triumphantly to the opposite bank and exclaimed, "There they are. Don't you see the two bridges, don't you see McDowell on his white horse?" when the fact was there was nothing visible but the ford and the unoccupied banks of the stream, which were so obstructed as to render a crossing impracticable until the obstructions were removed.

        It was then apparent that it was a clear case of hallucination, produced by a derangement of the nervous system, consequent on a loss of sleep and great anxiety of mind resulting from the nature of the duties in which he had been engaged. Neither his sincerity nor his courage was questioned, and this affair shows how the most careful commander may be misled when he has to rely on information furnished by others. It requires very great experience and a very discriminating judgment to enable a commanding general to sift the truth

out of the great mass of exaggerated reports made to him, and hence he has often to rely on his own personal inspection.

        I have known important movements to be suspended on the battlefield, on account of reports from very gallant officers that the enemy was on one flank or the other in heavy force, when a calm inspection proved the reported bodies of the enemy to be nothing more than stone or rail fences. Some officers, while exposing their lives with great daring, sometimes fail to preserve that clearness of judgment and calmness of the nerves which is so necessary to enable one to see things as they really are during an engagement; and hence it is that there are so many conflicting reports of the same matters. The capacity of preserving one's presence of mind in action is among the highest attributes of an efficient commander or subordinate officer, and it must be confessed that the excitement of battle, especially when the shells are bursting and the bullets whistling thick around, is wonderfully trying to the nerves of the bravest.

        The false alarm out of which the above reflections have sprung, operated as a very great relief to my command, as it enabled my men, who had had very little to eat, and scarcely any rest or sleep for two nights and days, to cook provisions and get a good rest and sleep in the woods where they were halted, and thereby to be prepared to go through the extraordinary fatigues of the next day.

        On this day, the 20th, General Johnston arrived at Manassas by the railroad, and an order was issued for his assuming command, as the ranking officer, of all the troops of the united armies. It was now ascertained beyond doubt that all of his troops were coming by the railroad.

GENERAL JUBAL ANDERSON EARLY (Profile)

CHAPTER III.

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS.

        AT this time the largest organizations in our army were brigades, and each brigade commander received his orders directly from headquarters. Since the conference at Fairfax Station, when General Beauregard stated that his effective strength did not exceed 15,000 men, one regiment, the 1st South Carolina, had been sent off by reason of expiration of term of service, and one regiment, the 7th Louisiana, had joined my brigade. Besides this, General Beauregard's troops had been augmented, since the advance of the enemy, by the arrival of six companies of the 8th Louisiana, the 5th North Carolina State Troops, the 11th North Carolina Volunteers, the 13th Mississippi, three companies of the 49th Virginia and Hampton's South Carolina Legion; the latter containing six companies of infantry. His whole effective force, however, did not probably much exceed the estimate made at the time of the conference, as the measles and typhoid fever, which were prevailing, had reduced very much the strength of the regiments, especially among the Virginia troops which were entirely new. To reinforce him, Holmes' brigade of two regiments had arrived from Aquia Creek, and Johnston's troops were arriving by the railroad, after much delay by reason of accidents or mismanagement on the part of the railroad officials.

        On the 20th we were not molested by the enemy, and on the morning of the 21st the position of Beauregard's troops was pretty much the same as it had been on the 18th, to wit: Ewell at Union Mills; D. R. Jones at McLean's Ford; Longstreet, reinforced by the 5th North Carolina, at Blackburn's Ford; Bonham, reinforced by six companies of the 8th Louisiana and the 11th North Carolina Volunteers, at Mitchell's Ford;

Cocke, reinforced by some companies of the 8th Virginia Regiment and three companies of the 49th Virginia Regiment, at some fords below Stone Bridge; and Evans at Stone Bridge; while my brigade was in reserve in the woods in rear of McLean's farm. No artillery was attached to my brigade on this day.

        The arrival of General Johnston in person and the transportation of his troops on the railroad had, of course, entirely changed the plans of operations as communicated to us on the night of the 19th, but the new plans, which were rendered necessary by the altered condition of things, were not communicated to us, and I had, therefore, to await orders.

        Very early on the morning of the 21st the enemy opened fire with artillery from the heights on the north of Bull Run near Blackburn's Ford, and I was ordered to occupy a position in rear of the pine woods north of McLean's house, so as to be ready to support Longstreet or Jones as might be necessary. After being in position some time, I received a request from General Longstreet for one of my regiments to be sent to him, and I sent him the six companies of the 24th Virginia under Lieutenant Colonel Hairston, and two companies of the 7th Louisiana under Major Penn. Not long afterwards I received a request for another regiment, and I carried the remaining eight companies of the 7th Louisiana to Blackburn's Ford, leaving Colonel Kemper with his regiment behind.

        On arriving at the ford, I found that the whole of Longstreet's brigade had been crossed over Bull Run, and were lying under cover at the foot of the hills on its northern bank, awaiting a signal to advance against the enemy, who was in considerable force near the point occupied by his artillery at the fight on the 18th. The companies of the 24th were being crossed over to join Longstreet's brigade, and the General ordered the 7th Louisiana to be formed in line in the strip of woods on the southern bank of the stream, covering the ford.

The enemy was keeping up a continuous artillery fire from two batteries, one in front of the ford and the other some distance to the right, which rendered the vicinity of the ford quite uncomfortable, but the troops across the Run were in a great measure under cover.

        After Hays' regiment had been put in position, General Longstreet went across the stream to reconnoitre, and in a short time returned and directed me to take Hays' and Kemper's regiments, cross at McLean's Ford, and move around and capture the battery to his right, which he said could be easily taken. I was informed by him that Jones had crossed the Run and was on the hills beyond McLean's Ford, likewise awaiting the signal to advance, and I was directed to move between him and the Run against the enemy's battery. Hays' regiment was moved back to where Kemper's was, and was exposed to the fire from the enemy's batteries which was attracted by the dust arising from its march over the direct road through the pines. A shell exploded in the ranks, killing and wounding four or five men. The two regiments were moved to McLean's Ford, and while they were crossing over and forming, I rode forward to an eminence, where I observed a lookout in a tree, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact position of the battery and the route over which I would have to advance against it. While I was engaged in obtaining this information, Colonel Chisolm, a volunteer aide of General Beauregard, rode up and informed me that General Beauregard's orders were that the whole force should cross Bull Run to the south side.

        I think this was about 11.00 A.M. I informed him of the order I had received from General Longstreet, and he stated that Longstreet was crossing, and that the order embraced me as well as the rest. I felt this as a reprieve from almost certain destruction, for I had discovered that the route by which I would be compelled to advance against the battery was along an open valley for some distance and then up a naked hill to the plain

on which the battery was located, the greater part of the route being raked by the enemy's guns. The lookout had also informed me that a considerable body of infantry was in the woods near the battery. It turned out afterwards that this battery, which I was ordered to take, was supported by a brigade of infantry, posted behind a formidable abattis of felled timber. An attempt to carry out my orders would very probably have entailed the annihilation or utter rout of my two regiments; and in fact much later in the day, Jones' brigade on moving against this battery sustained a damaging repulse.

        After recrossing to the south side, I sent Kemper's regiment to its former position, and moved with Hays' regiment up the Run to Longstreet's position, as I thought he probably desired its return to him. On reaching Blackburn's Ford, I found General Longstreet cautiously withdrawing a part of his troops across the Run, and he informed me that he did not now require Hays' regiment, but would retain the companies of the 24th. Hays was then ordered to move down the Run to McLean's Ford and return in that way to the position at which Kemper was, so as to avoid the artillery fire while passing over the direct route.

        I rode directly to Kemper's position, and after being there a short time I discovered clouds of dust arising about McLean's Ford, which I supposed to be produced by Jones' brigade returning to its original position. Fearing that Hays' regiment might be mistaken for the enemy and fired upon, I rode rapidly to Jones' position and found some of his men forming in the rifle pits in rear of the ford, while the General was looking with his field glasses at Hays' regiment, which was advancing from the direction of the enemy's position higher up the Run. I informed him what command it was and requested that his men might be cautioned against firing, for which they were preparing.

        As soon as this was done, General Jones asked me

if I had received an order from General Beauregard, directing that I should go to him with my brigade. Upon my stating that I had received no such order, he said that he had received a note from General Beauregard in which he was directed to send me to the General. The note, which was in the hands of one of Jones' staff officers, was sent for and shown to me. It was in pencil, and after giving brief directions for the withdrawal across the Run and stating the general purpose to go to the left where the heavy firing was, there was a direction at the foot in very nearly these words,--"Send Early to me." This information was given to me some time between 12 M. and 1 P.M.^*

        The note did not state to what point I was to go, but I knew that General Beauregard's position had been near Mitchell's Ford and that he was to be found somewhere to our left. I sent word for Hays to move up as rapidly as possible, directed Kemper to get ready to move, sent a message to General Longstreet requesting the return of the companies of the 24th, and directed my Acting Adjutant General, Captain Gardner, to ride to Mitchell's Ford and ascertain where General Beauregard was, as well as the route I was to pursue.

        The messenger sent to General Longstreet returned and informed me that the General said there was a regiment in the pines to my left which had been ordered to report to him, and that I could take that regiment instead of the companies of my own, to save time and prevent the exposure of both to the fire of the enemy's artillery in passing to and from Blackburn's Ford. In this arrangement I readily concurred, and soon found, to my left in the pines, the 13th Mississippi Regiment under Colonel Barksdale, which had very recently arrived. The Colonel consented to accompany me, and as soon as the

        * In his report General Beauregard states that I did not receive this order until 2.00 P.M. This is a mistake. I could not possibly have reached the battlefield at the time I did, if the reception of the order had been delayed until 2.00 P.M.

command could be got ready, it was started on the road towards Mitchell's Ford.

        This movement commenced about or very shortly after 1 o'clock P.M. On the way I met Captain Gardner returning with the information that General Beauregard's headquarters would be at the Lewis house, in the direction of the firing on our extreme left, and that I was to go there. On reaching General Bonham's position in rear of Mitchell's Ford, he informed me that I would have to move through the fields towards the left to find the Lewis house, and he pointed out the direction; but he did not know the exact location of the house. I moved in the direction pointed out, and continued to pass on to our left, through the fields, towards the firing in the distance, endeavoring, as I advanced, to find out where the Lewis house was.

        While moving on, Captain Smith, an assistant in the adjutant general's office at General Beauregard's headquarters, passed us in a great hurry, also looking for General Beauregard and the Lewis house. He told me that information had been received at the Junction that 6,000 of the enemy had passed the Manassas Gap railroad, and it was this information (which subsequently proved to be false) that he was going to communicate to the General.

        The day was excessively hot and dry. Hays' regiment was a good deal exhausted by the marching and the counter-marching about Blackburn's and McLean's Fords. Barksdale's regiment, an entirely new one, had just arrived from the south over the railroad, and was unused to marching. Our progress was therefore not as rapid as I could have wished, but we passed on with all possible speed in the direction of the firing, which was our only guide. Towards 3 o'clock P.M. we reached the field of battle and began to perceive the scenes usual in rear of an army engaged in action. On entering the road leading from the Lewis house towards Manassas, we met quite a stream of stragglers going

to the rear, and were informed by them that everything was over with us. I was riding by the side of Colonel Kemper at the head of the column, and we had the satisfaction of being assured that if we went on the field on horseback, we certainly would be killed, as the enemy shot all the mounted officers. Some of the men said that their regiments had been entirely cut to pieces, and there was no use for them to remain any longer.

        It was to the encouraging remarks of this stream of recreants that my command was exposed as it moved on, but not a man fell out of ranks. Only one man who had been engaged offered to return and he belonged to the 4th Alabama Regiment, which he said had been nearly destroyed, but he declared that he would "go back and give them another trial." He fell into the ranks of Kemper's regiment and I believe remained with it to the close of the battle. Captain Gardner had been sent ahead for instructions and had met with Colonel John S. Preston, a volunteer aide to General Beauregard; and on our getting near to the battlefield, Colonel Preston rode to meet us and informed me that the General had gone to the front on the right, to conduct an attack on the enemy, but that General Johnston was on that part of the field near which we were and would give me instructions. He pointed out the direction in which General Johnston was, and I moved on, soon meeting the General himself, who rode towards us when he discovered our approach, and expressed his gratification at our arrival.

        I asked him at once to show me my position, to which he replied that he was too much engaged to do that in person, but would give me directions as to what I was to do. He then directed me to move to our own extreme left and attack the enemy on his right, stating that by directing my march along the rear of our line, by the sound of the firing in front, there could be no mistake; and he cautioned me to take especial care to clear our whole line before advancing to the front, and

be particular and not fire on any of our own troops, which he was sorry to say had been done in some instances.

        Affairs now wore a very gloomy aspect, and from all the indications in the rear the day appeared to be going against us. While General Johnston was speaking to me, quite a squad of men approached us going to the rear, and the General asking them to what regiment they belonged and where going without receiving any satisfactory answer, directed me to make my men charge bayonets and drive them back to the front. I immediately ordered Colonel Kemper to charge them with his regiment, when they commenced making excuses, saying they were sick, or wounded, or had no ammunition. I saw at once there was no fight in them, and I directed Colonel Kemper to move on and not delay battling with such cowards.

        Immediately in front of us was a body of woods extending to our left, in which there was a constant rattle of musketry, and I moved along the rear of this woods, crossing the road from Manassas to Sudley, and inclining to the left so as to clear our line entirely. While so moving Colonel Kemper pointed out to me the United States flag floating in the distance on some high point in front of our right, probably the top of a house.

        To clear our line entirely on our left, I found that it was necessary to pass beyond the woods in which our troops were, and as I approached the open space beyond, a messenger came to me from Colonel, afterwards General, J. E. B. Stuart, who was on our extreme left with two companies of cavalry and a battery of artillery under Lieutenant Beckham, stating that the Colonel said the enemy was about giving way and if we would hurry up he would soon be in retreat. This was the first word of encouragement I had received after reaching the vicinity of the battlefield. I was then making all the haste the condition of my men, who were much blown, would permit, and I directed my march to

a field immediately on the left of the woods, and between Stuart's position and the left of our infantry then engaged.

        The messenger from Colonel Stuart soon returned in a gallop and stated that the Colonel said the enemy had only retired his right behind a ridge now in my front, and was moving another flanking column behind said ridge still further to our left, and he cautioned me to be on the lookout for this new column.

        Having now cleared the woods, I moved to the front, in order to form line against the flanking column the enemy was reported forming behind the ridge in front of me. I ordered Colonel Kemper, who was in front, to form his regiment, by file, into line in the open field, just on the left of the woods, and sent back directions for the other regiments to move up as rapidly as possible and form to Kemper's left in echelon. Just at this time I observed a body of our troops move from a piece of woods on my immediate right across an open space to another in front of it, and this proved to be the left regiment of Elzey's brigade. I heard a rapid fire open from the woods into which this regiment had moved, and a body of the enemy approached on the crest of the ridge immediately in my front, preceded by a line of skirmishers.

        This ridge was the one on which is situated Chinn's house, so often mentioned in the description of this battle, and the subsequent one near the same position. It is a high ridge sloping off towards our right, and the enemy had the decided advantage of the ground, as my troops had to form on the low ground on our side of the ridge, near a small stream which runs along its base. The formation of my troops was in full view of the enemy, and his skirmishers, which were about four hundred yards in front of us, opened on my men, while forming, with long range rifles or minie muskets. Barksdale and Hays came up rapidly and formed as directed, Barksdale in the centre and Hays on the left.

        While their regiments were forming by file into line, under the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, Kemper's regiment commenced moving obliquely to the right towards the woods into which Elzey's troops had been seen to move, and I rode in front and halted it, informing it that there were no troops in the woods, and pointing out the enemy on the crest of the ridge in front. I then rode to the other regiments to direct their movements, when Colonel Kemper, finding the fire of the enemy, who was beyond the range of our smooth bores, very annoying to his men, moved rapidly to the front, to the cover of a fence at the foot of the ridge. As soon as Hays' regiment was formed, I ordered an advance and Hays moved forward until in a line with Kemper, then their two regiments started up the side of the hill. As we advanced the enemy disappeared behind the crest, and while we were ascending the slope Lieutenant McDonald, acting aide to Colonel Elzey, came riding rapidly towards me and requested me not to let my men fire on the troops in my front, stating that they consisted of the 13th Virginia Regiment of Elzey's brigade. I said to him,--"They have been firing on my men," to which he replied, "I know they have, but it is a mistake, I recognize Colonel Hill of the 13th, and his horse." This was a mistake on the part of Lieutenant McDonald, arising from a fancied resemblance of a mounted officer with the enemy to the Colonel of the 13th. This regiment did not reach the battlefield at all.

        This information and the positive assurance of Lieutenant McDonald, however, caused me to halt my troops and ride to the crest of the ridge, where I observed a regiment about two hundred yards to my right drawn up in line in front of the woods where Elzey's left was. The dress of the volunteers on both sides at that time was very similar, and the flag of the regiment I saw was drooping around the staff, so that I could not see whether it was the United States or the Confederate flag. The very confident manner of Lieutenant McDonald,

in his statement in regard to the troops in my front, induced me to believe that this must also be one of our regiments.

        Colonel Stuart had also advanced on my left with his two companies of cavalry and Beckham's battery of four guns, and passed around Chinn's house, the battery had been brought into action and opened a flank fire on the regiment I was observing. Thinking it certainly was one of ours, I started a messenger to Colonel Stuart, to give him the information and request him to stop the firing, but a second shell or ball from Beckham's guns caused the regiment to face about and retire rapidly, when I saw the United States flag unfurled and discovered the mistake into which I had been led by Lieutenant McDonald.

        I immediately ordered my command forward and it advanced to the crest of the hill. All this occurred in less time than it has taken me to describe it. On reaching the crest we came in view of the Warrenton Pike and the plains beyond, and now saw the enemy's troops in full retreat across and beyond the pike. When Kemper's and Hays' regiments had advanced, Barksdale's, under a misapprehension of my orders, had not at first moved, but it soon followed, and the whole command was formed in line, along the crest of the ridge, on the right of Chinn's house.

        We were now on the extreme left of the whole of our infantry, and in advance of the main line. The only troops on our left of any description were the two companies of cavalry and Beckham's battery with Stuart. On my immediate right and a little to the rear was Elzey's brigade, and farther to the right I saw our line extending towards Bull Run, but I discovered no indications of a forward movement.

        My troops were now very much exhausted, especially Hays' regiment, which had been marching nearly all the morning before our movement to the left, and it was necessary to give the men a little time to breathe. Beckham's

guns had continued firing on the retreating enemy until beyond their range, and Stuart soon went in pursuit followed by Beckham. Colonel Cocke now came up and joined me with the 19th Virginia Regiment.

        As soon as my men had rested a little, I directed the brigade to advance in column of divisions along the route over which we had seen the enemy retiring, and I sent information to the troops, on my right, of my purpose to move in their front with the request not to fire on us. I moved forward followed by Cocke's regiment, crossing Young's branch and the Warrenton Pike to the north side. When we got into the valley of Young's branch we lost sight of the enemy, and on ascending to the plains north of the pike we could see nothing of them. Passing to the west and north of the houses known as the Dogan house, the Stone Tavern, the Matthews house and the Carter or Pittsylvania house, and being guided by the abandoned haversacks and muskets, we moved over the ground on which the battle had begun with Evans in the early morning, and continued our march until we had cleared our right.

        We had now got to a point where Bull Run makes a considerable bend above Stone Bridge, and I halted as we had not observed any movement from the main line. Nothing could be seen of the enemy, and his troops had scattered so much in the retreat that it was impossible for me to tell what route he had taken. Moreover the country was entirely unknown to me. Stuart and Beckham had crossed the run above me, and Cocke's regiment had also moved towards a ford above where I was. While I was engaged in making some observations and trying to find out what was going on, Colonel Chisolm of General Beauregard's volunteer staff passed me with a detachment of cavalry in pursuit of a body of the enemy supposed to be across Bull Run above me.

        About this time it was reported to me that the enemy had sent us a flag of truce, but on inquiry I found it was a messenger with a note from Colonel Jones of the

4th Alabama Regiment, who had been very badly wounded and was at one of the enemy's hospitals in rear of the battlefield, and I sent for him and had him brought in to Matthews' house near where the battle had begun. I also found Lieutenant Colonel Gardner of the 8th Georgia Regiment in the yard of the Carter house, where he had been brought by some of the enemy engaged in collecting the wounded, and suffering from a very painful wound.

        Shortly after this President Davis, accompanied by several gentlemen, rode to where my command was. He addressed a few remarks to each regiment and was received with great enthusiasm. I then informed him of the condition of things as far as I knew them, told him of the condition and location of Colonel Gardner, and requested him to have medical assistance sent to him, as no medical officer could be found with my command at that time. I informed him of the fact that I was unacquainted with the situation of the country and without orders to guide me under the circumstances, and asked him what I should do.

        He said I had better form my men in line near where I was and let them rest until orders were received. I requested him to inform Generals Beauregard and Johnston of my position and ask them to send me orders. While we were conversing we observed a body of troops across Bull Run, some distance below, moving in good order in the direction of Centreville. I at first supposed it to be Bonham's brigade moving from Mitchell's Ford, but it turned out to be Kershaw's and Cash's regiments of that brigade, which had preceded me to the battlefield and were now moving in pursuit, after having crossed at or below Stone Bridge. Bonham's position at Mitchell's Ford was entirely too far off for his movement to be observed.

        As soon as Mr. Davis left me, I moved my command farther into the bend of Bull Run, and put it in line across the bend with the flanks resting on the stream,

the right flank being some distance above Stone Bridge. In this position my troops spent the night. They were considerably exhausted by the fatigues of the day, and had had nothing to eat since the early morning. They were now miles away from their baggage and trains. Early in the morning a Virginia company under Captain Gibson, unattached, had been permitted, at the request of the Captain, to join Kemper's regiment and remained with it throughout the day. A South Carolina company belonging to Kershaw's or Cash's regiment, which was on picket at the time their regiments moved from Mitchell's Ford, not being able to find its proper command, had joined me just as we were advancing against the enemy near Chinn's house, and had been attached to Hays' regiment, with which it went into action. Lieutenant Murat Willis had volunteered his services early in the day as aide and been with me through all my movements, rendering valuable service.

        The conduct of my troops during the whole day had been admirable, and the coolness with which they formed in open ground under the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters was deserving of all praise. They were in a condition to have taken up the pursuit the next day, but it would have been with empty haversacks, or rather without any except those picked up on the battlefield and along the line of the enemy's retreat.

        My loss was in killed and wounded, seventy-six, the greater part being in Kemper's regiment.

        The troops which were immediately in my front near Chinn's house constituted the enemy's extreme right, and were, I think, composed in part of the regulars attached to McDowell's army. Their long range muskets or rifles enabled them to inflict the loss on my command, but I am satisfied that the latter inflicted little or no loss on the enemy, as he retired before we got within range with our arms, which were smooth-bore muskets.

        As soon as my troops were disposed for the night

and steps taken to guard the front, I rode with my staff officers in search of either General Beauregard or General Johnston, in order to give information of my position and get instructions for the next morning. Not knowing the roads, I had to take the circuitous route over which I had advanced, but I finally reached the Lewis house to find it a hospital for the wounded, and the headquarters removed. Not being able to get here any information of either of the generals, I rode in the direction of Manassas until I met an officer who said he was on the staff of General Johnston and was looking for him. He stated that he was just from Manassas and did not think either of the generals was there.

        Taking this to be true and not knowing where to look further, I rode back along the Sudley Mills road to the Stone Tavern, passing over the main battlefield, and rejoined my command after twelve o'clock at night, when I lay down to rest, my bed being a bundle of wheat. While trying to find the generals, I discovered that there was very great confusion among our troops that had been engaged in the battle. They were scattered in every direction, regiments being separated from their brigades, companies from their regiments, while many squads and individuals were seeking their commands. That part of the army was certainly in no condition to make pursuit next morning.

        Very early on the morning of the 22nd, I sent Captain Fleming Gardner to Manassas for instruction, and he returned with directions to me from General Beauregard to remain where I was until further orders, and to have my men made as comfortable as possible. A heavy rain had now set in, which continued through the day and night. When it was ascertained that there was to be no movement, I rode over the battlefield and to the hospitals in the vicinity to see about having my wounded brought in who had not been taken care of. The country in rear of the enemy's line of battle of the day before, and along his routes of retreat was strewn with knapsacks,

haversacks, canteens, blankets, overcoats, india-rubber cloths, muskets, equipments, and all the débris of a routed army.

        A report subsequently made by a Committee of the Federal Congress, of which Senator Wade was chairman, gave a most preposterous account of "Rebel atrocities" committed upon the dead and wounded of the Federal army after the battle. I am able to say, from my personal knowledge, that its statements are false, and the Federal surgeons, left with the wounded, could bear testimony to their falsehood.

CHAPTER IV.

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

        I HAVE now told what I saw and did during the first battle of Manassas, and as many very erroneous accounts of that battle, both in its general features and its details, were given by newspaper correspondents, from both sections, which have furnished the basis for most of the descriptions of it, contained errors--even in works professing to be authentic histories,--I will here give a succinct account of the battle from the authentic official reports, and my own knowledge as far as it extends.

        On the morning of the 21st we held the line of Bull Run, with our right at Union Mills and our left at Stone Bridge. Ewell's brigade was at Union Mills, Jones' at McLean's Ford, Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford, Bonham's at Mitchell's Ford, Cocke at the fords below Stone Bridge, and Evans with Sloan's regiment and Wheat's battalion was at the Stone Bridge. Holmes' brigade, which had arrived from Aquia Creek, was some three miles in rear of Ewell's position. My brigade was in reserve to support Longstreet or Jones, as might be required, and Jackson's and parts of Bee's and Bartow's brigades of Johnston's army--which had arrived by the Manassas Gap Railroad--were held as a general reserve to be used as occasion might require. The Warrenton Pike from Centreville to Warrenton crosses Bull Run at Stone Bridge, and its general direction from Centreville is a little south of west.

        McDowell's force had reached Centreville on the 18th, and that day the 19th and 20th had been employed by him in reconnoitring. Contrary to General Beauregard's anticipations, McDowell, instead of advancing against our centre on the morning of the 21st, left one division (Miles') and a brigade of another (Tyler's) to hold Centreville and amuse our right and centre, while

he moved two divisions (Hunter's and Heintzelman's) and three brigades of another (Tyler's) against our left, with the view of turning that flank and forcing us from the line of Bull Run. The three brigades of Tyler's division moved directly against Stone Bridge, over the Warrenton Pike, and opened an artillery fire at six o'clock A.M. About the same time fire was opened from two batteries established by the enemy north of Bull Run, near Blackburn's Ford, which was kept up steadily until late in the afternoon. Hunter's division, diverging from the Warrenton Pike, moved across Bull Run at or near Sudley Mills, about three miles above Stone Bridge, and then towards Manassas on the direct road, so as to get in rear of Stone Bridge, while Heintzelman followed Hunter to support him.

        When this movement was developed, Colonel Evans, leaving a very small force at Stone Bridge, where the road had been blocked up by felled timber, moved to the left to meet Hunter and encountered his advance north of the Warrenton Pike, sustaining his attack for some time, until overwhelming numbers were accumulated against him. Evans was being forced back when Bee, with the parts of his own and Bartow's brigades which had arrived, came to his assistance, and the advance of the enemy was stopped for some time until Heintzelman's division united with Hunter's and two of Tyler's brigades crossed over above Stone Bridge.

        Bee and Evans, though fighting with great obstinacy, were forced back across the Warrenton Pike to a ridge south of it, and nearly at right angles with Bull Run. Here they were reinforced first by Hampton's six companies then by Jackson's brigade, when a new line was formed and the fight renewed with great obstinacy. Subsequently two of Cocke's regiments were brought up, as also the seven companies of the 8th Virginia, under Colonel Hunter; the three companies of the 49th Virginia Regiment, under Colonel Smith; the 6th North Carolina Regiment, under Colonel Fisher; and two of

Bonham's regiments, under Colonel Kershaw; and engaged in the battle.

        The fighting was very stubborn on the part of our troops, who were opposed to immense odds, and the fortunes of the day fluctuated for some time. From the beginning, artillery had been employed on both sides, and a number of our batteries did most excellent service. Colonel Stuart made a charge at one time with two companies of cavalry on the right of the enemy's line. At a most critical period three regiments of Elzey's brigade--which had arrived at the junction by the railroad and been promptly moved to the battlefield under the direction of Brigadier General E. Kirby Smith--came upon the field in rear of our line, and after General Smith had been wounded were moved to our left, under command of Colonel Elzey, just in time to meet and repulse a body of the enemy which had overlapped that flank. A short time afterwards, while the enemy was preparing for a last effort, my brigade arrived on the field, and operated on the left of Elzey's brigade just as the enemy began his attack.

        He had been repulsed, not routed. When, however, the retreat began, it soon degenerated into a rout from the panic-stricken fears of the enemy's troops, who imagined that legions of cavalry were thundering at their heels, when really there were only a few companies acting without concert. Kershaw's two regiments with a battery of artillery moved in pursuit along the Warrenton Pike, and made some captures, but the mass of our troops on this part of the field were not in a condition to pursue at once. Ewell's and Holmes' brigades had been sent for from the right, when the day appeared doubtful, but the battle was won before they arrived, and they were ordered to return to their former positions.

        D. R. Jones, in the afternoon, made an advance against the battery which I had been ordered to take in the morning, but was compelled to retire with loss. Bonham and Longstreet moved across the Run in the

direction of Centreville just before night, but retired to their former positions on the approach of darkness. The enemy retreated in great disorder to Centreville, where he attempted to re-form his troops on the unbroken division and brigade that remained at that place, but shortly after dark he retreated with great precipitation, and by light next morning the greater part of his troops were either in the streets of Washington, or on the southern banks of the Potomac.

        Twenty-seven pieces of artillery fell into our hands, some of which were captured on the field, but the greater part were abandoned on the road between the battlefield and Centreville. Besides the artillery, a considerable quantity of small arms, a number of wagons, ambulances, and some stores fell into our hands; and we captured about 1,500 prisoners. Our loss in killed and wounded was 1,852. The enemy's loss was much heavier, and is reported by McDowell.

        I have thus given an outline of the battle as it took place, but I have not attempted to give the details of what the several commands did, for which reference must be had to the official reports.

        There are several popular errors in regard to this battle, which have been widely circulated by the writings of those who have undertaken to describe it, and about which very few people indeed seem to be correctly informed.

        Foremost among them is the opinion that General Johnston yielded the command to General Beauregard, and that the latter controlled the operations of our troops during the battle. This erroneous statement was so often and confidently made without contradiction, that I must confess for a long time I gave it some credence, though when I saw General Johnston on the field he appeared to be acting the part and performing the duties of a commanding general. Each of these generals is entitled to sufficient glory for the part taken in this battle in the performance of his appropriate

duties, to render a contest among their friends for the chief glory idle as well as mischievous.

        I cannot better explain the truth of the matter than by giving the following extract of a letter from General Johnston himself to me, which is in entire accordance with the facts coming within my knowledge on the field as far as they go, and will not be doubted by any one who knows General Johnston. He says: "General Beauregard's influence on that occasion was simply that due to my estimate of his military merit and knowledge of the situation. As soon as we met I expressed to him my determination to attack next morning, because it was not improbable that Patterson might come up Sunday night. He proposed a plan of attack which I accepted. It was defeated, however, by the appearance of Tyler's troops near the Stone Bridge soon after sunrise. He then proposed to stand on the defensive there and continue the offensive with the troops on the right of the road from Manassas to Centreville. This was frustrated by the movement which turned Cocke and Evans, and the battle fought was improvised on a field with which General Beauregard and myself were equally unacquainted. Early in the day I placed myself on the high bare hill you may remember a few hundred yards in rear of Mitchell's Ford, and General Beauregard soon joined me there. When convinced that the battle had begun on our left, I told him so, and that I was about to hasten to it. He followed. When we reached the field and he found that I was about to take immediate control of the two brigades engaged, he represented that it would be incompatible with the command of the army to do so, and urged that he should have the command in question. I accepted the argument. This, however, left him under me, and was the command of a small fraction of troops."

        This places the matter in its true light and does not detract at all from the very great credit to which General Beauregard is entitled for thwarting the enemy's

plans until the arrival of General Johnston, and for his able coöperation afterwards. But it is nevertheless true that General Johnston is entitled to the credit attached to the chief command in this, the first great battle of the war.

        Another error in regard to the battle is the belief, almost universal, that Kirby Smith, hearing the roar of musketry and artillery while passing over the Manassas Gap Railroad, stopped the cars before reaching the Junction and moved directly for the battlefield, coming upon the rear of the enemy's right flank. This is entirely unfounded in fact. Smith's command consisted of Elzey's brigade, three regiments of which were in the battle, and they moved up from the Junction to the rear of our centre, under orders which General Smith found there on his arrival, and were subsequently moved by Elzey to meet the enemy's right after Smith was wounded. My brigade went to the left of Elzey, and I am able to say that none of our troops got to the enemy's rear, unless it may have been when Stuart made his charge. The reports of Generals Johnston and Beauregard as well as that of Colonel, afterwards Major General, Elzey, show the truth of the matter, and it is a little singular that those writers who have undertaken to describe this battle have taken the newspaper accounts as authentic without thinking of having recourse to the official reports.

        Another erroneous statement in reference to the battle which has gone current, is that Holmes' brigade came up at a critical time and helped to save the day, when the fact is that that brigade was further from the field than any of our troops, and, though sent for in the afternoon, did not reach the battlefield at all, but its march was arrested by the close of the fight.

        The concentration of Johnston's and Beauregard's forces against McDowell was a master stroke of strategy well executed, and our generals displayed great ability and energy in meeting and defeating the unexpected

movement against our left. Claims were put forward in behalf of several commands for the credit of having saved the day and secured the victory.

        It is rather surprising to observe that erroneous views often prevail in regard to the relative merits of different commands, engaged in bearing respectively very necessary parts in an action. If a small force has been fighting obstinately for hours against great odds, until it has become exhausted and is beginning to give way, and then fresh troops come up and turn the tide of battle, the latter are said to have gained the day and often reap all the glory. It is not likely to be considered, that, but for the troops whose obstinate fighting enabled the fresh ones to come up in time, the day would have been irretrievably lost before the appearance of the latter. It is an old saying that "It is the last feather that breaks the camel's back," yet the last feather would do no harm but for the weight which precedes it. The first feather contributes as much as the last to the catastrophe.

        At this battle, but for the cavalry which watched the enemy's movements and gave timely notice to Evans so that he could move to the left and check the advance of Hunter, the day would probably have been lost at the outset. But for the prompt movement of Evans to the left and the obstinate fighting of his men, the enemy would have reached the range of hills on which our final line of battle was formed, thus turning our left completely and necessitating a rapid falling back from the line of Bull Run, which would most assuredly have resulted in defeat. This would likewise have been the case had not Bee arrived to the assistance of Evans when he did and stayed the progress of the enemy by his stubborn resistance.

        When Bee and Evans were forced back across the Warrenton Pike, the day would have been lost had not Jackson arrived most opportunely and furnished them a barrier behind which to re-form. From the beginning

our batteries rendered most essential service, and the infantry would probably have been overpowered but for their well directed fire. The arrivals of Cocke's two regiments, Hampton's Legion, the ten companies of the 7th and 49th Virginia Regiments, the 6th North Carolina and Bonham's two regiments all served to stem the tide of battle and stay defeat, but still in all probability the day would have been lost but for the timely appearance of Smith with Elzey's command and the subsequent movement of Elzey to our left.

        I do not claim to have won or saved the day with my command, but I think it will be conceded by all who read the reports of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, that the arrival of that command and the cool and deliberate manner in which my men formed in line, under fire and in full view of the enemy, and their advance had a material effect in thwarting the last effort of the enemy to flank our line and in precipitating his retreat. I can bear testimony to the very efficient service rendered by Stuart with his two companies of cavalry, and Beckham's battery.

        The fact is that all the troops engaged in the battle were necessary to prevent defeat and secure victory, and each command in its proper sphere may be said to have saved the day. It is very unjust to give all the credit or the greater part of it to any one command; and I would not exempt from the general commendation those troops on the right who held that part of the line, under fire, and prevented the enemy from getting to our rear and cutting off our communications.

        It is not easy to account for McDowell's delay in making his attack, thereby permitting the concentration against him. So far as he is personally concerned, a ready excuse is to be found for him in the fact that he was inexperienced in command, having before that served in the field only in the capacity of a staff officer; but General Scott, an old and distinguished

soldier, was in fact controlling the operations and was in constant communication by telegraph with McDowell, who had been his aide and was selected to carry out his plans. General Scott was in fact the commander and McDowell was merely his executive officer in the field. The former was the responsible man and to his name must be attached the discredit for the failure at Bull Run. Had McDowell's whole force been thrown against our centre on the day Tyler advanced on Blackburn's Ford, our line must have been broken and a defeat to us must have ensued, for at that time our troops were too few and too much scattered to have furnished sufficient resistance to the enemy's overwhelming force, or to have permitted an effective attack on his flanks. By delay this opportunity was lost and the two armies were concentrated against McDowell.

        McDowell seems to have made an honest effort to conduct the campaign on the principles of civilized warfare, and expressed a very just indignation at the excesses committed by his troops. In a dispatch from Fairfax Court-House, dated the 18th of July, he said: "I am distressed to have to report excesses by our troops. The excitement of the men found vent in burning and pillaging, which, however, was soon checked. It distressed us all greatly." On the same day he issued an order from which I make the following extract:

        "Any persons found committing the slightest depredation, killing pigs or poultry or trespassing on the property of the inhabitants, will be reported to the then headquarters, and the least that will be done to them will be to send them to the Alexandria jail. It is again ordered that no one shall arrest or attempt to arrest any citizen not in arms at the time, or search or attempt to search any house, or even enter the same without permission. The troops must behave themselves with as much forbearance and propriety as if they were at

their own homes. They are here to fight the enemies of the country, not to judge and punish the unarmed and helpless, however guilty they may be. When necessary, that will be done by the proper person.

"By command of General McDowell.

"Jas. B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant General."

        This order deserves to be exhumed from the oblivion into which it seems to have fallen, and is in strong contrast with the subsequent practice under Butler, Pope, Milroy, Hunter, Sheridan, Sherman, etc. This war order of McDowell's might well have been commended to the consideration of military satraps set to rule over the people of the South in a time of "peace." It did not prevent the burning of the entire village of Germantown, a few miles from Fairfax Court-House, but the citizens agreed that McDowell had made an honest effort to prevent depredations by his troops; and it gives me pleasure to make the statement, as it is the last time I will have occasion to make a similar one in regard to any of the Federal commanders who followed him.

        Pursuit of the enemy was not made after the battle in order to capture Washington or cross the Potomac, and as this omission has been the subject of much comment and criticism, I will make some observations on that head.

        In the first place, it must be borne in mind that our generals were inexperienced in command.

        In the next place, it must be conceded that a commanding general knows more about the condition of his troops and the obstacles in his way than any other can know; and for very obvious reasons he is debarred from making public at the time the reasons and conditions which govern his course.

        It must also be considered that he cannot know beforehand as much as the critics who form their judgment from the light of after events. Those, therefore, who ascertained some days after the battle what was the

actual condition of McDowell's army on the retreat, must recollect that this was not known to General Johnston until that army was safe from pursuit, even if it had been practicable to accomplish any more than was done with our army in its then condition.

        Without having been in General Johnston's confidence, or professing to know more about the motives actuating him at the time than he has thought proper to make public, I will undertake to show that it was utterly impossible for any army to have captured Washington by immediate pursuit, even if it had been in condition to make such pursuit, and that it would have been very difficult to cross the Potomac at all.

        In the first place, I will say that the army was not in condition to make pursuit on the afternoon of the 21st after the battle, or that night. All the troops engaged, except Cocke's regiment, the 19th Virginia, the two regiments with Kershaw, and my command, were so much exhausted and shattered by the desperate conflict in which they had participated, that they made no attempt at pursuit and were incapable of any.

        Our cavalry consisted of one organized regiment of nine companies, and a number of unattached companies. This cavalry was armed principally with shot guns and very inferior sabres, and was without the discipline and drill necessary to make that arm effective in a charge. Moreover it had been necessarily scattered on the flanks and along the line, to watch the enemy and give information of his movements. It could not readily be concentrated for the purpose of an efficient pursuit, and the attempts made in that direction were desultory.

        By light on the morning of the 22nd, the greater part of the enemy's troops were either in the streets of Washington or under the protection of the guns at Arlington Heights.

        The question then arises whether, by pursuit on the morning of the 22nd, Washington could have been captured. And I will here call attention to some facts which

seem entirely to have escaped the attention of the critics. The Potomac is at least a mile wide at Washington and navigable to that place for the largest vessels. The only means of crossing the river, except in vessels, are by the Long Bridge, the aqueduct on the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal at Georgetown, and the chain bridge above Georgetown.

        The Long Bridge is an old wooden structure with at least one draw and perhaps two in it, and could have been easily destroyed by fire, besides being susceptible of being commanded through its entire length by vessels of war lying near Washington, where there were some out of range of any guns we would have brought to bear.

        The aqueduct is long and narrow with a channel for the water, which we could not have turned off as it runs from the northern side of the Potomac, and a narrow towpath on the side. One piece of artillery at its northern end could have effectually prevented the passing of troops over it, and besides it could have been easily ruined and some of the spans blown up, so as to render it impassable.

        The chain bridge is a wooden structure and could have been easily burned. If therefore the entire Federal Army had fled across the river on our approach, we could not have crossed it near Washington. The largest pieces of artillery we had, capable of being transported, were small field pieces of which the heaviest for solid shot were six pounders, and we had no Howitzer larger than a twenty-four pounder if we had any of that size. None of our guns were of sufficient range to reach across the river into the city. If, therefore, we had advanced at once upon Washington and the Federal Army had fled across the river on our approach, abandoning the city itself, still we could not have entered it, unless the bridges had been left intact; and it is not to be supposed that McDowell, General Scott, and all the officers of the regular army, were so badly frightened and demoralized that they would have fled on our approach, and omitted to destroy the approaches to the city, even if such had

been the case with the volunteers, the civil authorities, and the Congress.

        All the bridges above, to and beyond Harper's Ferry, had been burned, and the nearest ford to Washington, over which at low water it is possible for infantry to pass, is White's Ford, several miles above Leesburg, and forty miles from Washington. This was then an obscure ford, where, in 1862, General Jackson had to have the banks dug down before our wagons and artillery could cross, and then the canal on the northern bank had to be bridged. We had nothing in the shape of pontoons, and it would have been impossible to have obtained them in any reasonable time.

        I had occasion, in 1864, to make myself acquainted with the character of the Potomac and its crossing at and above Washington, and what I state here is not mere speculation. General Johnston had resided in Washington for several years, and must be supposed to have been acquainted with the difficulties.

        I have heard some wiseacres remark that if we had gone on, we could have entered pell-mell with the enemy into Washington. To have done that, if possible, we would have had to keep up with the enemy, and I don't think any one supposes that a solitary soldier in our army could have reached the banks of the Potomac by daylight the morning after the battle. It is possible to cross a bridge of a few yards in length, or enter through the gates of a city pell-mell with an army, but no one ever heard of that thing being done on a bridge more than a mile in length and with a draw raised in the middle.

        The truth is that, while the enemy's retreat was very disorderly and disgraceful, some of his troops retained their organization and the condition of things at Washington was not quite as bad as represented. Spectators in the city, seeing the condition of the fugitives thronging the streets, and the panic of the civilians, may have well supposed that the whole army was disorganized, and so utterly demoralized that it would have fled on

the very first cry that the "rebels are coming," but if General McDowell and his officers are to be believed, there still remained on the southern bank of the Potomac a considerable force in fighting condition. Miles' division had not been engaged and Runyon's had not reached Centreville when the battle took place. Besides a considerable force had been retained in Washington under Mansfield.

        McClellan states in his report, that, when he assumed command on the 27th of July, the infantry in and around Washington numbered 50,000, and this was much larger than our whole force was after the reinforcements had reached us subsequent to the battle. The strength of our army at this time, as well as on all other occasions, has been greatly exaggerated even by Southern writers; its organization was very imperfect, many of the troops not being brigaded.

        If we had advanced, Alexandria would probably have fallen into our hands without a struggle, and we might have forced the enemy to evacuate his works south of the Potomac, but very likely not until after a fight in which our loss would have been greater than the object to be accomplished would have justified. We might have transferred our line to the banks of the Potomac, but we could not have held it, and would eventually have been compelled to abandon it with greater damage to us than the evacuation of the line of Bull Run caused.

        So much for the question as between the commanding general and the cavillers. But there is another phase of it, in which a staff officer of General Beauregard, writing for a Northern journal, has endeavored to raise an issue between that general and the Government at Richmond. I have before shown that General Johnston, as commander of the army, was the responsible person, and I believe he has never attempted to evade the responsibility. General Beauregard's agency in the matter could only be as an adviser and lieutenant of the commanding general.

        The point made against the Government is that Washington could and would have been taken, if the President, Secretary of War, and the heads of the Quarter-master and Commissary Departments had furnished sufficient transportation and supplies, though it is admitted that Mr. Davis left the question of an advance entirely to his generals.

        Now in regard to transportation, we had an abundance of wagons to carry all the ammunition needed, and for gathering in provisions, and if the bridges on the railroad had not been burned, we might have moved our depot to Alexandria as we moved, provided we could have advanced to that point, as the enemy had repaired the railroad to Fairfax Station, and had not interfered with it on his retreat. The burning of the bridges on the railroad did not impede the progress of the enemy before the battle, as he did not march on it and Bull Run was fordable anywhere. That burning could only have served the purpose of obstructing the use of the railroad by the enemy in the event of our defeat, which with his means of reconstruction would have been but a very few days, and it did not obstruct our movements for a much longer time. At the time of the battle, the county of Loudoun on the Virginia side of the Potomac, and the whole State of Maryland, were teeming with supplies, and we could have readily procured all the transportation needed from the citizens, if we had not taken it from the enemy, which would probably have been the case if an advance had been practicable otherwise.

        Certain it is, that in 1862, after the second battle of Manassas, when the enemy's army had been defeated, not routed, and was still vastly superior in number and equipment to our own, we did not hesitate a moment about supplies, though our army was without rations and Fairfax and Loudoun had been nearly exhausted of their grain and cattle; but taking only transportation for the ammunition and the cooking utensils, and sending

the rest of our trains to the valley, except wagons to gather up flour, we marched across the Potomac into Maryland, our men and officers living principally on green corn and beef without salt or bread. Neither was our army prevented from making the movement into Pennsylvania, in 1863, for fear of not getting provisions. We depended upon taking them from the enemy and the country through which we marched, and did thus procure them. The alleged difficulties in 1861 would have been no difficulties in 1862, 1863, or 1864. These were not the real difficulties which prevented the capture of Washington after the battle of the 21st of July, and the issue which is attempted to be made with the Government at Richmond is therefore an idle one.

        These remarks are not made with the slightest purpose of disparaging in any way General Beauregard, for whom I have great regard and admiration. When he ordered the burning of the bridge over Bull Run, he had reason to apprehend that his comparatively small force would have to encounter McDowell's whole army before any reinforcements arrived to his assistance, and he had therefore good grounds to regard this as a precaution which the circumstances warranted and demanded.

        The foregoing reflections and comments are such as my subsequent experience and observation have enabled me to make, and I do not pretend that a tittle of them occurred to me at the time.

        Both of our generals, notwithstanding their inexperience in command, displayed extraordinary energy and capacity in thwarting the plans of a veteran commander, whom the country at that time regarded as one of the ablest military chieftains of the age. If they did not accomplish all that might have been accomplished by an experienced and skilful commander, with an army of veterans, they are not therefore to be condemned; but it is equally unjust to attempt to shift the responsibility to the shoulders of the Government at Richmond.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS ALONG BULL RUN.

        IMMEDIATELY after the battle of the 21st a portion of our troops were moved across Bull Run and the former line north of that stream was re-occupied. The army at that time was known as the "Army of the Potomac," and General Beauregard's command was reorganized as the 1st corps of that army, with the same brigade commanders as before. I was promoted to the rank of brigadier general to date from the 21st of July, and was assigned to the command of a brigade composed of the 24th Virginia Regiment, the 5th North Carolina State Troops, Colonel Duncan K. McRae, and the 13th North Carolina Volunteers (subsequently designated the 23rd North Carolina Regiment), Colonel John Hoke. The greater part of the army was moved to the north of Bull Run, but I resumed my position on the right of the Junction at my former camps, and remained there until the latter part of August, when I moved to the north of the Occoquon, in front of Wolf Run Shoals, below the mouth of Bull Run. Our line was extended from this point by Langster's cross-roads and Fairfax Station through Fairfax Court-House. Hampton's Legion was composed of a battalion of infantry, a battalion of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, and remained south of the Occoquon on the right, and watched the lower fords of that stream and the landings on the Potomac immediately below Occoquon. Evans had occupied Leesburg.

        Captain W. W. Thornton's company of cavalry had been again attached to my command and subsequently, in the month of September, a battery of Virginia artillery under Captain Holman reported to me. In the latter part of August, General Longstreet, who had command of the advanced forces at Fairfax Court-House,

threw forward a small force of infantry and cavalry and established strong pickets at Mason's and Munson's Hills, in close proximity to the enemy's main line on the south of the Potomac.

        McClellan had succeeded McDowell, in command of the Federal Army opposed to us, and that army was being greatly augmented by new levies.

        A few days after I reached my camp in front of Wolf Run Shoals, my brigade was ordered to Fairfax Station, for the purpose of supporting Longstreet, if necessary. After being there a day, I was ordered by General Longstreet to move with two of my regiments to Mason's Hill, to relieve one of his on duty at that place. I took with me the 24th Virginia and 5th North Carolina Regiments, and my movement was so timed as to reach Mason's Hill in the night. I arrived there before light on the morning of the 31st of August, and relieved the 17th Regiment, Colonel Corse. About light on that morning, one of Colonel Corse's companies, which was on picket one mile from the main force in the direction of Alexandria, was attacked by a detachment from a New Jersey regiment, under its colonel, and after a very sharp fight, repulsed the enemy and inflicted a severe punishment on him.

        This advanced line at Mason's and Munson's Hills was about twelve or fifteen miles in front of Fairfax Court-House, and was a mere picket line held ordinarily by two infantry regiments with a few pieces of artillery, while a small force of cavalry watched the flanks. From it there were in full view the dome of the Capitol at Washington and a part of the enemy's line on the heights south and west of Alexandria. The two main positions were in sight of each other and about a mile apart. From them smaller pickets were thrown out in front and up to within a very short distance of large bodies of the enemy, those from Mason's Hill being in some cases more than a mile from the main body. The pickets were constantly skirmishing with those of the

enemy, and it was very evident that he was much alarmed at this demonstration in his immediate front, as Professor Lowe, who now made his appearance with his balloons, kept one of them up almost constantly, and large parties were seen working very energetically at the line of fortifications in our front. Contemporaneous accounts given by the enemy represent this movement on our part as a very serious one, and he was evidently impressed with the idea that the greater part of our army was immediately confronting him, whereas, if it had not been for his excessive caution and want of enterprise, he might have moved out and captured the whole of our advance force without the possibility of its escape.

        After my pickets had relieved those of Corse, it was reported to me that a flag of truce had appeared at the outside picket, where the fight had taken place in the early morning, and I rode to a house in the vicinity of that point and had the person bearing the flag brought to me blindfolded. He proved to be a Dr. Coxe, surgeon of the New Jersey regiment, a detachment of which had been engaged in the above named affair. He stated that he came on the part of Colonel Tyler of the 3rd New Jersey to get the bodies of several men who were missing, and that he was informed that General Kearney, who commanded on that part of the line, had directed Colonel Tyler to send the party with the flag.

        I informed him of the irregularity of the proceeding, but after some conversation in which I endeavored to leave him under the impression that we had a large force in the vicinity, I gave him permission to carry off the dead bodies, two of which he had picked up outside of my picket, and two others having been brought in to the picket before his arrival. We remained at Mason's Hill three or four days, and I was then relieved by Colonel Smith in command of the 20th Georgia Regiment My pickets had been constantly skirmishing with small parties of the enemy, and there had been one or

two false alarms of an approach against us, but the enemy made no serious demonstration. This advanced line of pickets was subsequently abandoned, after having been maintained for several weeks, but I did not again return to it.

        After leaving Mason's Hill, I moved back to my camp in front of Wolf Run Shoals, again occupying the right of our line. I remained on this flank until the fore part of October, and my regiments picketed at Springfield on the line of the railroad, alternating with those of Ewell's brigade at Langster's cross-roads. On the 4th of October Major General Earl Van Dorn joined our army and was assigned to the command of a division composed of Ewell's brigade and mine. This was the first division organized in the "Army of the Potomac" (Confederate) and I think in the entire Confederate army. In a day or two afterwards my brigade was moved to a position between Fairfax Station and Fairfax Court-House, and remained there until the army was moved back to the line which it occupied for the winter, my regiment picketing at Burke's Station on the railroad in the meantime.

        Soon after the organization of the division, Captain Green's company of cavalry, for which Thornton's had been exchanged, was relieved from duty with me and attached to General Van Dorn's headquarters. On the 7th of October, the 20th Georgia Regiment, Colonel W. D. Smith, was attached to my brigade, and joined me in a day or two thereafter. On the 15th of October the whole of our army moved back from the line passing through Fairfax Court-House to me, extending from Union Mills on the right, through Centreville, to Stone Bridge on the left. At the new position Van Dorn's division was on the right, with Ewell's brigade at Union Mills and mine on its left above that point. We proceeded at once to fortify the whole line from right to left.

        McClellan's report shows that the troops under his

command in and about Washington, including those on the Maryland shore of the Potomac above and below Washington and the troops with Dix at Baltimore, on the 15th day of October, the day before our retrograde movement, amounted to 133,201 present for duty, and an aggregate present of 143,647. The mass of this force was south of the Potomac, and nearly the whole of it available for an advance. The whole force under General Johnston's command did not exceed one-third of McClellan's, though the latter has estimated our force "on the Potomac" in the month of October at not less than 150,000.

        After the occupation of the line at Centreville, the infantry of our army at and near that place was organized into four divisions of three brigades each and two corps. Bonham's brigade was attached to Van Dorn's division, and the command of the other divisions was given to Major Generals G. W. Smith, Longstreet, and E. Kirby Smith, respectively. Van Dorn's and Longstreet's divisions constituted the first corps under General Beauregard, and the other two divisions constituted the second corps under the temporary command of Major General G. W. Smith.

        About the same time, General Jackson, with the rank of Major General, was sent to the valley with his old brigade, and the 22nd of October an order was issued from the Adjutant General's office at Richmond, establishing the Department of Northern Virginia, composed of the Valley district, the Potomac district, and the Aquia district, under the command of General Johnston; the districts being assigned to the command of Major General Jackson, General Beauregard, and Major General Holmes, in the order in which they are named. Colonel Robert E. Rodes of the 5th Alabama Regiment had been made brigadier general and assigned to the command of Ewell's brigade, Ewell being temporarily assigned to a brigade in Longstreet's division, and subsequently made major general and transferred

to the command of E. K. Smith's division, when the latter officer was sent to Tennessee.

        The affair of Evans' command with the enemy at Ball's Bluff occurred on the 21st of October, and Stuart's affair with the enemy at Drainesville occurred on the 20th of December. These are the only conflicts of the "Army of the Potomac" with the enemy of any consequence, during the fall and winter, after the occupation of the line of Centreville. Our front was covered by a line of pickets some distance in front, extending from left to right, and all under command of Brigadier General J. E. B. Stuart of the cavalry, who was especially assigned to that duty, details by regiments being made from the infantry to report to him.

        Rodes' brigade was moved to the south of Bull Run to go into winter quarters, leaving my brigade on the right of our line, which was now contracted so as to merely cover McLean's Ford on that flank. About the middle of January, 1862, Major General Van Dorn was relieved from duty with the "Army of the Potomac" and ordered to the Trans-Mississippi Department, General Bonham succeeding to the command of the division as senior brigadier general. On the 30th of January, General Beauregard took leave of the "Army of the Potomac," he having been ordered to Kentucky; and after this time there was no distinction of corps in the "Army of the Potomac," but all division commanders reported directly to General Johnston.

        After the 1st of February General Bonham relinquished the command of the division, having resigned his commission to take his seat in Congress, and I succeeded to the command of the division as next in rank--Colonel Kershaw, who was appointed brigadier general, succeeding Bonham in the command of his brigade. My brigade had gone into temporary winter quarters at the point to which it had moved, when we fell back from the line of Fairfax Court-House for the purpose of continuing the construction of the works on our right,

which were rendered necessary by the change in the line before mentioned; and it was engaged in building new winter quarters south of Bull Run, and completing the earthworks covering McLean's Ford when the line of Bull Run was abandoned.

        About two weeks before the evacuation took place, division commanders were confidentially informed of the probability of that event, and ordered to prepare their commands for it in a quiet way. Up to that time there had been no apparent preparation for such a movement, but an immense amount of stores of all kinds and private baggage of officers and men had been permitted to accumulate. Preparations, however, were commenced at once for sending the stores and baggage to the rear. Owing to the fact that our army had remained stationary so long, and the inexperience in campaigning of our troops, there had been a vast accumulation of private baggage by both officers and men; and when it became necessary to change a camp it was the work of two or three days. I had endeavored to inculcate proper ideas on this subject into the minds of the officers of my own immediate command, but with very indifferent success, and it was very provoking to see with what tenacity young lieutenants held on to baggage enough to answer all their purposes at a fashionable watering place in time of peace.

        After the confidential instructions for the evacuation were given, I tried to persuade all my officers to send all their baggage not capable of being easily transported and for which they did not have immediate necessary use, on the railroad to some place in the rear out of all danger, but the most that I could accomplish was to get them to send it to Manassas Junction. This was generally the case with the whole army, and the consequence was that a vast amount of trunks and other private baggage was accumulated at the Junction at the last moment, for which it was impossible to find any transportation. This evil, however, was finally and

completely remedied by the burning which took place when the Junction itself was evacuated, and we never had any great reason subsequently to complain of a plethoric condition of the baggage.

        Besides this trouble in regard to private baggage, there was another which incommoded us to some extent, and that resulted from the presence of the wives of a number of officers in and near camp. These would listen to no mild appeals or gentle remonstrances, but held on with a pertinacity worthy of a better cause, and I was myself compelled, as a final resort, to issue a peremptory order for some of them to leave my camp.

        The order was finally given for the movement to the rear on the 8th of March and early on that morning I broke up my camps and moved with my brigade and that of Kershaw towards the Junction. We were delayed, however, waiting for the movement of the other troops, and did not arrive at the Junction until in the afternoon. A portion of Ewell's division was to move in front of us along the railroad, while the remainder of it, with Rodes' brigade, was to move on a road east of the railroad. Our wagon trains had been previously sent forward on the roads west of the railroad. We waited at the Junction until the troops that were to precede us had passed on, and the last of the trains of cars could be gotten off. Finally at a late hour of the night after the last available train of cars had left, we moved along the railroad past Bristow Station, and bivouacked for the night, my brigade bringing up the rear of our infantry on that route.

        A very large amount of stores and provisions had been abandoned for want of transportation, and among the stores was a quantity of clothing, blankets, etc., which had been provided by the States south of Virginia for their own troops. The pile of trunks along the railroad was appalling to behold. All these stores, clothing, trunks, etc., were consigned to the flames by a portion of our cavalry left to carry out the work of their destruction.

        The loss of stores at this point, and at White Plains, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, where a large amount of meat had been salted and stored, was a very serious one to us, and embarrassed us for the remainder of the war, as it put us at once on a running stock.

        The movement back from the line of Bull Run was in itself a very wise one in a strategic point of view, if it was not one of absolute necessity, but the loss of stores was very much to be regretted. I do not pretend to attach censure to any one of our officials for this loss, especially not to General Johnston. I know that he was exceedingly anxious to get off all the stores, and made extraordinary exertions to accomplish that object. My own opinion was that the failure to carry them off was mainly owing to inefficient management by the railroad officials, as I always found their movements slow and little to be depended on, beginning with the transportation of the troops sent by me from Lynchburg in May and June, 1861.

        McClellan in his report assumes that the evacuation of the line of Bull Run, was in consequence of his projected movement to the Peninsula having become known to the Confederate commander, but such was not the fact. Our withdrawal from that line was owing to the fact that our force was too small to enable us to hold so long a line against the immense force which it was known had been concentrated at and near Washington. McClellan's statement of his own force shows that his troops, including those in Maryland and Delaware, numbered on the 1st of January, 1862, 191,840 for duty; on the 1st of February, 190,806 for duty; and on the 1st of March, 193,142 for duty. Of this force he carried into the field in his campaign in the Peninsula considerably over 100,000 men, after having left over 40,000 men to protect Washington. He could have thrown against General Johnston's army, at and near Manassas, a force of more than four times the strength of that army. I have before stated that Johnston's

army was composed of four divisions of infantry besides the cavalry and artillery.

        The division commanded by me was fully an average one, and that division, including three batteries of artillery and a company of cavalry attached to it, as shown by my field returns now before me, numbered on the 1st of February, 1862, 6,965 effective total present, and an aggregate present of 8,703; and on the 1st of March, 5,775 effective total present, and an aggregate present of 7,154. At both periods a very large number present were on the sick list. The aggregate present and absent on the 1st of March amounted to 10,008, there being at that time twenty-four officers and 962 enlisted men absent sick and 61 officers and 1,442 enlisted men absent on furlough--the rest of the absentees being on detached service and without leave. This will give a very good idea of General Johnston's entire strength, and will show the immense superiority of the enemy's force to his.

        The evacuation of Manassas and the line of Bull Run was therefore a movement rendered absolutely necessary by the inability of our army to cope with the enemy's so near to his base, and had been delayed fully as long as it was prudent to do so.

        Moving back over the routes designated, Ewell's division and mine crossed the Rappahannock on the 10th of March and took position on the south bank. We remained there several days, when my division was moved to the Rapidan and crossed over to the south bank, Ewell being left to guard the crossing of the Rappahannock. G. W. Smith's and Longstreet's divisions had moved by the roads west of the railroad, and were concentrated near Orange Court-House.

        I remained near the Rapidan until the 4th of April, when I received orders to move up to Orange Court-House to take the cars for Richmond and report to General Lee, who was then entrusted with the general direction of military operations, under the President. I

marched to the court-house next day, but found difficulty in getting cars enough to transport my division. Rodes was first sent off, then Kershaw, and my own brigade was finally put on board on the 7th. Going with the rear of this last brigade, I reached Richmond on the morning of the 8th of April, after much delay on the road, and found that Rodes and Kershaw had been sent to General Magruder on the Peninsula, to which point I was also ordered with my own brigade, part going by the way of York River, and the rest by the way of James River in vessels towed by tugs. My trains and artillery moved by land from Orange Court-House.

CHAPTER VI.

MANOEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA.

        I LANDED and reported to General Magruder on the morning of the 9th of April.

        After the abandonment of the line of Bull Run by our troops, McClellan had moved the greater part of his army to the Peninsula, and by the 4th of April had landed about 100,000 men at or near Fortress Monroe. Magruder at that time occupied the lower Peninsula with a force which did not exceed in effective men 7,000 or 8,000. Upon this force McClellan advanced with his immense army, when Magruder fell back to the line of Warwick River, extending from Yorktown on York River across James River, and checked the enemy's advance. McClellan then sat down before the fortifications at Yorktown and along Warwick River and began a siege by regular approaches.

        When I arrived at Magruder's headquarters, I was informed by him that his force, before the arrival of mine, amounted to 12,000, he having been reinforced since the enemy's advance, by troops from the south side of James River and Wilcox's brigade of G. W. Smith's (now D. R. Jones') division, the said brigade having been detached from the army under Johnston. The division carried by me now numbered about 8,000 men and officers for duty, it having been increased to that amount by the return of those on furlough and some recruits; so that Magruder's force now amounted to 20,000 men and officers for duty. McClellan, in a telegram to President Lincoln, dated the 7th of April, says: "Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply I have to state that my entire force for duty amounts to only about eighty-five thousand men." At that time, except Wilcox's brigade, not a soldier from General Johnston's army had arrived, and my division constituted

the next reinforcement received from that army by Magruder.

        Yorktown had been previously strongly fortified, and some preparations had been made to strengthen the other part of the line, which, however, had not been completed. Warwick River runs diagonally across the Peninsula from the vicinity of Yorktown, and its course for the greater part of the way is through low, marshy country. Though at its head it is quite a small stream, it had been dammed up to within about a mile of the works at Yorktown by dams thrown across at several points, so as to be impassable without bridging at any other points than where the dams were, which later we defended with earthworks.

        Between Warwick River and Yorktown were two redoubts, called respectively Redoubt No. 4 and Redoubt No. 5, which were connected by a curtain, with wings or lateral breastworks extending to Warwick River on the one side, and the head of a deep ravine between Redoubt No. 4 and Yorktown on the other. Redoubt No. 4, which was the one nearest Yorktown, was sometimes called Fort Magruder. Gloucester Point, across York River from Yorktown, was occupied by a small infantry force with some heavy batteries. The whole line was nearly fifteen miles in length. The assuming and maintaining the line by Magruder, with his small force in the face of such overwhelming odds, was one of the boldest exploits ever performed by a military commander, and he had so manoeuvred his troops, by displaying them rapidly at different points, as to produce the impression on his opponent that he had a large army. His men and a considerable body of negro laborers had been and were still engaged in strengthening the works by working night and day, so that their energies were taxed to the utmost limit.

        Before my arrival, Kershaw's brigade had been ordered to the right of the line and assigned to that part of it under the command of Brigadier General

McLaws, and Rodes' brigade had been posted at the works between the defences of Yorktown and the head of the obstructions on Warwick River. On my arrival I was ordered to move my own brigade near the point occupied by Rodes, and I was assigned to the command of that part of the line extending from the ravine south of Yorktown to the right of Wynn's Mill as far as the mouth of the branch leading into the pond made by Dam No. 1, which was the first dam below that at Wynn's Mill. There were two dams on the line thus assigned me, the dam at Wynn's Mill, etc. The troops defending the part of the line thus assigned me consisted of Rodes' brigade; my own, now under the command of Colonel D. K. McRae, of the 5th North Carolina Regiment; the 2nd Florida Regiment, Colonel Ward; the 2nd Mississippi Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor; Brigadier General Wilcox's brigade; and two regiments temporarily attached to his command under Colonel Winston of Alabama; and the 19th Mississippi Regiment, Colonel Mott. The latter regiment was, however, transferred to another part of the line in a few days.

        The only portions of my line exposed to the view of the enemy were Redoubts Nos. 4 and 5 and the works attached to them, the works at Wynn's Mill and part of a small work at the upper dam of Wynn's Mill--the works at Wynn's Mill and the upper dam with the intervening space being occupied by Wilcox's command. Between the works designated, including Dam No. 1, the swamps on both sides of Warwick River were thickly wooded, and it would have been impossible to cross without cutting away the dams, which could not have been done without first driving away our troops. This was also the case below Dam No. 1 to a greater or less extent. Redoubts Nos. 4 and 5 with the curtain and lateral works had been from necessity constructed on ground sloping towards the enemy, and the interior and rear of them were therefore much exposed to his fire. This was also the case at Wynn's Mill, and at both points

it had been necessary to cut zig-zag trenches, or bayous, to enable the men to pass into and from the works with as little exposure as possible.

        Our side of the Warwick River, between the exposed points, was occupied by thin picket lines. Besides the infantry mentioned, there were several batteries of field artillery in the works, and in Redoubt No. 4 there were two heavy guns and a large Howitzer. Brigadier General Raines had charge of the immediate defences of Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

        When I took command I found the enemy busily engaged in constructing trenches and earthworks in front of Redoubts 4 and 5 and of Wynn's Mill. In front of Redoubt No. 5 was a dwelling house, with several out-houses and a large peach orchard extending to within a few hundred yards of our works, under cover of which the enemy pushed forward some sharp-shooters, with long-range rifles, and established a line of rifle pits within range of our works, which annoyed us very much for several days, as nearly our whole armament for the infantry consisted of smooth-bore muskets, and our artillery ammunition was too scarce to permit its use in a contest with sharp-shooters. On the 11th of April General Magruder ordered sorties to be made by small parties from all the main parts of the line for the purpose of fooling the enemy. Wilcox sent out a party from Wynn's Mill which encountered the skirmishers the enemy had thrown up towards his front, and drove them back to the main line.

        Later in the day Colonel Ward, with his own regiment and the 2nd Mississippi Battalion, was thrown to the front on the right and left of Redoubt No. 5, driving the enemy's sharp-shooters from their rifle pits, advancing through the peach orchard to the main road beyond, from Warwick Court-House and Fortress Monroe, so as to compel a battery, which the enemy had posted at an earthwork on our left of said road, to retire precipitately. Colonel Ward, however, returned to our

works on the approach of a large force of the enemy's infantry, after having set fire to the house above mentioned and performed the duty assigned him in a very gallant and dashing manner without loss to his command. These affairs developed the fact that the enemy was in strong force both in front of Wynn's Mill and Redoubts 4 and 5.

        On the night following Ward's sortie, the 24th Virginia Regiment, under Colonel Terry, moved to the front, and cut down the peach orchard and burned the rest of the houses which had afforded the enemy shelter; and on the next night Colonel McRae, with the 5th North Carolina Regiment, moved further to the front and cut down some cedars along the main road above mentioned, which partially screened the enemy's movements from our observation, both of which feats were accomplished without difficulty or loss; and after this we were not annoyed again by the enemy's sharp-shooters. About this time Major General D. H. Hill arrived at Yorktown with two brigades from General Johnston's army, and was assigned to the command of the left wing, embracing Raines' command and mine. No change, however, was made in the extent of my command, but I was merely made subordinate to General Hill.

        The enemy continued to work very busily on his approaches, and each day some new work was developed. He occasionally fired with artillery on our works, and the working parties engaged in strengthening them and making traverses and epaulments in the rear, but we very rarely replied to him, as our supply of ammunition was very limited.

        During the month of April there was much cold, rainy weather, and our troops suffered greatly, as they were without tents or other shelter. Their duties were very severe and exhausting, as when they were not on the front line in the trenches they were employed in constructing heavy traverses and epaulments in the rear

of the main line, so as to conceal and protect the approaches to it. In addition to all this, their rations were very limited and consisted of the plainest and roughest food. Coffee was out of the question, as were vegetables and fresh meat. All this told terribly on the health of the men, and there were little or no hospital accommodations in the rear.

        In a day or two after General Hill's arrival, Colston's brigade reported to me and occupied a position between the upper dam of Wynn's Mill and Redoubt No. 5. On the 16th the enemy made a dash at Dam No. 1 on my right and succeeded in crossing the dam and entering the work covering it, but was soon repulsed and driven across the river with some loss. This was not within the limits of my command, but a portion of my troops were moved in the direction of the point attacked without, however, being needed. By the 18th, the residue of General Johnston's troops east of the Blue Ridge, except Ewell's division and a portion of the cavalry which had been left on the Rappahannock and a small force left at Fredericksburg, had reached the vicinity of Yorktown, and on that day General Johnston, having assumed the command, issued an order assigning Magruder to the command of the right wing, beginning at Dam No. 1 and extending to James River; D. H. Hill to the command of the left wing, including Yorktown, and Redoubts 4 and 5, and their appertinent defences; Longstreet to the command of the centre, which extended from Dam No. 1 to the right of the lateral defences of Redoubt No. 5; and G. W. Smith to the command of the reserve.

        This order, as a necessary consequence, curtailed my command, which was now confined to Redoubts Nos. 4 and 5 and the works adjacent thereto, and they were defended by Rodes' and my brigades, and the 2nd Florida Regiment, 2nd Mississippi Battalion, and 49th Virginia Regiment, the latter regiment having been lately assigned to me for the defence of the head of the ravine

south of Yorktown. Shortly afterwards General Hill made a new arrangement of the command, by which Rodes' brigade was separated from mine and General Rodes was assigned to the charge of Redoubt No. 5 and the defences on its right, while I was assigned to the charge of Redoubt No. 4 and the defences on the right and left of it, including the curtain connecting the two redoubts.

        The enemy continued to advance his works, and it was while we were thus confronting him and in constant expectation of an assault, that the reorganization of the greater part of the regiments of our army, under the Conscript Act recently passed by Congress, took place. Congress had been tampering for some time with the question of reorganizing the army and supplying the place of the twelve months' volunteers, which composed much the greater part of our army; and several schemes had been started and adopted with little or no success and much damage to the army itself, until finally it was found necessary to adopt a general conscription. If this scheme had been adopted in the beginning, it would have readily been acquiesced in, but when it was adopted much dissatisfaction was created by the fact that it necessarily violated promises and engagements made with those who had re-enlisted under some of the former schemes. The reorganization which took place resulted in a very great change in the officers, especially among the field-officers, all of whom were appointed by election, and as may well be supposed this state of things added nothing to the efficiency of the army or its morals.

        In the meantime the enemy's army had been greatly augmented by reinforcements, and by the last of April his approaches in our front had assumed very formidable appearances. McClellan, in his report, states the strength of his army as follows: present for duty, April 30, 1862, 4,725 officers, and 104,610 men, making 109,335 aggregate present for duty, and 115,350 aggregate present. This was exclusive of Wool's troops at Fortress

Monroe. General Johnston's whole force, including Magruder's force in it, could not have exceeded 50,000 men and officers for duty, if it reached that number, and my own impression, from data within my knowledge, is that it was considerably below that figure.

        After dark on the night of Thursday the 1st of May, General Hill informed his subordinate commanders that the line of Warwick River and Yorktown was to be abandoned, according to a determination that day made, upon a consultation of the principal officers at General Johnston's headquarters; and we were ordered to get ready to evacuate immediately after dark on the following night, after having previously sent off all the trains. This measure was one of absolute necessity, and the only wonder to me was that it had not been previously resorted to.

        The line occupied by us was so long and our troops had to be so much scattered to occupy the whole of it, that no point could be sufficiently defended against a regular siege or a vigorous assault. The obstacles that had been interposed to obstruct the enemy, likewise rendered it impossible for us to move out and attack him after he had established his works in front of ours; and we would have to await the result of a regular siege, with the danger, imminent at any time, of the enemy's gunboats and monitors running by our works on York and James Rivers, and thus destroying our communication by water. About twelve miles in rear of Yorktown, near Williamsburg, the Peninsula is only about three or four miles wide, and there are creeks and marshes intersecting it on both sides at this point, in such way that the routes for the escape of our army would have been confined to a very narrow slip, if our line had been broken. The most assailable point on our whole line was that occupied by Rodes and myself, and when the enemy could have got his heavy batteries ready, our works on this part of the line would have soon been rendered wholly untenable.

        Owing to the fact that the ground on which these works were located sloped towards the enemy's position, so as to expose to a direct fire their interior and rear, it would have been easy for him to have shelled us out of them; and when this part of the line had been carried, the enemy could have pushed to our rear on the direct road to Williamsburg and secured all the routes over which it would have been possible for us to retreat, thus rendering the capture or dispersion of our entire army certain. Nothing but the extreme boldness of Magruder and the excessive caution of McClellan had arrested the march of the latter across this part of the line in the first place, as it was then greatly weaker than we subsequently made it.

        During the night of the 1st of May, after orders had been given for the evacuation, we commenced a cannonade upon the enemy, with all of our heavy guns, in the works at Yorktown and in Redoubt No. 4. The object of this was to dispose of as much of the fixed ammunition as possible and produce the impression that we were preparing for an attack on the enemy's trenches. This cannonading was continued during the next day, and, on one part of the line, we were ready to have commenced the evacuation at the time designated, but a little before night on that day (Friday the 2nd) the order was countermanded until the next night, because some of Longstreet's troops were not ready to move. We therefore continued to cannonade on Friday night and during Saturday. Fortunately, after dark on the latter day the evacuation began and was conducted successfully--Stuart's cavalry having been dismounted to occupy our picket line in front, and then men attached to the heavy artillery remaining behind to continue the cannonade until near daylight next morning, so as to keep the enemy in ignorance of our movements. There was a loss of some stores and considerable public property which had been recently brought down, for which there was no transportation, as the steamboats

expected for that purpose did not arrive, and the whole of our heavy artillery including some guns that had not been mounted had to be abandoned.

        Hill's command, to which I was attached, moved on the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg, but our progress was very slow, as the roads were in a terrible condition by reason of heavy rains which had recently fallen. My command passed through Williamsburg after sunrise on the morning of Sunday, the 4th, and bivouacked about two miles west of that place. The day before the evacuation took place the 20th Georgia Regiment had been transferred from my brigade, and its place had been supplied by the 38th Virginia Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Whittle. The 2nd Florida Regiment and the 2nd Mississippi Battalion continued to be attached to my command. No supplies of provisions had been accumulated at Williamsburg, and the rations brought from Yorktown were now nearly exhausted, owing to the delay of a day in the evacuation and the fact that our transportation was very limited.

        We rested on Sunday, but received orders to be ready to resume the march at 3 o'clock A.M. on next day, the 5th. My command was under arms promptly at the time designated, but it had been raining during the night, and it was very difficult for our trains and artillery to make any headway. My command, therefore, had to remain under arms until about noon, before the time arrived for it to take its place in the column to follow the troops and trains which were to precede it, and was just about to move off when I received an order from General Hill to halt for a time. I soon received another order to move back to Williamsburg and report to General Longstreet, who had been entrusted with the duty of protecting our rear.

CHAPTER VII.

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

        ON reporting to General Longstreet at Williamsburg, I ascertained that there was fighting, by a portion of our troops, with the enemy's advance, at a line of redoubts previously constructed a short distance east of Williamsburg, the principal one of which redoubts, covering the main road, was known as Fort Magruder. I was directed to move my command into the college grounds and await orders. There was now a cold, drizzling rain and the wind and the mud in the roads, and everywhere else, was very deep. After remaining for some time near the college, I received an order from General Longstreet to move to Fort Magruder and support Brigadier General Anderson, who had command of the troops engaged with the enemy.

        My command was immediately put into motion, and I sent my aide, Lieutenant S. H. Early, forward, to inform General Anderson of my approach, and ascertain where my troops were needed. Lieutenant Early soon returned with the information that General Anderson was not at Fort Magruder, having gone to the right, where his troops were engaged, but that General Stuart, who was in charge at the fort, requested that four of my regiments be moved into position on the right of it and two on the left. As I was moving on to comply with his request and had neared Fort Magruder, General Longstreet himself rode up and ordered me to move the whole of my command to a position which he pointed out, on a ridge in a field to the left and rear of the Fort, so as to prevent the enemy from turning the position in that direction, and to await further orders. General Longstreet then rode towards the right, and I was proceeding to the position assigned me, when one of the General's staff officers came to me with an order

to send him two regiments, which I complied with by sending the 2nd Florida Regiment and the 2nd Mississippi Battalion, under Colonel Ward.

        With my brigade proper I moved to the point designated before this last order, and took position on the crest of a ridge in a wheat field and facing towards a piece of woods from behind which some of the enemy's guns were firing on Fort Magruder. Shortly after I had placed my command in position, General Hill came up and I suggested to him the propriety of moving through the woods to attack one of the enemy's batteries which seemed to have a flank fire on our main position. He was willing for the attack to be made, but replied that he must see General Longstreet before authorizing it. He then rode to see General Longstreet and I commenced making preparations for the projected attack. While I was so engaged, Brigadier General Rains, also of Hill's command, came up with his brigade and formed immediately in my rear so as to take my place when I moved. General Hill soon returned with the information that the attack was to be made, and he proceeded to post some field-pieces which had come up, in position to cover my retreat if I should be repulsed.

        As soon as this was done, my brigade moved forward through the wheat field into the woods, and then through that in the direction of the firing, by the sound of which we were guided, as the battery itself and the troops supporting it were entirely concealed from our view. General Hill accompanied the brigade, going with the right of it. It moved with the 5th North Carolina on the right, then with the 23rd North Carolina, then the 38th Virginia, and then the 24th Virginia on the left. I moved forward with the 24th Virginia, as I expected, from the sound of the enemy's guns and the direction in which we were moving, it would come upon the battery. After moving through the woods a quarter of a mile or more, the 24th came to a rail fence with an open field beyond,

in which were posted several guns, under the support of infantry, near some farm houses. In this field were two redoubts, one of which, being the extreme left redoubt of the line of which Fort Magruder was the main work, was occupied by the enemy, and this redoubt was, from the quarter from which we approached, beyond the farm house where the guns mentioned were posted. The 24th, without hesitation, sprang over the fence and made a dash at the guns which were but a short distance from us, but they retired very precipitately, as did the infantry support, to the cover of the redoubt in their rear and the fence and piece of woods nearby.

        My line as it moved forward was at right angle to that of the enemy, so that my left regiment alone came upon him and as it moved into the field was exposed to a flank fire. This regiment, inclining to the left, moved gallantly to the attack, and continued to press forward towards the main position at the redoubt under a heavy fire of both infantry and artillery; but the other regiments had not emerged from the woods, and I sent orders for them to move up to the support of the 24th. In the meantime I had received a very severe wound in the shoulder from a minie ball and my horse had been very badly shot, having one of his eyes knocked out. I then rode towards the right for the purpose of looking after the other regiments and ordering them into action, and met the 5th North Carolina, under Colonel McRae, advancing in gallant style towards the enemy. Upon emerging from the woods and finding no enemy in his immediate front, Colonel McRae had promptly formed line to the left and moved to the support of the regiment which was engaged, traversing the whole front which should have been occupied by the two other regiments. He advanced through an open field under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery and infantry, and soon became hotly engaged by the side of the 24th.

        Having by this time become very weak from loss of blood, and suffering greatly from pain, I rode to the second redoubt nearby, in full view of the fight going on and but a few hundred yards from it, for the purpose of dismounting and directing the operations from that point. When I attempted to dismount I found myself so weak, and my pain was so excruciating, that I would not have been able to remount my horse, nor, from these causes, was I then able to direct the movements of my troops. I therefore rode from the field, to the hospital at Williamsburg, passing by Fort Magruder, and informing General Longstreet, whom I found on the right of it, of what was going on with my command.

        The 24th Virginia and 5th North Carolina Regiments continued to confront the enemy at close quarters for some time without any support, until Colonel McRae, who had succeeded to the command of the brigade, in reply to a request sent for reinforcements, received an order from General Hill to retire. The 23rd North Carolina Regiment, as reported by Colonel Hoke, had received an order from General Hill to change its front in the woods, doubtless for the purpose of advancing to the support of the regiment first engaged, but it did not emerge from the woods at all, as it moved too far to the left and rear of the 24th Virginia, where it encountered a detachment of the enemy on his right flank. The 38th Virginia Regiment, after some difficulty, succeeded in getting into the field, and was moving under fire to the support of the two regiments engaged, when the order was received to retire.

        At the time this order was received, the 24th Virginia and 5th North Carolina were comparatively safe from the enemy's fire, which had slackened, as they had advanced to a point where they were in a great measure sheltered, but the moment they commenced to retire the enemy opened a heavy fire upon them, and, as they had to retire over a bare field, they suffered severely. In

going back through the woods, some of the men lost their way and were captured by running into a regiment of the enemy, which was on his right in the woods.

        From these causes the loss in those two regiments was quite severe. Colonel Wm. R. Terry and Lieutenant Colonel P. Hairston, of the 24th Virginia, were severely wounded, and Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Badham of the 5th North Carolina was killed, while a number of company officers of both regiments were among the killed and wounded. The loss in the 23rd North Carolina and 38th Virginia was slight, but Lieutenant Colonel Whittle of the latter regiment received a wound in the arm. The brigade fell back to the position from which it advanced, without having been pursued by the enemy, and was there re-formed. The troops of the enemy encountered by my brigade in this action consisted of Hancock's brigade and some eight or ten pieces of artillery.

        The charge made by the 24th Virginia and the 5th North Carolina Regiments on this force was one of the most brilliant of the war, and its character was such as to elicit applause even from the newspaper correspondents from the enemy's camps. Had one of the brigades which had come up to the position from which mine advanced been ordered up to the support of Colonel McRae, the probability is that a very different result would have taken place, and perhaps Hancock's whole force would have been captured, as its route for retreat was over a narrow mill-dam.

        McClellan, in a telegraphic dispatch at the time, reported that my command had been repulsed by "a real bayonet charge," and he reiterates the statement in his report, that Hancock repulsed the troops opposed to him by a bayonet charge, saying: "Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited their onset, and then turned upon them: after some terrific volleys of musketry he charged them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force." This statement is entirely devoid of truth. My regiments were not repulsed, but retired

under order as I have stated, and there was no charge by the enemy with or without bayonets. This charging with bayonets was one of the myths of this as well as all other wars. Military commanders sometimes saw the charges, after the fighting was over, but the surgeons never saw the wounds made by the bayonets, except in a few instances of mere individual conflict, or where some wounded men had been bayoneted in the field.

        Colonel Ward of Florida had led his command into action on the right of Fort Magruder, and he was killed soon after getting under fire. He was a most accomplished, gallant, and deserving officer, and would have risen to distinction in the army had he lived.

        This battle at Williamsburg was participated in by only a small part of our army, and its object was to give time to our trains to move off on the almost impassable roads. It accomplished that purpose. The enemy's superior force was repulsed at all points save that at which I had been engaged, or at least his advance was checked. A number of guns were captured from him and his loss was severe, though we had to abandon some of the captured guns for the want of horses to move them.

        During the night, the rear of our army resumed its retreat, and the whole of it succeeded in reaching the vicinity of Richmond and interposing for the defence of that city, after some minor affairs with portions of the enemy's troops. A portion of our wounded had to be left at Williamsburg for want of transportation, and surgeons were left in charge of them. I succeeded in getting transportation to the rear, and, starting from Williamsburg after 12 o'clock on the night of the 5th, and deviating next day from the route pursued by our army, I reached James River, near Charles City Court-House, and there obtained transportation on a steamer to Richmond, where I arrived at night on the 8th. From Richmond I went to Lynchburg, and, as soon as I was able to travel on horseback, I went to my own county, where I remained until I was able to resume duty in the field.

CHAPTER VIII.

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND.

        DURING my absence from the army, the battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, as the enemy called it, was fought on the 31st of May and the 1st of June, and General Johnston had been wounded. General R. E. Lee had succeeded to the command of the army of General Johnston, and it was now designated "The Army of Northern Virginia."

        General Lee's army had received some reinforcements from the South; and General Jackson (after his brilliant campaign in the valley of the Shenandoah, by which he had baffled and rendered useless large bodies of the enemy's troops, and prevented McDowell from being sent to the support of McClellan with his force of 40,000 men) had been ordered to move rapidly toward Richmond for the purpose of uniting in an attack on McClellan's lines.^*

        * The following correspondence shows how much the Federalauthorities, civil and military, were befogged by Jackson's movements.

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 24, 12 P.M., 1862.

        "A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the army. The party states he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell, fifteen brigades (a) at Gordonsville, on the 21st; that they were moving to Frederick's Hall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have."

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

"WASHINGTON, June 25, 2.35.

"MAJOR GENERAL McCLELLAN:

        "We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand men. Some reports place ten thousand rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened, and General Kelly that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fremont contradicted this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the Department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, an the fourteenth (14th) instant, stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked Richmond; but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is towards Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here.

"EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

        (a) Jackson's command consisted of nine brigades at this time. Whiting with two brigades and Lawton with one had joined him after the engagements at Cross Keys and Port Republic, at which time he had only six brigades, three in Ewell's division, and three in his own.

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE ON HIS HORSE, "TRAVELLER," 1867.
(By permission of A. H. Plecker)

        This movement had been made with such dispatch and secrecy, that the approach of Jackson towards Washington was looked for by the authorities at that city, until he was in position to fall on McClellan's rear and left.

        Having started on my return to the army, without having any knowledge of the contemplated movement, on my arrival at Lynchburg I found that the fighting had already begun with brilliant results. I hastened on to Richmond and arrived there late in the afternoon of the 28th of June. Though hardly able to take the field

and advised by the surgeon not to do so, immediately on my arrival in Richmond I mounted my horse, and with my personal staff rode to General Lee's headquarters at Gaines' house, north of the Chickahominy, for the purpose of seeking a command and participating in the approaching battles which seemed inevitable. I arrived at General Lee's headquarters about 11 o'clock on the night of the 28th, and found him in bed. I did not disturb him that night but waited until next morning before reporting to him. The battles of Mechanicsville and Chickahominy^* had been fought on the 26th and 27th respectively, and that part of the enemy's army which was north of the Chickahominy had been driven across that stream to the south side.

        The troops which had been engaged in this work consisted of Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's, and A. P. Hill's divisions, with a brigade of cavalry under Stuart, from the army around Richmond, and Jackson's command, consisting of his own, Ewell's, and Whiting's divisions. All of these commands were still north of the Chickahominy, and Magruder's, Huger's, McLaw's, and D. R. Jones' divisions had been left on the south side to defend Richmond, there being about a division at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs under Generals Holmes and Wise. Magruder's, McLaw's and Jones' divisions consisted of two brigades each, and were all under the command of General Magruder.

        A reorganization of the divisions and brigades of the army had been previously made, and my brigade, composed of troops from two different States, had been broken up, and my regiments had been assigned to other brigadier generals. On reporting to General Lee on the morning of the 29th (Sunday), I was informed by him that all the commands were then disposed of, and no

        * So called by General Lee, though designated by subordinate commanders as the battle of Cold Harbor or Gaines' Mill, according to the part of the ground on which their commands fought.

new arrangement could take place in the presence of the enemy; but he advised me to return to Richmond and wait until a vacancy occurred, which he said would doubtless be the case in a day or two.

        I rode back to Richmond that day, and on the next day, the 30th, called on the Secretary of War, General Randolph, who gave me a letter to General Lee, suggesting that I be assigned to the temporary command of Elzey's brigade of Ewell's division, as General Elzey had been severely wounded, and would not be able to return to duty for some time. On the day before, our troops on the north of Chickahominy had crossed to the south side in pursuit of the enemy, and were marching towards James River, and Magruder had had an engagement with the rear of the retreating column at Savage Station on the York River Railroad. On the afternoon of the 30th, I rode to find General Lee again, and, being guided by reports of the movement of our troops and, as I got nearer, by the sound of artillery, I reached the vicinity of the battlefield at Frazier's farm, just about the close of the battle near dark. This battle had taken place between Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions and a large body of the enemy's retreating forces. There had been a failure of other portions of the army to come up as General Lee expected them to do, but the enemy had been driven from the field with a loss of some artillery and a considerable number in killed, wounded and prisoners on his part.

        I gave General Lee the letter of the Secretary of War, and next morning he gave me an order to report to General Jackson for the purpose of being assigned temporarily to Elzey's brigade. This was the 1st of July, and I rode past the battlefield of the day before with our advancing troops, until we reached the road leading from across White Oak Swamp past Malvern Hill to James River, where I found the head of General Jackson's column. I rode forward and found the General on the road towards Malvern Hill with a cavalry

escort, awaiting a report from some scouts who had been sent forward to ascertain the enemy's position.

        On reporting to General Jackson, he directed his adjutant general to write the order for me at once, but while Major Dabney, the then adjutant general, was preparing to do this, the enemy opened with some of his guns from Malvern Hill, and several shells fell near us. This rendered an immediate change of quarters necessary, and the whole party mounted at once and retired to the rear, followed by the enemy's shells in great profusion, as the cloud of dust arising from the movement of the cavalry enabled him to direct his fire with tolerable precision. As soon as we got out of immediate danger, Major Dabney wrote me the necessary order, on his knee, in a hurried manner, and I thus became attached to the command of the famous "Stonewall" Jackson. I found General Ewell's division in the rear of Jackson's column, and upon reporting to him the command of Elzey's brigade was at once given me, it being then about ten o'clock p.m.

        The brigade was composed of the remnants of seven regiments, to-wit: the 13th Virginia, the 25th Virginia, the 31st Virginia, the 44th Virginia, the 52nd Virginia, the 58th Virginia, and the 12th Georgia Regiments. The whole force present numbered 1,052 officers and men, and there was but one colonel present (Colonel J. A. Walker of the 13th Virginia Regiment), and two lieutenant colonels (of the 25th and 52nd Virginia Regiments respectively), the rest of the regiments being commanded by captains. General Jackson's command at this time was composed of his own division, and those of Ewell, D. H. Hill, and W. H. Whiting, besides a number of batteries of artillery. Ewell's division was composed of Trimble's brigade, Taylor's Louisiana brigade, the brigade to which I had been assigned, and a small body of Maryland troops under Colonel Bradley T. Johnson.

        After remaining for some time in the rear, we finally

moved forward past Willis' Church, to where a line of battle had been formed confronting the enemy's position at Malvern Hill. D. H. Hill's division had been formed on the right of the road leading towards the enemy, and Whiting's on the left, with an interval between his right and the road into which the Louisiana brigade of Ewell's division was moved. My brigade was posted in the woods in rear of the Louisiana brigade, and Trimble's brigade was formed in rear of Whiting's left, which constituted the extreme left of our line. Jackson's division was held in reserve in rear of the whole. The enemy soon commenced a heavy cannonade upon the positions where our troops were posted, and kept it up continuously during the rest of the day. From the position which I occupied, the enemy could not be seen, as a considerable body of woods intervened, but many shells and solid shot passed over us, and one shell passed through my line, killing two or three persons.

        We remained in this position until about sunset, and, in the meantime, D. H. Hill on our immediate right and Magruder on his right had attacked the enemy and become very hotly engaged. Just about sunset I was ordered to move my brigade rapidly towards the right to support General D. H. Hill. General Ewell accompanied me, and we had to move through the woods in a circle in rear of the position Hill had first assumed, as the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery prevented our moving in any other route. As we moved on through intricate woods, which very much impeded our progress, we were still within range of the shells from the enemy's numerous batteries, and they were constantly bursting in the tops of the trees over our heads, literally strewing the ground with leaves.

        After moving through the woods for some distance we came to a small blind road leading into an open flat, where there had once been a mill on a creek which ran through swampy ground between our left and the enemy. On reaching the edge of the open flat I was ordered to

halt the head of my brigade, until General Ewell rode forward with a guide, who had been sent to show us the way, to ascertain the manner in which we were to cross the creek. The musketry fire was now terrific, and reverberated along the valley of the creek awfully. General Ewell soon returned in a great hurry and directed me to move as rapidly as possible. As soon as the head of the brigade, led by Lieut. Colonel Skinner of the 52nd Virginia Regiment, emerged into the open ground, General Ewell turned to him and directed him to go directly across the flat in the direction he pointed, cross the creek, and then turn to the left through the woods into the road beyond, ordering him at the same time to move at a double quick. Before I could say anything General Ewell turned to me and said, "We will have to go this way," and he dashed off in a gallop on a road leading to our right along the old dam across the creek into another road leading in the direction of the battlefield.

        I had no option but to follow him, which I did as rapidly as possible, but this required me to make a considerable circuit to get to the point where I expected to meet the head of my brigade. There were now streams of our men pouring back from the battlefield, and on getting into the road leading towards it I lost sight of my brigade, as a woods intervened. I did not find it coming into the road at the point where I expected, and after some fruitless efforts to find it, in which I was often deceived by seeing squads from the battlefield come out of the woods in such manner as to cause me to mistake them for the head of my brigade, I rode back to find if it was crossing the flat.

        I saw nothing of it then, and the fact was, as afterwards ascertained, that, after crossing the creek, Colonel Skinner had turned to the left too far, and moved towards the battlefield in a different direction than that indicated. His regiment had been followed by three others, the 13th, 44th, and 58th Virginia Regiments,

but the 12th Georgia and 25th and 31st Virginia Regiments, being in the rear in the woods when the head of the brigade moved at a double quick, were left behind, and when they reached the flat, seeing nothing of the rest of the brigade, they crossed the creek at the dam and took the wrong end of the road. In the meantime, while I was trying to find my brigade, General Ewell had rallied a small part of Kershaw's brigade and carried it back to the field. I saw now a large body of men, which proved to be of Toombs' brigade, coming from the field and I endeavored to rally them, but with little success.

        While I was so engaged, the 12th Georgia of my own brigade came up, after having found that it had taken the wrong direction, and with that regiment under the command of Captain J. G. Rogers, I moved on, followed by Colonel Benning of Toombs' brigade with about thirty men of his own regiment. Lieutenant Early, my aide, soon came up with the 25th and 31st Virginia Regiments, which he had been sent to find. On reaching the field, I found General Hill and General Ewell endeavoring to form a line with that part of Kershaw's brigade which had been rallied, while Ransom's brigade, or a part of it, was moving to the front.

        I was ordered to form my men in line with Kershaw's men, and this was done in a clover field in view of the flashes from the enemy's guns, the guns themselves and his troops being concealed from our view by the darkness which had supervened. General Hill's troops had been compelled to retire from the field as had been the greater part of Magruder's, after a very desperate struggle against immense odds, and a vast amount of heavy siege guns and field artillery. I was ordered to hold the position where I was and not attempt an advance.

        The enemy still continued a tremendous fire of artillery from his numerous guns, and his fire was in a circle diverging from the main position at Malvern Hill so as

to include our entire line from right to left. This fire was kept up until after nine o'clock, and shells were constantly bursting in front and over us, and crashing into the woods in our rear. It was a magnificent display of fireworks, but not very pleasant to those exposed to it. After being gone some time the part of Ransom's brigade which had advanced in front of us, retired to the rear. Trimble's brigade had arrived from the extreme left, and was posted in my rear. Generals Hill and Ewell remained with us until after the firing had ceased, and then retired after giving me orders to remain where I was until morning and await further orders. During the night General Trimble moved his brigade back towards its former position, and General Kershaw and Colonel Benning retired with their men for the purpose of looking after the rest of their commands.

        My three small regiments, numbering a little over three hundred in all, were left the sole occupants of that part of the field, save the dead and wounded in our immediate front. My men lay on their arms in the open field, but they had no sleep that night. The cries and groans of the wounded in our front were truly heart-rending, but we could afford them no relief. We observed lights moving about the enemy's position during the whole night, as if looking for the killed and wounded, and the rumbling of wheels was distinctly heard as of artillery moving to the rear, from which I inferred that the enemy was retreating.

        At light next morning I discovered a portion of the enemy's troops still at his position of the day before, but it was evidently only a small portion and it turned out to be a heavy rear guard of infantry and cavalry left to protect the retreating army. The position which he had occupied and which our troops had attacked was a strong and commanding one, while the whole country around, over which our troops had been compelled to advance, was entirely open several hundred yards and

swept by his artillery massed on the crest of Malvern Hill.

        In my view were nearly the whole of our dead and wounded that had not been able to leave the field, as well as a great part of the enemy's dead, and the sight was truly appalling. While watching the enemy's movements I observed to our right of his position and close up to it a small body of troops lying down with their faces to the enemy, who looked to me very much like Confederates. I moved a little further to my right for the purpose of seeing better and discovered a cluster of Confederates, not more than ten or twelve in number, one of whom was also looking with field glasses at the body which I took to be a part of our troops. On riding up to this party, I found it to consist of General Armistead of Huger's division with a few men of his brigade. In answer to my question as to where his brigade was, General Armistead replied, "Here are all that I know anything about except those lying out there in front." He had spent the night in a small cluster of trees around some old graves about two hundred yards from my right.

        After viewing them with the glasses, we were satisfied that the troops lying so close up to the position of the enemy were Confederates, and it turned out that they consisted of Generals Mahone and Wright of Huger's division with parts of their brigades. The whole force with them only amounted to a few hundred, and this body constituted the whole of our troops making the assault who had not been compelled to retire. They maintained the ground they had won, after mingling their dead with those of the enemy at the very mouths of his guns, and when the enemy finally retired this small body under Mahone and Wright remained the actual masters of the fight. Before the enemy did retire, a messenger came from Generals Mahone and Wright, with a request for the commander of the troops on the part of the field where I was to advance, stating that the enemy was retreating and that but a rear guard

occupied the position. I was, however, too weak to comply with the request, especially as I was informed that their ammunition was exhausted.

        Shortly after light, General Ewell came in a great hurry to withdraw my command from the critical position in which he supposed it to be, but I informed him that the enemy had been retreating all night, and he sent information of that fact to General Jackson.

        Early in the morning a captain of Huger's division reported to me that he had collected nearby about one hundred and fifty men of that division, and he asked me what he should do with them. I directed him to hold them where they were and report to General Armistead, who was on the field. About this time a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry advanced towards us on the road from his main position of the day before, as I supposed for a charge upon us, and I requested General Armistead to take command of the detachment from Huger's division and aid me in repulsing the charge, but, while I was making the necessary preparations, a few shots from a small party of infantry on the left of the road sent the cavalry back again. By this time our ambulance details had commenced to pass freely to the front for our dead and wounded, and they began to mingle freely with those of the enemy engaged in a similar work. For some time a sort of tacit truce seemed to prevail while details from both armies were engaged in this sad task, but the enemy's rear guard finally retired slowly from our view altogether, on the road toward Harrison's Landing.

        It was not until this movement that I discovered what had become of the rest of my brigade, and I then ascertained that when the missing regiments had arrived on the battlefield at a different point from that intended, Colonel Walker had taken charge of them. It was dark by that time, and they got in amongst some of the enemy's regiments, when Colonel Walker quietly withdrew them, as the force into which they had got was

entirely too strong for him to attack. My brigade did not draw trigger at all, but it sustained a loss of thirty-three in killed and wounded from the artillery fire of the enemy. During the 2nd it commenced raining, and before night the rain was very heavy, continuing all night. After being employed for some time in picking up small arms from the battlefield, my command was moved to a position near where we had been in line, the day before, and there bivouacked with the rest of the brigade, which had returned to that point the night before.

        At the battle of Malvern Hill, the whole army of McClellan was concentrated at a very strong position, with a limited front and both flanks effectively protected. General Lee's entire army was likewise present, and it was the first time during the seven days' fighting around Richmond that these two armies had thus confronted each other.

        McClellan's army, however, was so situated that each portion of it was in ready communication with, and in easy supporting distance of, every other part, so that the whole was available for defence or attack, while such was the nature of the ground over which General Lee's army had to move to get into position, and in which it was drawn up after it got in position, that communication between the several commands was very difficult, and movements to the support of each other still more difficult.

        General Lee made the attack, and it was his purpose to hurl the greater part of his army against the enemy, but there had been much delay in getting some of the commands into position, owing to the difficulties of the ground and an unfortunate mistake as to roads. When the attack was made, it was very late in the afternoon, and then, from the want of concert produced by the want of proper communication, only a portion of our troops advanced to the attack of the enemy. The troops which did so advance consisted alone of D. H.

Hill's division of Jackson's command, Magruder's command of three small divisions of two brigades each, and three brigades of Huger's division, in all fourteen brigades.

        From some mistake in regard to the signal for the advance, D. H. Hill, hearing what he supposed to be that signal, and was probably intended as such, advanced to the attack on the enemy's front with his five brigades alone, and for some time confronted the whole force at Malvern Hill, but after a desperate conflict and a display of useless valor, was compelled to retire with heavy loss. Magruder's command, including Huger's three brigades, was then hurled upon the enemy by brigades, one after the other, but those brigades were likewise, compelled to retire after making in vain the most heroic efforts to force the enemy from his position.

        In the meantime, Holmes' division of three brigades, Jackson's division of four brigades, Ewell's division of three brigades, and Whiting's division of two brigades, were inactive, while Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions, of six brigades each, were held in reserve some distance in the rear. It is true two brigades of Ewell's division, and Jackson's whole division, were ordered to the support of D. H. Hill after his command had been compelled to retire, but it was only to be thrown into confusion by the difficulties of the way and the approaching darkness, and to be exposed to a murderous fire of artillery, for it was then too late to remedy the mischief that had been done.

        In addition to all this, our troops had to advance over open ground to the attack of the enemy's front, while exposed to a most crushing fire of canister and shrapnel from his numerous batteries of heavy guns and field pieces massed on a commanding position, as well as to a flank fire from his gunboats in James River, as it was impossible from the nature of the ground and the position of the flanks to turn and attack either of them.

Moreover, such was the character of the ground occupied by us that it was impossible to employ our artillery, as in attempting to bring the guns into action on the only ground where it was possible to use them, they could be knocked to pieces before they could be used with effect, and such was the result of the few experiments made. Longstreet's and Hill's divisions were held in reserve because they had been heavily engaged at Frazier's farm the day before, but why the rest of Jackson's command was not thrown into action I cannot say, unless it be that the difficulty of communicating, and the impossibility of seeing what was going on on our right, prevented the advance from that quarter from being known in time. Certain it is that I was not aware of the fact that it was any other than an affair of artillery, until ordered to General Hill's support, as the roar of the artillery drowned the sound of the small arms.

        General Hill states that his division numbered ten thousand men at the commencement of the fighting north of the Chickahominy, and he had sustained considerable loss in that fighting. General Magruder says his force of three divisions (six brigades) numbered about thirteen thousand men when the movement to the north of the Chickahominy began, and he had been severely engaged at Savage Station. Huger's three brigades numbered perhaps seven or eight thousand, certainly not more. Our troops engaged could not, therefore, have numbered over thirty thousand, and was probably something under that figure, while McClellan was able to bring into action, to meet their assault on his strong position, his whole force, or very nearly the whole of it.

        The loss in the two armies was very probably about equal, and we were left in possession of the battlefield, and all the abandoned muskets and rifles of both armies, besides those pieces of artillery abandoned on the retreat, and some wagons and ambulances, but all this did not compensate us for the loss of valuable lives

sustained, which were worth more to us than the material of war gained or any actual results of the battle that accrued to our benefit.

        Both sides claimed the victory, but I do not think any advantage was gained by either army from the battle, though McClellan made good the retreat of his shattered army to the very strong position at Harrison's Landing. If General Lee's plans for the battle had been carried out, I have no doubt that it would have resulted in a crushing defeat to the enemy.

        On the 3rd of July the army was put in motion again, and Jackson's, Ewell's, and Whiting's divisions moved around to the left and approached McClellan's new position by the road leading from Long Bridge to Westover, Ewell's division being in front. On the 4th we arrived in front of the enemy, and advanced, with Ewell's division in line of battle, and skirmished in front, until we encountered the enemy's skirmishers, when our progress was arrested by an order from General Longstreet, who had come up. We remained in line skirmishing heavily with the enemy for a day, when we were relieved by Whiting's division. It was now judged prudent not to attack the enemy in this position, as it was a strong one with very difficult approaches, and on the 8th our army retired, the greater part of it returning to the vicinity of Richmond, thus leaving McClellan to enjoy the consolation of having, after near twelve months of preparation on the most gigantic scale and over three months of arduous campaigning, accomplished the wonderful feat of "a change of base."

        McClellan in his report (Sheldon & Co.'s edition of 1864) shows that there was an aggregate present in his army on the 20th of June, 1862, of 107,226, of which there were present for duty 4,665 officers and 101,160 men, making the aggregate present for duty 105,825. See page 53. On page 239, he says: "The report of the Chief of the 'Secret Service Corps,' herewith forwarded, and dated 26th of June, shows the estimated strength

of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same report puts his numbers on the 26th of June at about 180,000, and the specific information obtained regarding their organization warrants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength."

        He seems to have been troubled all the time with the spectre of "overwhelming numbers" opposed to him, and that he should have believed so when he had "Professor Lowe" with his balloons to make reports from the clouds, and his "Chief of the Secret Service" and "intelligent contrabands," to fool him with their inventions, may be perhaps conceded by some charitable persons, but that he should have written such nonsense as the above in 1863, and published it in 1864, is perfectly ridiculous. If the United States Government with its gigantic resources and its population of 21,000,000 of whites could bring into the field for the advance on Richmond only 105,000 men, and some fifty or sixty thousand men for the defence of Washington, how was the Confederate Government, with its limited means, its blockaded ports, and its population of less than 6,000,000 of whites, to bring into the field, to oppose this one of several large armies of invasion, 180,000 men, and if it could get the men where were the arms to come from?

        When I was at General Lee's headquarters, on the night of the 28th of June, at Gaines' house, General Longstreet, who occupied a part of the same house and had accompanied General Lee from the commencement of the operations on McClellan's flank and rear, informed me that, when the movement commenced, we had about 90,000 men in all, including Jackson's command, 60,000 being employed in the movement north of the Chickahominy, and 30,000 being left on the south side for the protection of Richmond. This latter number included the troops at Drewry's Bluff and Chaffin's Bluff. This statement was elicited in reply to a question by me, in which I expressed some surprise at the boldness of the

movement, and asked how it was possible for General Lee to undertake it with his force. General Longstreet had no reason to underestimate the force to me, and his estimate was a sanguine one, and, I think, perhaps rather too large, as it was based on the idea that General Jackson's force was stronger than it really was.

        The very active campaign and rapid marching of that part of Jackson's command which had been employed in the valley, had very much reduced its strength, and the brigades and regiments were very weak. The whole force was probably somewhere between eighty and ninety thousand, and certainly did not exceed the latter number. A very large portion of the army was armed with smooth-bore muskets, and it was not until after the battles around Richmond, and of second Manassas, that we were able to exchange them for rifles and minie muskets captured from the enemy.

        The movement of General Lee against McClellan was a strategic enterprise of the most brilliant character, and at once demonstrated that he was a general of the highest order of genius. Its results, independent of the capture of artillery, small arms, and stores, were of the most momentous consequences, as it relieved the capital of the Confederacy of the dangers and inconveniences of a regular siege for a long while, though it had not resulted in the destruction of McClellan's army as General Lee had desired, and the army and country fondly hoped; but in a thickly wooded country, where armies can move only along the regular roads, and move in line of battle or compact columns along those roads, there are facilities for the escape of a beaten army which one accustomed to reading of European wars cannot well understand. This was peculiarly the case in the country through which McClellan retreated, where the impracticable character of the swamps and woods enabled him to conceal his movements and to protect his trains, rear, and flanks by blocking up the roads and destroying bridges.

        General McClellan, it must be confessed, displayed considerable ability in conducting the retreat of his army after it was out-manoeuvred and beaten, notwithstanding the excessive caution he had shown on the Potomac and at Yorktown, and I think there can be no doubt he was the ablest commander the United States had in Virginia during the war, by long odds. During the seven days' operations around Richmond, the two armies were more nearly equal in strength than they ever were afterwards.

CHAPTER IX.

BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN.

        AFTER McClellan had been safely housed at his new base on James River, Major General John Pope, of the United States Army, made his appearance in Northern Virginia, between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers, at the head of an army called the "Army of Virginia," and composed of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, the latter being then under Sigel. General Pope issued a vain-glorious address to his troops, in which he declared that he had never seen anything of the "rebels" but their backs; and he talked largely about making his "headquarters in the saddle," and looking out for the means of advancing, without giving thought to the "lines of retreat," which were to be left to take care of themselves. He certainly was producing great commotion in the poultry yards of the worthy matrons, whose sons and husbands were absent in the service of their country, when General Lee sent "Stonewall" Jackson to look after the redoubtable warrior.

        After remaining in camp several days near Richmond, Ewell's and Jackson's divisions were ordered to Gordonsville under General Jackson, and, taking the lead, Ewell's division arrived about the 15th of July. On the next day after our arrival, a body of the enemy's cavalry, having crossed the Rapidan, advanced through Orange Court-House towards Gordonsville, and my brigade and the Louisiana brigade were moved out with a regiment of cavalry for the purpose of intercepting the retreat of this body, but it made its escape across the Rapidan by swimming that river, as the water was high. Ewell's division went into camp near Liberty Mills on the Rapidan, on the road from Gordonsville to Madison Court-House, and I remained there, with occasional movements when approaches of the enemy's cavalry

were reported, until the 7th of August. In the mean time, Jackson's force had been reinforced by the division of A. P. Hill, and there had been skirmishing and fighting between our cavalry and that of the enemy in Madison County and at Orange Court-House.

        General Jackson ordered a forward movement to be made on the 7th of August, and on that day Ewell's division crossed into Madison at Liberty Mills, and moved down the Rapidan toward Barnett's Ford, bivouacking for the night near that point. Early next morning, we moved past Barnett's Ford, driving a small detachment of the enemy's cavalry from the Ford, and took the road for Culpeper Court-House. General Beverly Robertson's cavalry now passed to the front and had a skirmish and some artillery firing with the enemy's cavalry at Robinson's River, where the latter retired. We crossed Robinson's River and bivouacked north of it at the mouth of Crooked Creek, Robertson's cavalry going to the front some two or three miles.

        On the morning of the 9th, I was ordered by General Ewell to move forward in advance to the point occupied by our cavalry some three or four miles ahead of us, and to put out strong pickets on the road coming in from the right and left. My brigade had now increased in strength to something over 1,500 officers and men for duty, by the return of absentees. As we moved forward, the 44th Virginia Regiment under Colonel Scott, and six companies of the 52nd Virginia were detached to picket the side roads. Robertson's cavalry was found at a position about eight or nine miles from Culpeper Court-House, not far from Cedar Run, and in his front, in some open fields, bodies of the enemy's cavalry were in view, watching his movements. On our right was Cedar Run or Slaughter's Mountain, and between it and Culpeper road were the large open fields of several adjacent farms in the valley of Cedar Run, while the country on the left of the road was mostly wooded.

        After General Ewell came up, my brigade was moved

to the right towards the mountain, for the purpose of reconnoitring, and a section of the battery attached to it was advanced to the front under Lieutenant Terry and opened on the cavalry in our view. This elicited a reply from some of the enemy's guns concealed from our view in rear of his cavalry, but no infantry was visible. My brigade was then moved back to the Culpeper road and along it about a mile, to its intersection with a road coming in from Madison Court-House, where it remained for some hours.

        Shortly after noon, Captain Pendleton, of General Jackson's staff, came with an order from the General, for me to advance on the road towards Culpeper Court-House, stating that General Ewell would advance on the right, over the northern end of Slaughter's Mountain, with the rest of the division, and that I would be supported by Brigadier General Winder with three brigades of Jackson's division, which would soon be up; but I was ordered not to begin the movement until I received information from General Winder that he was ready to follow me.

        While waiting for the message from General Winder, General Robertson and myself reconnoitred the position of the enemy's cavalry, and the country immediately in my front, for the purpose of ascertaining how I would advance so as to surprise the force immediately in front of us. Just ahead of me, the Culpeper road crossed a small branch, a tributary of Cedar Run, and then passed for some distance through a thick woods, leaving a narrow belt on the right of it. Between this belt and the mountain the country was an undulating valley, consisting of several adjoining fields.

        All of the enemy's cavalry visible was in the field in this valley, and the position where my command was posted was hidden from its view by an intervening ridge, which crossed the road diagonally from the woods into the fields and fell off into the low grounds on the small branch mentioned. No infantry had yet been discovered,

and we were in doubt whether the enemy had any in the vicinity. On the left of the road was a long, narrow meadow on the branch, and as my brigade could not march along the road except by flank, nor without great difficulty through the woods if deployed in line, I determined to form it in the meadow out of view of the enemy, and then advance obliquely across the road, against his cavalry, following it through the fields on a route parallel to the road.

        About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, a messenger came from General Winder saying that he was ready to follow me, and I commenced my movement. The brigade was formed in line in the meadow, on the north of the branch, with the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Walker, thrown out as skirmishers to cover the front and flank of the left of the brigade, which had to pass obliquely through the corner of the woods. It then advanced to the ridge behind which the enemy's cavalry was posted, the right regiment (12th Georgia) moving by flank so as to avoid observation, and forming in line as it reached the ridge, when the whole moved over the crest and came in view of the cavalry, which scampered off in a great hurry, receiving as it went a slight volley at long range, by which one or two saddles were emptied.

        The brigade then swung around to the left and moved forward in line for about three-fourths of a mile, until we reached a farm road leading from Mrs. Crittenden's house on our right across the Culpeper road, Colonel Walker still continuing to cover the left, by moving with his regiment extended as skirmishers into the woods across the road, until we came to the farm road. At this latter point the Culpeper road emerged from the woods and ran along the left of a field in our front, by the side of the woods to its termination, where it passed between a cornfield on the right and a wheatfield on the left. Colonel Walker immediately re-formed his regiment on the left of the brigade and we advanced across the farm road into the field beyond, to the crest of a ridge, where

we discovered a considerable body of cavalry on the opposite side of the wheatfield, on a high ridge over which the Culpeper road ran, and three batteries of artillery opened on us, from over the crest of the ridge in front.

        No infantry had yet been seen, but the boldness with which the cavalry confronted us and the opening of the batteries, satisfied me that we had come upon a heavy force, concealed behind the ridge on which the cavalry was drawn up, as the ground beyond was depressed. I therefore halted the brigade, causing the men to cover themselves as well as they could by moving back a little and lying down, and then sent word for General Winder to come up. The position which I now occupied was in an open field on Mrs. Crittenden's farm. Immediately to my right and a little advanced, was a clump of cedars, and from that point the ground sloped off to our right to a bottom on a prong of Cedar Run, the whole country between us and Slaughter's Mountain consisting of open fields. The northern end of the mountain was opposite my right and about a mile distant. On my left was the woods mentioned, which was very dense and extended for a considerable distance to the left.

        In front of this woods, about a hundred yards from my left, was the wheat field, in a hollow, or small valley, and immediately in my front was the cornfield, and a small branch ran from the wheatfield through the cornfield, to which the ground sloped. On the farther side of the wheatfield was the high ridge on which the enemy's cavalry was formed, and beyond which his batteries were posted; and it extended across the road into the fields on the right, but was wooded on the left of the road. It was on and behind this ridge the enemy's batteries were posted, and it was in the low ground beyond that I supposed, and it subsequently turned out, his infantry was masked.

        Immediately after sending for General Winder, I sent back for some artillery, but this request had been

anticipated, and Captain Brown, with one piece, and Captain Dement, with three pieces of their respective batteries of Maryland artillery, soon came dashing up, and were posted at the clump of cedars on my right. They immediately opened on the enemy's cavalry and his batteries, causing the former speedily to retire through the woods over the ridge. Those guns continued to be served with great efficiency during the action and rendered most effectual service.

        As there was a long interval between my right and the northern end of Slaughter's Mountain, where General Ewell was, I posted the 12th Georgia Regiment, under Captain Wm. F. Brown, on that flank, to protect the guns which were operated there. During all this time the enemy poured an incessant fire of shells upon us, and we were looking anxiously for the opening of Ewell's guns from the mountain, and the arrival of Winder. General Winder came up as rapidly as possible, and, when he arrived, he took position on my left, and at once had several pieces of artillery brought into action with good effect. Ewell's guns had by this time opened and a brisk cannonading ensued.

        From the position I occupied, I had an excellent view of the whole ground--except that beyond the ridge where the enemy's infantry was kept concealed,--and seeing that a force could be moved from our left around the wheatfield, under cover, so as to take the enemy's batteries in flank, I sent information of the fact to General Winder; but, in a very short time afterwards, the glistening bayonets of infantry were discovered moving stealthily to our left, through the woods on the ridge beyond the wheatfield, and I sent my aide, Lieutenant Early, to warn General Winder of this fact, and caution him to look out for his flank. Lieutenant Early arrived to find General Winder just mortally wounded by a shell, while superintending the posting of some batteries at an advanced position, and the information was given to General Jackson who had now arrived on the field.

        After the artillery fire had continued some two hours from the time it was first opened on me, the enemy's infantry was seen advancing through the cornfield in my front, but it halted before getting within musket range and lay down. His line overlapped my right and I sent a request to General Jackson for a brigade to put on that flank, which was promised.

        Before it arrived, however, several pieces of the artillery battalion attached to A. P. Hill's division, which was just coming up, dashed in front of my brigade down the slope to within musket range of the enemy in the cornfield, and commenced unlimbering, when the enemy's whole force rose up and moved forward. I saw at once that these pieces would be captured or disabled unless relieved immediately, and my brigade was ordered forward at a double quick. On reaching the guns, the brigade halted and opened fire on the enemy, checking his advance and enabling the artillery to open on him with canister. At the same time a heavy force of infantry had moved through the wheatfield, and fire was opened on it from the brigades of Jackson's division on my left, which were posted in the edge of the woods adjoining the field, and the fight became general, raging with great fury. Brown's and Dement's guns opened with canister, and the 12th Georgia was brought from the right and posted on the crest of a small ridge, leading out from the main one around in front of the clump of cedars on my right, so as to have a flank fire on the enemy immediately in front of the brigade.

        Just as I had made this arrangement, Thomas' brigade of Hill's division came up to my support as promised, and I posted it on the right of the 12th Georgia, behind the crest of the same ridge, which was so shaped that Thomas' line had the general direction of the main line, but was in advance of it. The arrival of this brigade was very timely, as the enemy was advancing with a line overlapping my right considerably. Thomas confronted this part of the opposing force, and effectually checked its progress, strewing the ground with the

killed. While posting this brigade, the left of my own brigade was concealed from my view, and as soon as I had given Colonel Thomas his instructions, I rode to see what was the condition of things on that part of the line. On getting to where I could see, I discovered that it had given way, and the men of several regiments were retiring rapidly to the rear, while a portion of the enemy had crossed the little stream in front of where my left had been. The only thing now standing, as far as I could see, was Thomas' brigade on my right, the 12th Georgia, four companies of the 52nd Virginia, and part of the 58th Virginia.

        It was a most critical state of things, and I saw that the day would probably be lost, unless I could hold the position I still occupied. I could not, therefore, go to rally my retreating men, but sent my Assistant Adjutant General, Major Samuel Hale, to rally them and bring them back, while I rode to the rest of my troops and directed their commanders to hold on to their positions at all hazards. On my giving the directions to Captain Brown of the 12th Georgia, he replied: "General, my ammunition is nearly out, don't you think we had better charge them?" I could not admit the prudence of the proposition at that time, but I fully appreciated its gallantry. This brave old man was then 65 years old, and had a son, an officer, in his company. The position was held until other troops were brought up and the greater part of the retreating men rallied, and the day was thus prevented from being lost.

        The enemy had penetrated into the woods on my left, and the brigades of Jackson's division there posted had been driven back, after a desperate conflict. The left of the line had thus given way, and the enemy had got possession of the woods, from which he had poured a galling fire into the rear of my regiments on the flank, which had been thrown into confusion, and compelled to retire in some disorder. Colonel Walker of the 13th Virginia had withdrawn his own regiment and part of the 31st Virginia in good order, after they had been

almost surrounded by the enemy. Only my own brigade, Thomas' brigade, and the three brigades of Jackson's division had been engaged up to this time, but some of the other brigades of Hill's division were now coming on the field, and being at once ordered into action, the temporary advantage gained by the enemy was soon wrested from him, and he was forced back into the wheatfield, and then across it over the ridge beyond.

        Colonel Walker with the 13th Virginia, and part of the 31st, and Captain Robert D. Lilley with part of the 25th Virginia, returned to the attack while the woods on our left was being cleared of the enemy, and participated in his final repulse. Finding himself being driven from the field, after sunset, the enemy made a desperate effort to retrieve the fortunes of the day by a charge with cavalry. We had no regular line formed at this time, and our men were much scattered in advancing, when a considerable body of cavalry came charging along the road from over the ridge, towards the position where the left of my brigade and the right of Jackson's division had rested during the action. Without being at all disconcerted or attempting to make any formation against cavalry, small regiments nearby, among which was the 13th Virginia, poured a volley into the head of the approaching cavalry, when it had got within a few yards, causing it to turn suddenly to its right up through the wheatfield, followed by the whole body, which made its escape after encountering a raking fire from our troops further to the left, by which many saddles were emptied. The attack on the enemy was thus resumed and he was driven entirely from the field.

        We were ordered to pursue on the road towards Culpeper Court-House, and the division of General A. P. Hill was placed in front, my brigade following it. Pursuit was made for two miles, when the enemy's reinforcements, coming to the aid of the beaten troops, were encountered, and there was some skirmishing after dark between Hill's leading brigade and the enemy, and an affair between one of our batteries and some of the

enemy's artillery, but night put an end to any further operations. During the night, General Jackson ascertained that Pope's whole army had concentrated in his front, and he therefore determined not to attack him. In moving forward in pursuit of the enemy from the field, my brigade rejoined the rest of the division under General Ewell, and, after operations for the night were suspended, we bivouacked about where the enemy's infantry had been masked when I first encountered his batteries. The two brigades with General Ewell had not been engaged, but his artillery had done good service, and prevented any attempt to flank us on the right.

        On the morning of the 10th (Sunday), after some manoeuvring on our part, and a little shelling from the enemy, we moved back and covered the battlefield with our troops, while the wounded were being carried off, and the small arms abandoned by the enemy were being gathered. Later in the day we moved farther back and took position in rear of the battlefield, Ewell's division being posted on the end and side of Slaughter's Mountain, and the other divisions crossing the Culpeper road on our left. We remained in this position all night and next day, but there was no fighting, as each army awaited the advance of the other.

        On Monday, the 11th, the enemy requested a truce for the purpose of burying his dead, which was granted, until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and subsequently extended, at his request, to give him time to complete the burial--the arrangements on our side being under the superintendence of General Stuart, and on the side of the enemy under that of Brigadier General Milroy.^*

        *Milroy, in his report, states that the truce was requested by us, but General Jackson says it was applied for by the enemy, and no one will doubt his word. I know that the extension was applied for by Milroy or his staff officer, for I was on the ground in communication with General Stuart at the time. This same Milroy was himself prevented by me from riding to the rear of the ground on which the enemy's dead lay, and he witnessed the taking from the field, under my directions, of very large quantities of small arms, which had been abandoned by Banks' men on the day of the battle.

        I went on the field under General Ewell's orders, to superintend the burial of a portion of our dead, who had not been buried by their proper commanders. I found on the field, stacked up, a very large quantity of excellent rifles, which the division, detailed to gather them up, omitted to carry off. Some of the enemy's men were taking these rifles, but I made them desist, and demanded that a part already carried off, under direction of a staff officer of General Sigel, should be brought back, which was complied with. I then sent for a detail from my brigade and had these arms carried off in wagons sent to me from the rear, there being six full wagon loads. While this work was going on, I heard a Federal soldier say: "It is hard to see our nice rifles going that way," to which another replied: "Yes, but they are theirs, they won them fairly."

        The enemy had very large details on the field, and several general officers rode on it, while the burial was going on. This work was finally concluded a little before dark, when the truce was concluded. The enemy buried on this day over six hundred dead, a very large proportion of which were taken from the cornfield in front of the positions occupied by Thomas' and my brigade on the day of the battle. My detail buried the bodies of 98 of our men, nearly the whole of which were taken from the woods in which the brigades of Jackson's division had been engaged. From the want of sufficient tools on our part and the hardness of the ground where we buried our men, our work was not completed until about the same time the enemy completed his.

        On returning to my brigade, I found our troops preparing to move back to our former position south of the Rapidan, as the army of Pope concentrated in our front was entirely too large for us to fight. Our movement to the rear commenced immediately after dark, Hill's division bringing up the rear of the infantry and our cavalry that of the whole army. On the next day, the 12th, Ewell's division recrossed at Liberty Mills and

returned to its old camps in that vicinity, the withdrawal of our entire force having been effected without serious molestation from the enemy. In this action, Banks commanded the Federal troops immediately on the field, but Pope came up at its close with a portion of McDowell's Corps and the whole of Sigel's.

        The loss in my brigade was 16 killed and 145 wounded, and the loss in General Jackson's whole command was 223 killed, 1,060 wounded and 31 missing, making a total loss of 1,314. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded very greatly exceeded ours, and we captured 400 prisoners, including one Brigadier General (Prince), besides securing one piece of artillery and more than 5,000 small arms.

        Pope, or at least his soldiers, had now seen something more of the "rebels" than their backs, and he was soon to see other sights.

        Shortly after our return from the battle, Lawton's brigade was transferred from Jackson's division to Ewell's, and Starke's Louisiana Brigade, newly created out of regiments which had been attached to other brigades during the battles around Richmond, and had accompanied Hill's division, was attached to Jackson's division. General Jackson's command, as now constituted, was composed of fourteen brigades, to-wit: four in his own and Ewell's divisions each; and six in Hill's division, besides the artillery attached to the divisions (about four batteries to each); and Robertson's cavalry which was co-operating with us.

CHAPTER X.

OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

        THE presence of General Jackson in the vicinity of Gordonsville, again bewildered the minds and excited anew the fears of the Washington authorities. The spectre of "overwhelming numbers" at Richmond and of a speedy advance on the Federal Capital now assumed a fearful shape, and McClellan was ordered to remove his army from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek as rapidly as possible, for the purpose of uniting with Pope, and interposing for the defence of Washington--Burnside, with 13,000 men from the North Carolina coast on his way to join McClellan on James River, having been previously diverted from that point to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock.^*

        * The following correspondence taken from McClellan's report is interesting, as it exhibits the bewilderment of the Federal authorities and the hallucination under which McClellan himself continued to labor in regard to the strength of General Lee's forces:

"WASHINGTON, July 30, 1862, 8 P.M.

"MAJOR GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN:

        The execution of the order given to McClellan on the 3rd of August for the evacuation of his base on James River, was not completed until the 16th. In the meantime, General Lee had ordered the divisions of Longstreet, Hood (formerly Whiting's), D. R. Jones, and Anderson (formerly Huger's), to Gordonsville for the purpose of advancing against Pope, and the three first named arrived about the 15th of August, Anderson's following later. The greater part of Stuart's cavalry was also ordered to the same vicinity.

        On the 15th Jackson's command moved from its camps and concentrated near Pisgah Church on the road

from Orange Court-House to Somerville Ford on the Rapidan, preparatory to the movement forward. While here the 49th Virginia Regiment, Colonel William Smith, joined my brigade. Pope's army, then reinforced by the greater part of Burnside's Corps under Reno, was in the County of Culpeper, north of the Rapidan; but before we were ready to move it commenced to fall back to the northern bank of the Rappahannock.

        On the 20th, our whole army, now consisting of two wings under Longstreet and Jackson respectively, and Stuart's cavalry, crossed the Rapidan--Longstreet at Raccoon Ford, and Jackson at Somerville Ford,--the cavalry having preceded them early in the morning. Jackson's wing, comprising the same force he had at Cedar Run, camped at Stevensburg on the night of the 20th. On the 21st he moved past Brandy Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the direction of Beverly's Ford on the Rappahannock. Jackson's division under Brigadier General Taliaferro was in front and moved to the ford, where there ensued some cannonading, and a fight between a portion of our cavalry and the enemy on the northern bank. Ewell's division bivouacked in the rear of Taliaferro near St. James' Church.

        On the morning of the 22nd the division moved up to the vicinity of the ford, where the cannonading still continued. It was then moved to the left, across Hazel River at Wellford's Mill, towards Freeman's Ford, Trimble's brigade being left at Hazel River to protect our trains from a movement of the enemy from across the Rappahannock. At Freeman's Ford, a portion of Stuart's cavalry was found, and an artillery fight was progressing with the enemy's batteries on the opposite bank. The three remaining brigades passed to the left from Freeman's Ford, and moved by a circuitous route through the woods and fields towards the bridge at Warrenton Springs. Late in the afternoon, Lawton's brigade moved to the bridge at the Springs for the purpose of

MAJOR ANDREW L. PITZER

crossing, and my brigade, followed by Hays' (formerly Taylor's) under Colonel Forno of the Louisiana Infantry, was moved to the right, under the superintendence of General Ewell, and crossed over about a mile below the Springs, on an old dilapidated dam.

        Hays' brigade was to have followed, but as it was nearly dark when my brigade succeeded in getting over, and the crossing was very difficult, that brigade was left on the south bank until next morning. General Ewell ordered me to occupy a pine woods or thicket in front of the place at which I had crossed, and to establish communications with General Lawton, the whole of whose brigade it was expected would be crossed over at the Springs. There had been a hard rain before I was ordered to cross the river, and it was still raining slightly. As soon as General Ewell left me, I moved my brigade into the woods indicated, and established my left near a road found leading from the Springs towards the lower fords, throwing out pickets on the front and flanks. By this time it had become intensely dark, and we could see nothing except when the flashes of lightning gave faint glimpses of things around.

        As soon as the brigade was established in its position, Major A. L. Pitzer, a volunteer aide, was sent to seek General Lawton for the purpose of opening communications with him. After he had been gone for some time, he came back with a sergeant and six privates of Federal cavalry as prisoners, with their horses, equipments and arms complete. This party had passed up the road a few minutes before I had taken position near it, and, on getting near the Springs and finding that place occupied by a portion of our troops, was deliberating as to what should be done when the Major rode into it. He was at once hailed and forced to surrender himself as prisoner, and his captors started with him down the road leading past my left. On getting near the point at which he knew my brigade was posted, the Major told the party having him in charge that they must reverse positions,

and when he explained the condition of things and stated that General Lawton was on the right, my brigade on the left with pickets all around, he succeeded in inducing the whole of it to surrender to him and come quietly into my camp, to avoid being fired upon by the pickets. After this attempt, as it was very dark and quite late, I did not renew that night the effort to communicate with General Lawton.

        During the night there was a very heavy rain, and by light on the morning of the 23rd, the Rappahannock, or Hedgeman's River, as it is here called, was so much swollen as to defy all attempts at crossing except by swimming, as the bridge at the Springs had been burned by the enemy.

        A messenger sent to find General Lawton soon returned with the information that only one regiment of Lawton's brigade, the 13th Georgia under Colonel Douglas, and Brown's and Dement's batteries of four guns each, had crossed at the Springs, the morning before. As soon as this condition of things was ascertained, I sent a messenger, who was directed to swim the river, with a note for General Ewell or Jackson, whichever might be first met with, stating that if the enemy advanced upon us in force, the whole of our troops on the north of the river must be captured, and suggesting the propriety of my attempting to extricate them by moving up towards Waterloo bridge, several miles above.

        Before this note could be delivered, I received a verbal message from General Jackson, which had been given across the river at the Springs and was brought to me by a sergeant of one of the batteries, directing me to move my brigade up to where Colonel Douglas' was, take command of the whole force, and prepare for defence, stating, at the same time, that there was a creek running a short distance from the Springs into the river below me, which was past fording also, and that no enemy was in the fork of the river and this creek; and also

informing me that he was having the bridge repaired as rapidly as possible. Very shortly after the reception of this message, I received a note from General Jackson, in reply to mine, containing the same instructions conveyed by his message, and directing me in addition, in the event of the enemy's appearance in too heavy force for me to contend with, to move up towards Waterloo bridge, keeping close to the river; and stating that he would follow along the opposite bank with his whole force, to cover my movement.

        I at once moved towards the Springs and found Colonel Douglas occupying a hill, a short distance below the buildings, which extended across from the river to Great Run (the creek alluded to by General Jackson). Colonel Douglas, on crossing the morning before, had captured a portion of a cavalry picket watching the ford, and there was still a small body on the opposite banks of Great Run with which he had had some skirmishing. Colonel Walker with the 13th and 31st Virginia Regiments had been posted across the road leading from below, about three-fourths of a mile from Colonel Douglas' position, and I now posted the remaining regiments of my brigade and the 13th Georgia along the hill occupied by the latter, so as to present the front to any force that might come from the direction of Warrenton, across Great Run above, resting my right on the Run and my left on the river. The artillery was also posted on this line, and the whole concealed as much as possible by the woods. In this position, Colonel Walker guarded my rear, and my right flank was the only one exposed, but that was safe for the present, as the creek was very high and Colonel Douglas had commenced the destruction of the bridges across it, which was soon completed.

        The body of the enemy's cavalry on the opposite side of Great Run continued to hover about my right flank all the morning, and some companies were posted on that flank to watch the creek. Some time during the morning, General Jackson sent over an officer familiar with the

country, to pilot one of the staff officers over the route to Waterloo bridge, which it might be necessary to pass over in case of emergency, and Major Hale was sent with him to ascertain the road.

        In the meantime, the creek began to fall, and in the afternoon it was in a condition to be crossed.

        It now began to be evident that the enemy was moving up from below in very heavy force, and that my command was in a critical condition, as large trains were seen moving on the road, east and north of us, towards Warrenton. Late in the afternoon a heavy column of infantry with artillery made its appearance on the hills beyond my right, but it moved with great caution, and the enemy was evidently of the impression that my force, which was concealed from his view, was much larger than it really was. I now changed my front so as to present it towards the force in sight, but this movement was so made as to be concealed from the enemy's view by the intervening woods.

        About this time, General Robertson, who had accompanied Stuart on a raid to Catlett's Station and upon Pope's headquarters, arrived from the direction of Warrenton with two regiments of cavalry and two pieces of artillery. After consulting with me, General Robertson posted his two pieces on a hill north of the Springs, which commanded a view of the enemy's infantry and opened on it. This fire was soon replied to by one of the enemy's batteries, and I sent two Parrott guns from Brown's battery to the aid of Robertson's guns, which were of short range. A brisk cannonade ensued and was kept up until near sunset, with no damage, however, to my infantry or artillery, but one or two shells fell into one of Robertson's regiments which was in rear of the battery, on the low ground near the Springs, doing some slight damage.

        After the cessation of the artillery fire and very near dark about a brigade of the enemy was seen approaching the bank of the creek opposite where my brigade was

posted, and in a few moments it delivered a volley into the woods, which was followed by three cheers and a tiger in regular style. Two of Dement's Napoleons were immediately run out to the left of my line, and opened with canister upon the enemy, who was scarcely visible through the mist which had arisen. This fire was, however, so well directed and so rapid that the enemy was soon driven back in confusion, and his cheering was exchanged for cries and groans, which were distinctly audible to those in his front. The volley delivered by the enemy was entirely harmless, and my men reserved their fire with great coolness, until there should be greater need for it. A very short time before this affair, the 60th Georgia Regiment of Lawton's brigade, under Major Berry, had crossed over on the bridge, which was now in a condition for the passage of infantry, though not for artillery or wagons, and had been placed in position.

        There was no further attack on me, but it was now very certain, from the noise of moving trains and artillery and the reports of scouts, that a very heavy force was being massed around me, with a view of cutting me off. I drew in Colonel Walker closer to my main force, as he reported that the enemy had crossed the creek on the road he was guarding and were massing in his front; and I sent a messenger to General Jackson, after dark, with information of the condition of things and the suggestion that I be reinforced sufficiently to hold my ground or be withdrawn. The remainder of Lawton's brigade was crossed over on the temporary bridge, and when General Lawton himself arrived, which was about 1 o'clock A.M. on the 24th, he informed me that he had seen written instructions to General Ewell, directing to cross over himself at daylight in the morning, and if it was evident that the enemy was in heavy force, to recross the troops, as it was not desired to have a general engagement at that junction.

        On receiving this information, I immediately

dispatched a messenger to General Ewell, to inform him that there could be no doubt that the enemy was in very heavy force, and if I was to be withdrawn, it had better be done that night without waiting for daylight, as by moving to my left the enemy could post artillery, so as to command the bridge and ford completely, and prevent my being either withdrawn or reinforced, and that I was satisfied that he was preparing for that very object. In response to this, General Ewell came over himself a little before three o'clock A.M., and, after consultation with me, gave the order for recrossing, which was begun at once, Lawton's brigade crossing first and carrying over the artillery by hand, and my brigade following, so as to complete the withdrawal a very little after dawn.

        General Ewell had not been entirely satisfied that the enemy was in such strong force as I represented, and he was rather inclined to the opinion that movements I had observed indicated a retreating army. To satisfy him, we remained behind until the advancing skirmishers of the enemy made it prudent for us to retire, and we then rode across the bridge in rear of my brigade. Soon Sigel's whole corps, supported by those of Banks and Reno, moved to the position which I had occupied, and a very heavy cannonading followed.

        My command was thus rescued from inevitable destruction, for it would have been impossible for General Jackson to have crossed his troops in time to arrest its fate, as his only means of crossing the river consisted of one narrow, temporary bridge, unsuitable for the passage of artillery, and which the enemy could have commanded from several positions beyond the reach of our artillery on the south bank. Pope's whole army was in easy supporting distance of the force sent against me, and I had in part confronted that army on the 23rd and the following night.

        The men of my command, including Douglas' regiment, had had very little to eat since crossing the river, and were without rations, as there had been little opportunity

for cooking since leaving the Rapidan; and they had lain on their arms during the night of the 22nd in a drenching rain; yet they exhibited a determined resolution to withstand the enemy's attack at all hazards, should he come against us.

        After recrossing the river, Lawton's brigade and mine retired to the vicinity of Jefferson for the purpose of resting and cooking rations.

CHAPTER XI.

CAPTURE OF MANASSAS JUNCTION.

        ON the same morning I had crossed the river, Stuart, with a portion of his cavalry, after crossing the river above, had made a raid to Catlett's Station and upon Pope's headquarters at Warrenton Junction, and among other things had captured Pope's dispatch book.

        The captured correspondence showed that Pope was being reinforced from the Kanawha Valley and also from McClellan's army, and General Lee determined to send General Jackson to the enemy's rear, to cut the railroad, so as to destroy his communications and bring on a general engagement before the whole of the approaching reinforcements could arrive.

        Jackson's wing of the army was put in motion early on the morning of the 25th, with no wagons but the ordnance and medical wagons, and with three days' rations in haversacks, for a "cavalry raid with infantry." Moving with Ewell's division in front, we crossed the river at Hinson's Mill above Waterloo bridge, and marched by a small place called Orleans to Salem, near which place we bivouacked after a very long day's march. On the morning of the 26th, we moved, with Ewell's division still in front, past White Plains, through Thoroughfare Gap in Bull Mountain to Gainesville on the Warrenton Pike, and there turned off to the right towards Bristow Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. At Haymarket, before reaching Gainesville, we halted two or three hours to wait for Stuart to come up with his cavalry, which had started that morning to follow us, and did join us at Gainesville. Hays' brigade, under General Forno, was in the advance of the division on this day, and it arrived at Bristow Station a little before sunset, just as several trains were approaching from the direction of Warrenton Junction.

        There was but a small force of cavalry at Bristow, which Colonel Forno soon dispersed, and he then arrested and captured two trains of empty cars with their engines, the first train which approached having made its escape towards Manassas before the road could be sufficiently obstructed, and other trains in the rear running back, on hearing the alarm, towards Warrenton Junction. General Trimble was sent, soon after dark, with two of his regiments, to capture Manassas Junction, and in conjunction with General Stuart succeeded in taking the place and securing eight pieces of artillery, a considerable number of prisoners and horses, a long train of loaded cars, and a very large amount of stores of all kinds. As soon as the remainder of Ewell's division arrived at Bristow, it was placed in position to prevent a surprise by the enemy during the night.

        Very early on the morning of the 27th, Hays' brigade and one regiment of Lawton's with a piece of artillery were moved towards Kettle Run in the direction of Warrenton Junction on a reconnaissance, and a train of cars was seen re-embarking a regiment which had been sent to drive off the "raiding party," but, on finding the strength of our force, was about retiring. A shot from one piece of artillery sent the train off in a hurry, and one regiment of Hays' brigade was left on picket and another regiment to tear up the railroad, with orders to fall back skirmishing towards the main body, on the approach of the enemy in force.

        Trimble's other regiment, and the 12th Georgia, which was now transferred from my brigade to his, were sent to him at Manassas Junction this morning, and the two other divisions of Jackson's command were ordered to the same place. General Ewell had been ordered by General Jackson to remain at Bristow with his three remaining brigades to check any advance from Pope's army along the railroad, but, if the enemy appeared in heavy force, to retire upon the Junction, as he did not desire a general engagement at this time. General Ewell

accordingly disposed his command across the railroad and facing towards Warrenton Junction as follows: my brigade on the right, Lawton's on the left and Hays' in the centre, the main body being posted on a slight ridge covering the station. The 49th Virginia Regiment of my brigade was moved to a ridge on my right, on the road leading to and past Greenwich, and a regiment of Lawton's brigade (the 60th Georgia), with one piece of artillery, was advanced on the left of the railroad so as to support Forno's two regiments which were in front, while the batteries were posted so as to command the approaches on our front and flanks.

        In the afternoon indications were seen of the approach of the enemy from the direction of Warrenton Junction, and the wagons were ordered to Manassas. In a short time the enemy advanced in force with infantry and artillery, and the 6th and 8th Louisiana Regiments which had been left in front fell back to a woods about three hundred yards in front of the remainder of the brigade. As soon as the enemy got within range, our batteries opened on him from their various positions, and the 6th and 8th Louisiana, and 60th Georgia Regiments received him with well directed volleys, by which two columns of not less than a brigade each were sent back. The 5th Louisiana was sent to reinforce the 6th and 8th, but by this time fresh columns of the enemy were seen advancing, and it was apparent that his force was larger than ours. As the position we occupied was a weak one, and the enemy could very easily have turned our flank by moving a force on the ridge to our right, which he appeared to be doing, General Ewell determined to retire in accordance with General Jackson's instructions. The order for the withdrawal across Broad Run was given, and I was directed to cover it with my brigade.

        At this time the Louisiana regiments in front were actively engaged, and a heavy column of the enemy was moving against them. Lawton's brigade was first drawn back across the ford at the railroad bridge over Broad

Run, and took position on the northern bank. Hays' brigade then followed, the regiments engaged in front having retired in good order. My own brigade had been withdrawn from a pine woods in which it was posted, and covered the movements of the others by forming successive lines of battle back to the ford, and was then crossed over by regiments successively. All the artillery was successfully withdrawn, a part crossing at Milford several hundred yards above the bridge, at which point the 49th Virginia also crossed.

        In the meantime, the enemy had been advancing in line of battle on both sides of the railroad, preceded by skirmishers, and keeping up a constant artillery fire. The 13th Virginia had been deployed as skirmishers to keep those of the enemy in check, and kept them from advancing beyond the station until all the rest of our force had crossed the Run, when it also retired. Lawton's brigade had been formed in line on the north bank of the Run, and some batteries put in position. Hays' brigade was ordered to proceed to Manassas Junction as soon as it crossed, and my brigade was moved back about three-fourths of a mile and formed in line on a hill commanding the road to the Junction, and in full view of the enemy, who had halted on the ridges near Bristow Station.

        In a short time afterwards, General Ewell with Lawton's brigade passed through my line, which was across the road, and ordered me to remain in position until further orders should be sent me. He left a battery with me and directed that one or two regiments should be so moved and manoeuvred as to present the appearance of the arrival of reinforcements to my assistance. This was done, and a small party of the enemy which had crossed the Run, and was moving along the railroad, was driven back by a few shots from the artillery, but the enemy's main force, which consisted of the advance division of Pope's army under Hooker, did not come further than the station.

        Shortly after dark, under orders from General Ewell, I retired to the Junction, where my men filled their haversacks with rations of hard bread and salt meat from the stores captured from the enemy, but this was all of the plunder obtained at that place which they could get.

        Our loss in this affair was comparatively slight and was confined almost entirely to the 5th, 6th and 8th Louisiana, and the 60th Georgia Regiments, which were the only troops who drew trigger on our side, except the 13th Virginia when deployed as skirmishers to cover our withdrawal. The enemy reported his loss at 300.

        The two captured trains had been burned in the early part of the day, and the railroad bridge across Broad Run had been destroyed. A brigade of the enemy which advanced towards Manassas, after having been landed from a train coming from Alexandria, had been met by a party of our troops moving out from the Junction and routed, its commanding officer being killed.

        As soon as Ewell's division had rested and broiled a little meat, it moved from the Junction towards Blackburn's Ford on Bull Run, and the brigades became separated and bivouacked at different places, mine lying down in the open field.

        The other divisions had previously moved, and Stuart proceeded to burn the trains, and such stores as had not been carried off.

CHAPTER XII.

THE AFFAIR AT GROVETON.

        IT having become evident that Pope had found it necessary to look after his "lines of retreat," and was moving his whole army back for the purpose of falling upon General Jackson's comparatively small force, the latter determined to move to the left so as to be in a position to unite with the right wing of General Lee's army under Longstreet. Jackson's division, under Brigadier General W. S. Taliaferro, had therefore been moved on the night of the 27th to the vicinity of the battlefield of the 21st of July, 1861, and A. P. Hill's to Centreville, with orders to Ewell to move up, by the northern bank of Bull Run, to the same locality with Taliaferro early on the morning of the 28th. At dawn on that morning, my brigade resumed the march, moving across Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford and then up the north bank to Stone Bridge, followed by Trimble's brigade. We crossed at a ford just below Stone Bridge, and moved across the Warrenton Pike and through the fields between the Carter house and the Stone Tavern, where the battle of the 21st of July had begun, to the Sudley road, near where Jackson's division was already in position.

        Lawton's and Hays' brigades had by mistake taken the road to Centreville, but had now rejoined the rest of the division, and the whole of the brigades were placed under cover in the woods, north of the Warrenton Pike, through which the Sudley road ran. Hill's division came up from Centreville subsequently. In the meantime Pope's whole army had been moving by various roads upon Manassas Junction, with the expectation of finding Jackson's force there, but in the afternoon the corps of McDowell's en route for Manassas had been ordered to move to Centreville, and a portion of it marched along

the Warrenton Pike. Very late in the afternoon, Jackson's division under Taliaferro was moved along parallel to the pike, under cover of the woods, across the track which had been graded for a railroad, until it passed the small village of Groveton on our left. Ewell's division followed Jackson's until the whole had crossed the railroad track, and the two divisions were then halted and formed in line facing the pike. General Ewell ordered me to take command of my own brigade and Hays' and form a double line in the edge of a piece of woods, with my left resting on the railroad, and to await orders; and he moved to the right with Lawton's and Trimble's brigades.

        My line was formed as directed, with my own brigade in front and Hays' in rear of it, and as thus formed we were on the left and rear of Starke's brigade of Jackson's division, whose line was advanced farther towards the pike. About sunset a column of the enemy commenced moving past our position, and Jackson's division and the two brigades with General Ewell moved forward to attack him, when a fierce and sanguinary engagement took place. While it was raging, and just before dark, I received an order from General Jackson, through one of his staff officers, to advance to the front, which I complied with at once, my own brigade in line of battle being followed by that of Hays.

        While advancing, I received an order to send two regiments to the right to General Jackson, and I detached the 44th and 49th Virginia under Colonel Smith for that purpose. On reaching the railroad cut in my forward movement, I found it so deep that it was impossible to cross it, and I had therefore to move to the right by flank until I found a place where I could cross. This proved to be a ravine with embankments on both sides for a bridge or culvert, and I had here to pass through by flank and form by file into line in front of a marsh beyond. This brought me near the left of the position to which Trimble's brigade had advanced, and I

had passed a part of Starke's brigade on the railroad track. While my brigade was forming in line it was exposed to a galling fire of canister and shrapnel, and before it was ready to advance the enemy had begun to retreat and it had become so dark that it was impossible to tell whether we should encounter friend or foe. I therefore advanced no farther and Hays' brigade was halted on the railroad; and in this position the two brigades lay on their arms all night.

        A short distance from me General Ewell was found very severely wounded by a ball through the knee, which he had received while leading one of the regiments on foot, and I had him carried to the hospital, after having great difficulty in persuading him to go, as he insisted upon having his leg amputated before he left the ground.

        Lawton's and Trimble's brigades lay on their arms a short distance to my right, near the points where they were at the close of the action, and both had suffered heavily. The enemy had retired from our immediate front, and we could hear the rumbling of his artillery as he was moving off in the distance.

CHAPTER XIII.

SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

        THOUGH the force of the enemy, consisting of King's division of McDowell's Corps moving on the left flank of that corps, with which the engagement took place on the afternoon of the 28th, had retreated in the direction of Manassas, other troops had moved up to the vicinity, and early next morning it was discovered that Pope was moving his whole army against us from the direction of Manassas and Centreville, to which point it had gone in search of us.

        It now became necessary to change our front to meet the approaching columns, and Ewell's division, under the command of Brigadier General Lawton as senior brigadier, was formed in line facing Groveton, near where it had lain on its arms the night before, on a ridge running nearly at right angles to Warrenton Pike, with its right, my brigade, resting on the pike. The other divisions were retired behind the unfinished railroad on our left, and the whole line faced towards the enemy. At an early hour the enemy's batteries opened on us and were replied to by ours. After this artillery firing had continued for some time, the position of Ewell's division was changed, and General Jackson in person ordered me to move with Hays' brigade and my own, and Johnson's battery of artillery, to a ridge north of the Warrenton Pike and behind the railroad, so as to prevent the enemy from turning our right flank, a movement from Manassas indicating that purpose having been observed. Two of my regiments, the 13th Virginia and 31st Virginia, under Colonel Walker, were detached by General Jackson's order and placed in position south of the pike, for the purpose of watching the movements of the force that was advancing from the direction of Manassas towards our right.

        Hays' brigade and my own were formed in line on the ridge indicated, in the edge of a piece of woods, and skirmishers were advanced to the line of the railroad, Johnson's battery being placed in position to command my front. In the meantime our main line had been established on the railroad a mile or more to my left, and Lawton's and Trimble's brigades had been moved so as to conform thereto. The artillery firing had continued all the morning, on my left at our main position, and there had been some infantry fighting. The two regiments under Colonel Walker, by skirmishing, kept the head of the force moving from Manassas on our right in check, until the appearance of the leading division (Hood's) of Longstreet's force on the Warrenton Pike from the direction of Gainesville, which occurred about ten or eleven o'clock A.M.

        I remained in position until Longstreet's advance had moved far enough to render it unnecessary for me to remain longer, and, without awaiting orders, I recalled Colonel Walker with his two regiments about one o'clock P.M., and then moved the two brigades to the left, to rejoin the rest of the division. I found General Lawton with his own brigade in line in rear of the railroad, not far from the position I had occupied, the previous morning, before the fight, and Trimble's brigade was in line on the railroad between Jackson's division and Hill's, the former being on the right and the latter on the left. Along this railroad Jackson's line was mainly formed, facing to the southeast. The track of the road was through fields and woods, and consisted of deep cuts and heavy embankments, as the country was rolling. The two brigades with me were formed in line in the woods, in rear of Lawton's brigade, with Hays' on the right of mine.

        We remained in this position until about half-past three P.M., and in the meantime the enemy was making desperate attempts to drive our troops from the line of the railroad, having advanced some heavy columns

against Hill's brigades and been repulsed; and the battle was raging fiercely in our front. Just about half-past three, Colonel Forno, with Hays' brigade, was ordered to advance to the assistance of one of Hill's brigades which had been forced from his position, and he did so, driving the enemy from the railroad and taking position on it with his brigade. He was subsequently wounded very seriously, while holding this position, by a sharpshooter, and had to be removed from the field.

        Some time after Forno's advance, a messenger came from A. P. Hill, with the information that one of his brigades, whose ammunition was nearly exhausted, was being very heavily pressed, and with the request that I should advance to its support. I did so at once, without waiting for orders, and moved directly ahead, as I was informed the attack was immediately in my front; the 8th Louisiana Regiment under Major Lewis, which had been sent to the wagons the day before to replenish its ammunition and had just arrived, accompanying my brigade. As I passed Lawton's brigade I found the 13th Georgia Regiment preparing to move forward under the General's orders. I continued to advance until I came to a small field near the railroad, when I discovered that the enemy had possession of a deep cut in the railroad with a part of his force in a strip of woods between the field and the cut. General Gregg's and Colonel Thomas' brigades, having very nearly exhausted their ammunition, had fallen back a short distance, but were presenting a determined front to the enemy.

        My brigade, with the 8th Louisiana on its left, advanced at once across the field, and drove the enemy from the woods and the railroad cut, dashing across the railroad, and pursuing the retreating force some two or three hundred yards beyond, before I could arrest its progress. The messenger from General Hill had stated that it was not desired that I should go beyond the railroad, but should content myself with driving the enemy from it, as General Jackson's orders were not to

advance but hold the line. I, therefore, drew my men back to the railroad cut and took position behind it. This charge was made with great dash and gallantry by my brigade and the 8th Louisiana Regiment, and very heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy with a comparatively slight one to us, though two valuable officers, Colonel William Smith of the 49th Virginia and Major John C. Higginbotham of the 25th Virginia, were severely wounded. At the time my brigade crossed the railroad, the 13th Georgia advanced further to the right and crossed over in pursuit.

        This was the last of seven different assaults on General Hill's line that day, all of which had now been repulsed with great slaughter upon the enemy, and he did not renew the attack, but contented himself with furiously shelling the woods in which we were located. Jackson's division had also repulsed an attack on his front, and General Trimble was severely wounded during the course of the day by an explosive ball from a sharpshooter. General Jackson had accomplished his purpose of resisting the enemy until General Lee with Longstreet's force could effect a junction with him. The latter force was now up and a part of it had been engaged just about night with one of the enemy's columns.

        Pope, in his report, claims that General Jackson was retreating through Thoroughfare Gap, when his attack arrested this retreat and compelled Jackson to take position to defend himself, and that he drove our troops several miles, but there was no thought of retreat, and the various movements of our troops had been solely for the purpose of defence against the enemy's threatened attacks as he changed their direction.

        Hill's brigades, to whose relief I had gone, went to the rear to replenish their cartridge boxes and did not return to relieve me after the close of the fight on the 29th. I had therefore to remain in position all night with my men lying on their arms.

        I had understood that some of Hill's brigades were

to my left, but it turned out that they had also gone to the rear to get ammunition and did not return; and very early in the morning of the 30th, the enemy's sharpshooters got on the railroad embankment on my left and opened fire on that flank, killing a very valuable young officer of the 13th Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant Leroy. I thus discovered for the first time that my flank was exposed, and the enemy's sharpshooters soon began to cross the railroad on my left and advance through a cornfield. I immediately sent word to General Hill of this state of things, and, after some delay, some brigades were sent to occupy positions on my left, who drove the sharpshooters back. During the morning there was very heavy skirmishing in my front, and the skirmishers of my brigade, under Captain Lilley of the 25th Virginia, drove back a heavy force which was advancing apparently for an attack on our position.

        Subsequently our troops were arranged so as to place Ewell's division in the centre, leaving Hill's division on the left and Jackson's on the right, but when Lawton's brigade was moved up, there was left space for only three of my regiments, and leaving the 44th, 49th and 52nd Virginia Regiments on the line under General Smith of the 49th, I retired about 150 yards to the rear with the rest of the brigade. Hays' brigade, now under Colonel Strong, had been sent to the wagons to get ammunition and had not returned.

        The fore part of the day was consumed by the main body of the enemy and Longstreet's wing of the army in manoeuvring and cannonading, but about four o'clock P.M. the enemy brought up very heavy columns and hurled them against Jackson's line, when the fighting became very severe, but all of the attempts to force our position were successfully resisted, and a very heavy punishment was inflicted on the enemy. My three regiments under Colonel Smith, participated in the repulse of the enemy, and as he retired they dashed across the railroad cut in pursuit, very unexpectedly to me, as I

had given orders to Colonel William Smith not to advance until the order to do so was given. His men, however, had been incapable of restraint, but he soon returned with them. In the meantime, I advanced the other regiments to the front of the line that had been vacated. Trimble's brigade, now under Captain Brown of the 12th Georgia, and Lawton's brigade had participated in this repulse of the enemy likewise.

        The attack on the part of the line occupied by Jackson's division had been very persistent, but Longstreet now began to advance against the enemy from the right and was soon sweeping him from our front. Some of Hill's brigades also advanced and the enemy was driven from the field with great slaughter. While this was taking place, the other divisions of Jackson were ordered to advance, and my brigade was soon put in motion in the direction taken by Hill's brigades, advancing through the woods in our front to a large field about a quarter of a mile from the railroad. I halted at the edge of the woods to enable the other brigades to come up, as I was ahead of them, when General Jackson rode up and ordered me to move by my left flank to intercept a body of the enemy reported moving up Bull Run to our left. I did so, moving along with skirmishers ahead of the brigade until I came to the railroad, and then along that until I came to a field.

        It was now getting dark, and as my skirmishers moved into the field they were fired upon from their left. This fire came from a very unexpected quarter, and I immediately sent to let General Jackson know the fact, as it would have been folly to have advanced in the direction I was going if it came from the enemy. A message was soon received from General Jackson, stating that the fire very probably came from some of Hill's troops, and directing me to send and see. This had been anticipated by sending a young soldier of the 44th Virginia, who volunteered for the purpose, and he soon returned with the information that the firing was from

the skirmishers from Gregg's and Branch's brigades of Hill's division who mistook us for the enemy. Fortunately no damage was done, and I was moving on when I received an order to advance to the front from where I was, and in a few minutes afterwards another to move back by the right flank, as the report of the movement of the enemy around our left flank had proved untrue. I found that the other brigades of the division had bivouacked near where I had left them, and my own did the same.

        The enemy had been driven beyond Bull Run, and was in retreat to Centreville, our pursuit having been arrested by the approaching darkness.

CHAPTER XIV.

AFFAIR AT OX HILL OR CHANTILLY.

        JACKSON'S command, after having rested on the morning of the 31st, in the afternoon of that day was put in motion for the purpose of turning the enemy's position at Centreville. Crossing Bull Run at and near Sudley's Ford, it moved to the left over a country road, Jackson's division in front followed by Ewell's and Hill's bringing up the rear, until the Little River Turnpike was reached, when we turned towards Fairfax Court-House and bivouacked late at night. Early on the morning of September the 1st, the march was resumed, and continued until we reached the farm of Chantilly in the afternoon. The enemy was found in position, covering the retreat of his army, near Ox Hill, not far from Chantilly, and a short distance beyond which the Little River Pike, and the pike from Centreville to Fairfax Court-House, intersect.

        General Jackson at once put his troops in position on the ridge on the east of the Little River Pike, with his own division on the left, Hill's on the right and Ewell's in the centre; Hays' and Trimble's brigades only of Ewell's division being on the front line, Lawton's and mine being formed in the woods in their rear. As we moved into position the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire on us, and soon the action commenced with some of Hill's brigades on the right, extending to Trimble's and Hays' brigades. During this action a severe thunder storm raged, and while it was progressing, General Starke, then in command of Jackson's division, represented to me that a heavy force was threatening his left, between which and the pike there was a considerable interval, and requested me to cover it with my brigade to protect him from the apprehended danger.

        After examining the position I reluctantly consented

to yield to General Starke's entreaty, without awaiting orders, as Hays' brigade was in my front and he represented his situation as critical, and I proceeded to move my brigade by the left flank to the point designated by him. I had put myself on the leading flank, and while moving I heard a considerable musketry fire, but as the woods were very thick and it continued to rain I could see only a short distance, and took it for granted that the firing proceeded from the troops in front of where I had been.

        On reaching the position General Starke desired me to occupy, which was but a short distance from the place I had moved from, as his left was drawn back in a circle towards the pike, I discovered that the 13th, 25th and 31st Virginia Regiments which were on my right had not followed the rest of the brigade. I immediately sent my aide, Lieutenant Early, back to see what had become of the missing regiments, and he found them engaged with a body of the enemy in their front. On ascertaining this fact, I moved back at once and found that my regiment had repulsed the force opposed to them and inflicted considerable loss on it. Hays' brigade under Colonel Strong had fallen back in considerable confusion about the time I commenced my movement, and passed through the three regiments on my right, followed by a considerable force of the enemy. The commanding officers had very properly detained those regiments, as the affair was entirely concealed from my view, and they had received the enemy's onset with great coolness, driving him back out of the woods.

        Colonel Strong had attempted to change front when the enemy were advancing on him, and, being entirely inexperienced in the management of a brigade, he had got it into such confusion that it was compelled to retire. The 8th Louisiana Regiment, under Major Lewis, had been halted and formed into line immediately in rear of my regiments, and the remaining regiments were soon rallied and brought back by their respective commanders. After quite a severe action, in which the enemy lost two

general officers, Kearney and Stevens, he was repulsed at all points, and continued his retreat during the night. After the close of the action, Jackson's division was withdrawn from the left to the rear, and Ewell's division covered the point previously covered by General Starke, and Hays' and Trimble's brigades, and the men lay on their arms during the night. While Trimble's brigade was engaged, the gallant old Captain Brown, of the 12th Georgia Regiment, in command of the brigade, was killed, and Colonel James A. Walker of the 13th Virginia Regiment was subsequently assigned to the command of the brigade, as it had no field officer present.

        On the morning of the 2nd it was discovered that the enemy had retired from our front, and during that day Pope made good his escape into the fortifications around Washington. He had now seen the "rebels" in various aspects and found that his lines of retreat would not take care of themselves; and very soon he was shipped and sent to the northwest to look after the Indians in that quarter.

        This affair at Ox Hill closed the series of engagements with the enemy under Pope, and it was again the old story of the "rebels in overwhelming numbers," opposed to a small army of "Union soldiers." According to Pope's account, his army was wearied out and broken down by the fatigues of the campaign on the Rappahannock, and the incessant marching and manoeuvring to confront Lee's army, and was short of rations and ammunition. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the soldiers of the army which thus wearied his own were at all susceptible of fatigue or hunger, or that when his own rations were short, their chances of supplying themselves were slim.

        Pope's army had at the time of the battles of the 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th of August, been reinforced by Burnside's corps under Reno, one brigade of Sturgis' division from Alexandria, and the following troops from McClellan's army: Heintzelman's corps, Porter's corps, and the division of Pennsylvania reserves commanded

by Reynolds. At the time of the affair at Ox Hill he had been further reinforced by Franklin's and Sumner's corps of McClellan's army, leaving but one corps of that army (Keyes') which had not reached him. His consolidated report of the 31st of July showed a strength of 46,858 before he was joined by any of those reinforcements and in the letter of Halleck to McClellan, dated the 6th of August, Pope's army is stated to be about 40,000. In a telegram from Halleck to McClellan, dated the 12th of August, Burnside's force is stated to be nearly 13,000.

        General Lee's army at the time of these battles near Manassas consisted of Jackson's wing of the army in which there were three divisions of infantry containing fourteen brigades, Longstreet's wing in which there were four divisions of infantry containing fifteen brigades, and two brigades of cavalry under Stuart. There was about one battery of artillery of four guns for each brigade attached to the divisions, and there was a reserve force of artillery which may have numbered some eight or ten batteries, but perhaps not so many.

        Longstreet's command consisted of his own division, seven brigades; Hood's division, two brigades; Jones' division, three brigades; and Anderson's division, three brigades. The whole of those brigades, as well as the force of Jackson, had been in the battles around Richmond, except Evans' brigade--attached to Longstreet's division,--and Drayton's brigade, attached to Jones' division. Those two brigades had probably been brought from the South since those battles, or they may have been organized out of regiments attached to other brigades at that time; but I think they were brought from North and South Carolina, and if such was the fact, they were the only reinforcements which I ever heard of reaching General Lee after the battles around Richmond or before or during the campaign against Pope or the campaign in Maryland. D. H. Hill's division of five brigades; McLaw's division of four brigades, composed

of his own and Magruder's consolidated; and the force of Holmes and Wise--all of which had constituted part of the army at Richmond during the battles,--had been left for the protection of that city until the whole of McClellan's force moved from James River.

        When that event was fully ascertained, Hill's and McLaw's division and two of Holmes' brigades, under Walker, had been ordered to move North, but Hill and McLaws got up on the 2nd, the day after the affair at Ox Hill, and Walker later, so that Pope had only to confront the 29 brigades before mentioned. My brigade was fully an average one, and my effective force did not exceed 1,500. Some idea therefore may be formed of the force with which General Lee fought the second battle of Manassas; I don't think it could have exceeded 50,000 effective men in all, including artillery and cavalry, and it was probably considerably under that number.

        The loss in Ewell's division, beginning with the artillery fighting on the Rappahannock and ending, with the affair at Ox Hill, was in killed 366, wounded 1,169, and missing 32, the loss in my own brigade being 27 killed and 181 wounded.

        The main battle, which occurred on the 29th and 30th of August, has been called the second battle of Manassas, but I think the little village or hamlet of Groveton is entitled to the honor of giving its name to that great battle, as the fighting began there on the 28th, and was all around it on the 29th and 30th.

        The first battle near the same spot, on ground which was again fought over, had been properly named, as Manassas Junction was then the headquarters and central position of our army, and was the objective point of the enemy during the battle. Such was not the case with either army at the last battle, and the Junction, several miles off, had no more relation to the battle than Bristow, Gainesville or Centreville.

CHAPTER XV.

MOVEMENT INTO MARYLAND.

        ON the 2nd of September our army rested, while the movements of the enemy were being ascertained. Provisions were now very scarce, as the supply in the wagons, with which we had started, was exhausted. The rations obtained by Jackson's command from the enemy's stores, at Manassas, which were confined to what could be brought off in haversacks, were also exhausted, and on this day boiled fresh beef, without salt or bread, was issued to my brigade, which with an ear or two of green corn roasted by a fire, constituted also my own supply of food, at this time. Longstreet's wing of the army was in a worse condition than Jackson's, as it had not participated in the supply found at Manassas.

        On the morning of the 3rd, Jackson's wing commenced the march towards the Potomac, and moved to the left over some country roads, crossing the Loudoun & Hampshire Railroad at a station, above Vienna, until we reached the turnpike from Georgetown to Leesburg in Loudoun, and then along this road through Drainesville, until we passed Leesburg on the afternoon of the 4th, and bivouacked near Big Springs, two or three miles from the latter place, at night.

        On the 5th we resumed the march and crossed the Potomac at White's Ford, about seven miles above Leesburg, into Maryland. This ford was an obscure one on the road through the farm of Captain Elijah White, and the banks of the river had to be dug down so that our wagons and artillery might cross. On the Maryland side of the river the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal runs along the bank, and the canal had to be bridged over a lock to enable our wagons to pass, as they could not get through the culvert where the road ran. That night we bivouacked near Three Springs in Maryland on the road leading

towards Frederick City, and after my brigade had lain down I received a message from General Jackson to let my men get green corn for two days, but, I told the staff officer bringing it, that they had already drawn their rations in that article, which was all they had now to eat. I will here say that green Indian corn and boiled beef without salt are better than no food at all by a good deal, but they constitute a very weakening diet for troops on a long march, as they produce diarrhoea.

        On the 6th we resumed the march and in the afternoon occupied Frederick City and the Monocacy Junction on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Jackson's division took position near the city, and Hill's and Ewell's near the Junction, which is about three miles from the city in the direction of Washington. Ewell's division covered the railroad and the approaches from the direction of Baltimore, and Hill's those from the direction of Washington. We were now able to get some flour and salt, and our whole army was in a day or two concentrated near the same points.

        We remained in position until the 10th, and on that day General Jackson's command moved through Frederick westward, for the purpose of capturing Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights, where there was a considerable force of the enemy. At the same time, McLaws, with his own and Anderson's divisions, including three brigades of Longstreet's attached to Anderson's division, moved towards Maryland Heights, and Brigadier General Walker with his two brigades moved towards Loudoun Heights on the south of the Potomac, for the purpose of surrounding Harper's Ferry and co-operating with General Jackson in its capture.

        On the night of the 10th, Ewell's division bivouacked between Middletown and South Mountain. On the 11th, we moved across the mountain at Boonsboro Gap, and through Boonsboro to Williamsport, where we crossed the Potomac; Hill's division moving from that place directly for Martinsburg on the pike, and Ewell's and

Jackson's divisions for North Mountain depot on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, some miles west of Martinsburg, near which they bivouacked. On the morning of the 12th we moved for Martinsburg, and found that a force of the enemy at that place under General White had retired in the direction of Harper's Ferry on the approach of Hill's division. We passed through the town in the direction of Harper's Ferry and Ewell's division bivouacked on the banks of the Opequon.

        On the morning of the 13th we resumed the march, and reached the turnpike from Charlestown to Harper's Ferry, one mile above Halltown, and bivouacked in sight of the enemy's work on Bolivar Heights, covering the town at the ferry, to wait until McLaws and Walker should get in position on Maryland Heights and Loudon Heights respectively, both of which overlooked and commanded the enemy's position.

        On the afternoon of the 14th, McLaws and Walker having previously gotten in position and opened fire with their artillery, General Jackson's force moved forward to invest the enemy's works, Hill's division moving on the right along the Shenandoah, Ewell's division along the turnpike, and one brigade of Jackson's division along the Potomac on the left, the rest of the division moving in support. Ewell's division moved along and on each side of the pike in three columns until it passed Halltown, when it was formed in treble line of battle with Trimble's and Hays' brigades on the front line, and Lawton's and my brigade in their rear, Lawton's forming the second line, and mine the third. In this order we moved forward through some fields on the right of the road until we reached a woods on a hill called School House Hill, confronting the main works on Bolivar Heights, and in easy range for artillery.

        This was done without opposition, and Hays' brigade was then moved to the left of the road and mine posted in its rear, the right being occupied by Trimble's and Lawton's brigades in the same order. It was now dark

and the artillery firing from Maryland and Loudon Heights, as well as that from the enemy's works, had ceased. General Hill had had some skirmishing with the enemy on our right, and had pushed some brigades close to the enemy's left flank to favorable positions for assaulting his works, and taking them on the flank and rear, but night also closed his operations.

        Early on the morning of the 15th, preparations were made for the assault, and the batteries from Maryland Heights, Loudon Heights, from a position across the Shenandoah to which the guns belonging to Ewell's division had been moved during the night, from Hill's position, from each side of the pike in front of Ewell's division, and from the left on the Potomac, opened on the enemy. In front of the position occupied by Ewell's division was a deep valley between School House Hill and Bolivar Heights, the whole of which was cleared. On the opposite side the ascent to the enemy's works was steep and over thick brush that had been felled so as to make a formidable abattis. It was over this ground we would have had to move to the assault, and the prospect was by no means comforting.

        Very early in the morning, Lawton's brigade had been moved to the right and then by flank to the upper part of the valley in front of us, for the purpose of supporting an attack to be made by Hill's division, and the latter was moving to the assault, when the white flag was hoisted on Bolivar Heights. This indication of the enemy's surrender was received with very hearty and sincere cheers all along the line, as we were thus saved the necessity of an assault, which if stubbornly resisted would have resulted in the loss of many lives to us.

        Under the directions of General Jackson, General A. P. Hill received the surrender of the enemy, then under the command of Brigadier General White, Colonel Miles, the commander of the forces at Harper's Ferry, having been mortally wounded. About 11,000 prisoners were surrendered and paroled, and we secured about 12,000

small arms, 70 pieces of artillery, and a very large amount of stores, provisions, wagons and horses.

        The victory was really a bloodless one so far as General Jackson's command was concerned, the only loss being a very few killed and wounded in Hill's division, but General McLaws had had heavy work in taking Maryland Heights, and had been engaged severely with the enemy coming up in his rear.

CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM.

        LATE in the afternoon of the 15th, General Lawton received an order from General Jackson to move the division on the road to Boteler's Ford, on the Potomac below Shepherdstown, and he at once put his own and Trimble's brigade, which had gotten rations from Harper's Ferry, in motion, and ordered me to follow with my own and Hays' brigade as soon as they were supplied likewise from the stores of the enemy. I was detained until after night before the men of the two brigades could be supplied, and I then followed General Lawton, finding him just before morning bivouacked about four miles from Boteler's Ford. Brigadier General Hays, wounded at Port Republic while Colonel of the 7th Louisiana, had returned to the brigade on the 15th after the surrender of Harper's Ferry and assumed command of his brigade before we started on this march.

        The division moved at dawn on the 16th, and, crossing the Potomac, arrived in the vicinity of Sharpsburg in the early part of the day, and stacked arms in a piece of woods about a mile in rear of Sharpsburg, Jackson's division having preceded it, and Hill's being left behind to dispose of the prisoners and property captured at Harper's Ferry.

        After the different columns, which had been sent against the latter place, had moved from the vicinity of Frederick, the residue of General Lee's army had moved across South Mountain in the direction of Hagerstown, and the division of General D. H. Hill had been left to defend Boonsboro Gap against the Federal Army, composed of Pope's army and McClellan's army combined, and heavy reinforcements which had arrived to their assistance, now approaching under General McClellan. General Hill had been attacked on the 14th, at Boonsboro

Gap, by the main body of McClellan's army, and, after a very obstinate resistance for many hours to the vast forces brought against him, had, with the reinforcements sent to his assistance in the latter part of the day, retired late at night to Sharpsburg on the western side of the Antietam.

        A position had been taken on the morning of the 15th by the force north of the Potomac, consisting of D. H. Hill's division, five brigades; the three remaining brigades of Longstreet's division; Hood's division, two brigades; D. R. Jones' division, three brigades; and Evans' brigade; fourteen brigades in all, covering Sharpsburg on the north and east, with the right resting on Antietam Creek, and the left extending to the Hagerstown pike; and the enemy had gradually moved his whole army up to the front of this position. This was the condition of things when Jackson's two divisions arrived on the 16th, and in the meantime there had been some skirmishing and artillery firing.

        After remaining in position in the rear for some hours, General Lawton was ordered to move to the right to cover a bridge over the Antietam, but after the movement had commenced, it was countermanded and an order received to follow Jackson's division to the left through fields until we struck the turnpike from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, and proceeding along this we reached a piece of woods on the west of the pike in which there was a Dunkard or Quaker Church, and found, some distance beyond the church, Jackson's division already posted in a double line on the west of the pike, and connecting on the right with the left of Hood's division. General Jackson in person directed me to place my brigade, which was at the head of the division, on the left of his own so as to protect its flank, and to communicate with Brigadier General J. R. Jones, then in command of that division.

        It was then getting near dark, and there was heavy skirmishing between Hood's troops further to the right

and the enemy, while shells were flying pretty thick. I had some difficulty in finding General Jones or his left, but after a while succeeded in doing so, and then posted my brigade on the left of Starke's brigade, constituting, as I was informed, Jones' left, which was formed on the west of the pike extending into the woods.

        My brigade was posted on a small road running along the back of the woods past Starke's left, and thrown back at right angles to his line. Lawton's and Trimble's brigades had been halted near the church, but General Hays, under orders from General Jackson, reported to me with his brigade, and it was posted in rear of mine. The artillery firing and the skirmishing except occasional shots between the pickets was put to an end by the darkness, and about ten or eleven o'clock Lawton's and Trimble's brigades took the place, on the front line, of Hood's two brigades, which were withdrawn to the rear.

        Very shortly after dawn on the morning of the 17th, I was ordered by General Jackson in person to move my brigade to the front and left, along a route pointed out by him, for the purpose of supporting some pieces of artillery which General Stuart had in position to operate against the enemy's right, and Hays was ordered to the support of Lawton's and Trimble's brigades.

        Moving along the route designated by General Jackson, I discovered a body of the enemy's skirmishers close on my right pushing forward as if for the purpose of getting around the left flank of our line, and I sent some from my own brigade to hold them in check until I had passed. I found General Stuart about a mile from the position I had moved from, with several pieces of artillery in position on a hill between the left of Jackson's division and the Potomac which were engaging some of the enemy's batteries. At his suggestion, I formed my line in rear of this hill and remained there for about an hour, when General Stuart discovered a body of the enemy's infantry gradually making its way between us

and the left of our main line, and determined to shift his position to a hill further to the right and a little in rear of the direction of our line.

        This movement was executed by passing over a route to the rear of the one I had taken in the morning, the latter being in possession of the enemy, and, while I was forming my brigade in a strip of woods running back in an elbow from the northern extremity of the body of woods in which the Dunkard Church was located, General Stuart informed me that General Lawton had been wounded, and that General Jackson had sent for me to return with my brigade and take command of the division. Leaving the 13th Virginia Regiment, numbering less than 100 men, with General Stuart, I moved the rest of the brigade across the angle made by the elbow with the main body of the woods, through a field to the position I had started from early in the morning.

        The enemy had by this time pushed skirmishers into the northern or further end of this woods, and was moving up a very heavy force to turn our left flank. When I got near my starting point, I found Colonel Grigsby of the 27th Virginia Regiment, and Stafford of the 9th Louisiana rallying some two or three hundred men of Jackson's division at the point at which Starke's brigade had been in position the night before. As I came up I halted my brigade and formed line in rear of Grigsby and Stafford, and they at once advanced against the enemy's skirmishers, who had penetrated some distance into the woods, driving them back.

        My brigade was advanced in their rear until we came up with Grigsby and Stafford, where I formed line on the crest of a slight ridge running through the woods and directed them to form on my left. Heavy bodies of the enemy were now discovered in the field beyond the woods moving up to it. I left my brigade under the command of Colonel William Smith, of the 49th Virginia, with directions to resist the enemy at all hazards, and rode across the Hagerstown pike towards the right to

find the brigades which had been engaged early in the morning, but I found that they had been very badly cut up and had gone to the rear, Hood having taken their place with his two brigades. Jackson's division had also been very badly used, and the whole of it, except the few men rallied by Grigsby and Stafford, had retired from the field.

        The facts were, as I subsequently ascertained from the brigade commanders, that, at light, after skirmishing along the front of Lawton's and Trimble's brigades in a piece of woods occupied by him, the enemy had opened a very heavy enfilading fire from the batteries on the opposite side of the Antietam, and then advanced very heavy columns of infantry against them, at the same time pouring a destructive fire of canister and shells into their ranks from the front. Hays' brigade had gone to the support of the others and this terrible assault from the front with the flank fire from the batteries across the Antietam, had been withstood for some time with obstinacy, until General Lawton was severely wounded; Colonel Douglas, commanding his brigade, killed; Colonel Walker, commanding Trimble's brigade, had had his horse killed under him, and himself been disabled by a contusion from a piece of shell; all the regimental commanders in the three brigades except two had been killed or wounded; and Lawton's brigade had sustained a loss of very nearly one-half, Hays' of more than one-half, and Trimble's of more than a third. General Hood then came to their relief and the shattered remnants of these brigades, their ammunition being exhausted, retired to the rear.

        Jackson's division in the meantime had been very heavily engaged, and had shared a like fate, all of it that was left being what I found Grigsby and Stafford rallying, after General Jones had retired from the field stunned by the concussion of a shell bursting near him, and General Starke, who had succeeded him, had been killed.

        After having discovered that there was nothing of the division left on the field for me to command except my own brigade, and seeing that, what I supposed were Hood's troops, were very hard pressed, and would probably have to retire before overpowering numbers, I sent Major J. P. Wilson, a volunteer aide who had been serving with Generals Ewell and Lawton, to look after the brigades which had gone to the rear, and I rode to find General Jackson to inform him of the condition of things in front, as well as to let him know that a very heavy force was moving on the west of the pike against our flank and rear, confronted by my brigade and the small force under Grigsby and Stafford alone.

        I found the General on a hill in rear of the Dunkard Church, where some batteries were posted, and when I informed him of the condition of things, he directed me to return to my brigade and resist the enemy until he could send me some reinforcements, which he promised to do as soon as he could obtain them. I found my brigade and Grigsby and Stafford's force at the point I had left them, and the movement of the enemy in that quarter was assuming very formidable proportions. The woods in which the Dunkard Church was located, ran along the Hagerstown pike on the west side for about a quarter of a mile until it came to a field on the same side, about 150 or 200 yards wide. Then the woods fell back to the left at right angles with the road, and then ran parallel to it on the other side of the field for about a quarter of a mile further, and then turned to the left and ran some distance to the rear, making the elbow before spoken of.

        The field thus located between the pike and the woods formed a plateau higher than the adjacent woods, and the latter sloped towards a small road at the further edge, which extended through the elbow, and was the one on which I had been posted the night before, and along which I had moved to the support of Stuart in the early morning. The line formed by my brigade was

MAJOR SAMUEL HALE

entirely in the woods, with its right flank opposite the middle of the field or plateau, and its direction was a right angle with the Hagerstown pike. In the woods were limestone ledges which formed very good cover for troops, and they extended back towards the church. From my position the forces of both armies on my right, or rather in my rear, as I now faced, were entirely concealed from view, as the plateau on my right was considerably higher than the ground on which my brigade was formed.

        After my return, the enemy continued to press up towards the woods in which I was, in very heavy force, and I sent Major Hale, my Assistant Adjutant General, to let General Jackson know that the danger was imminent, and he returned with the information that the promised reinforcements would be sent immediately. Just as Major Hale returned, a battery opened on the Hagerstown pike where the field, or plateau, and woods joined. This was in rear of my right flank and not more than two hundred yards from it. I had been anxiously looking to my front and left flank, not dreaming that there was any immediate danger to my right, as I had seen our troops on the eastern side of the pike, at an advanced position, engaged with the enemy, and I took it for granted that this was one of our batteries which had opened on the enemy, but Major Hale's attention was called to it by a soldier in our rear, who was standing on the edge of the plateau, and informed him that it was one of the enemy's batteries. Major Hale examined it himself and immediately informed me of the fact, but I doubted it until I rode to the edge of the woods and saw for myself that it was really one of the enemy's batteries, firing along the pike in the direction of the Dunkard Church.

        While I was looking at it for a minute to satisfy myself, I saw a heavy column of infantry move up by its side. This column consisted of Green's division of Mansfield's corps. The fact was that Hood, after resisting

with great obstinacy immensely superior numbers, had fallen back to the vicinity of the Dunkard Church, and the enemy had advanced to this position. My position now was very critical, as there was nothing between Hood and myself, thus leaving an interval of from a quarter to a half mile between my command and the rest of the army. Fortunately, however, my troops were concealed from this body of the enemy, or their destruction would have been inevitable, as it was nearly between them and the rest of the army, and the body, moving up on the left in my front, had now got into the woods. Hoping the promised reinforcements would arrive in time, I quietly threw back my right flank under cover of the woods to prevent being taken in the rear.

        The situation was most critical and the necessity most pressing, as it was apparent that if the enemy got possession of this woods, possession of the hills in their rear would immediately follow, and then, across to our rear on the road leading back to the Potomac, would have been easy. In fact the possession of these hills would have enabled him to take our whole line in reverse, and a disastrous defeat must have followed. I determined to hold on to the last moment, and I looked anxiously to the rear to see the promised reinforcements coming up, the column on my right and rear and that coming up in front, with which my skirmishers were already engaged, being watched with the most intense interest.

        While thus looking out, I saw the column on my right and rear suddenly move into the woods in the direction of the rear of the church. I could not now remain still, and I at once put my brigade in motion by the right flank on a line parallel to that of the enemy's movements, directing Grigsby and Stafford to fall back in line, skirmishing with the enemy coming up on the left. The limestone ledges enabled my troops to keep out of view of the enemy moving in the woods on my right, and they moved rapidly so as to get up with them.

On passing from behind one of these long ledges, we discovered the enemy moving with flankers thrown out on his right flank. I directed Colonel William Smith, whose regiment, the 49th Virginia, was in the lead, to open fire on the flankers, which was promptly done, and they ran in on the main body, which was taken by surprise by the fire from the unexpected quarter from which it came.

        I now saw two or three brigades moving in line to our assistance, at the further end of the woods, and my brigade was faced to the front as soon as the whole of it had passed from behind the ledge, and opened fire on the enemy, who commenced retiring towards the pike in great confusion, after delivering one or two volleys. I had not intended to move to the front in pursuit, as I saw a brigade of the troops coming to our assistance moving into the woods at its further end on my right so as to come upon the flank of mine if it advanced, and I was, therefore, afraid that both would be thrown into confusion by the collision, and that mine would be exposed to the fire of the other. Moreover the enemy's other column was advancing on my left, held in check, however, by Grigsby and Stafford with their men, aided by the 31st Virginia Regiment, which was on that flank. The brigade, however, without awaiting orders, dashed after the retreating column, driving it entirely out of the woods, and, notwithstanding my efforts to do so, I did not succeed in stopping it until its flank and rear had become exposed to the fire of the column on the left.

        I then saw other troops of the enemy moving rapidly across the plateau from the pike to the column, opposed to Grigsby and Stafford, and I ordered my brigade to retire a short distance, so as to change front and advance against the enemy in that direction. Just as I was reforming my line for that purpose, Semmes' brigade, and two regiments of Barksdale's brigade, of McLaws' division, and Anderson's brigade of D. R. Jones' division came up, and the whole, including Grigsby's and Stafford's

small command, advanced and swept the enemy from the woods into the fields, and the enemy retreated in great disorder to another body of woods beyond that from which he had been thus driven. As soon as the enemy had been thus repulsed, I recalled my regiments and caused them to be re-formed, when they were again posted in their former position on the small ridge before mentioned. As soon as his infantry had retired the enemy opened a tremendous fire with canister and shell upon the woods occupied by us, which was continued for some time.

        The troops which had been opposed to us in this latter affair consisted of Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps, which had not been previously engaged, supported by Mansfield's corps, under Williams, and which moved up for a fresh attack on our extreme left. During his advance, the enemy's columns had received a galling fire from the guns under General Stuart on a hill in the rear of our left which contributed very materially to the repulse, and General Stuart pursued the retreating force on its flank for some distance, with his pieces of artillery and the remnant of the 13th Virginia Regiment under Captain Winston.^*

        * McClellan says in reference to this affair on our left, his right: "Entering the woods on the west of the turnpike, and driving the enemy before them, the first line was met by a heavy fire of musketry and shell from the enemy's breastworks and the batteries on the hill, commanding the exit from the woods. Meantime a heavy column of the enemy had succeeded in crowding back the troops of General Green's division, and appeared in rear of the left of Sedgwick's division. By command of General Sumner, General Howard was forced the third time to the rear, preparatory to a change of front, to meet the column advancing on the left, but this line, now suffering from a destructive fire both in front and on its left, which it was unable to return, gave way towards the right and rear in considerable confusion, and was soon followed by the first and second lines."

        There was nothing in the shape of breastworks in the woods or in its rear at that time, and the fight on our part was a stand up one altogether. The slight works, made mostly of rails, which McClellan saw after the battle, were made on the 18th when we were expecting a renewal of the attack.

        My brigade at that time numbered less than 1,000 officers and men present, and Grigsby and Stafford had between two and three hundred; yet with this small force we confronted, for a long time, Sumner's formidable column, and held it in check until reinforcements arrived to our assistance. Had we retired from the fear of being flanked or cut off, the enemy must have obtained possession of the woods, where we were, and, as a necessary consequence, of the hills in their rear, which would have resulted in a decisive defeat to us, and a probable destruction of our army.

        While these operations on our extreme left were going on, all of which transpired in the forenoon, two other divisions of Sumner's corps, French's and Richardson's, had been moving against our centre occupied by General D. H. Hill, and were forcing it back after a hard struggle, just about the time I was contending with the two columns of the enemy in the woods. A portion of this force moving against Hood near the Dunkard Church, was met and repulsed by Kershaw's and Cobb's brigades of McLaws' division, the portion of Barksdale's brigade which had not come to my assistance, and Ransom's brigade of Walker's division, at the same time that the force opposed to me was repulsed.

        Not long after my brigade had been re-formed and placed in its former position, Colonel Hodges, in command of Armistead's brigade of Anderson's division, came up and took the place of my brigade, which latter was then posted along the edge of the plateau on Hodges' right, facing towards the Hagerstown pike. Subsequently General McLaws posted Barksdale's brigade on my right, and Kershaw's and Cobb's brigades on the left of Hodges'. My line as established along the edge of the woods and plateau after the repulse of the enemy, extended beyond where the left of Jackson's division rested at daylight, and embraced inside of it all of our killed and wounded, and nearly the whole of that of the enemy, in this last affair on our left.

        Major Wilson had by this time returned with the information that he had been able to find only a part of Hays' brigade, which was under General Hays, who was with General Hood, and that it was in no condition to render any service. He further stated that the remnants of the other brigades had gone to the rear for the purpose of re-forming and gathering up stragglers, but that he had been unable to find them.

        The enemy continued to shell the woods in which we were for some time, doing, however, little or no damage, as we were under cover, and his shot and shells went over our heads. Some of our batteries, which had been brought up to the hills in our rear, opened fire on the woods where we were, on two occasions, under the impression that they were occupied by the enemy, and I had to send and have it stopped. Some pieces of our artillery were moved into the angle of the plateau on my right and opened on the enemy, but were soon compelled to retire by the superior metal and number of guns opposed to them.

        We remained in position during the rest of the day, as did the troops on my left, and those immediately on my right. The enemy made no further attack on us on this part of the line, but there were several demonstrations as if for an attack, and from the top of a tree on the edge of the woods a lookout reported three lines of battle beyond the pike with a line of skirmishers extending nearly up to the pike. There were, however, some attempts against our line further to the right, and late in the afternoon a fierce attack was made on our extreme right by Burnside's corps, which drove some of our troops from the bridge across the Antietam on that flank, and was forcing back our right, when some of A. P. Hill's brigades, which were just arriving from Harper's Ferry, went to the assistance of the troops engaged on that flank, and the enemy was driven back in considerable confusion.

        This affair, which terminated just before dark, closed the fighting on the 16th, and after a most protracted and

desperate struggle, our centre had been forced back to some extent, but the positions on our flanks were maintained.

        The attack on Jackson's command in the early morning had been made by Hooker's and Mansfield's corps, numbering, according to McClellan's statement, 24,982 men present and fit for duty, and this force had been resisted by Jackson's division and the three brigades of Ewell's, and subsequently by Hood's two brigades, aided by those of D. H. Hill's brigades sent to the assistance of Hood, until Sumner's corps, numbering 18,813 men, came up about nine A.M. to the assistance of Hooker's and Mansfield's. Hood was then compelled to retire to the woods near the Dunkard Church, and Sumner, in command now of the entire right wing of the enemy, prepared for another attack with his corps supported by Hooker's and Mansfield's. This attack was made on our left by Sedgwick's division supported by Mansfield's corps, and on the centre by French's and Richardson's divisions supported by Hooker's corps, and was repulsed as has been stated, Hill, however, losing ground in the centre to some extent. Franklin's corps numbering 12,300 men was then carried to the support of Sumner, arriving a little after twelve M., and a new attack on the woods in which our left rested was projected, but was arrested by General Sumner's orders.

        Another attack, however, was made on Hill's position in the centre, which met with some success by reason of the removal of one of his brigades, by mistake, from its position, but the enemy's progress was arrested by Walker's brigades and a part of Anderson's division, which had arrived to his support. The enemy had then made the attack with Burnside's corps, numbering 13,819, on Longstreet's right, on the Antietam, held by D. R. Jones' division, which was repulsed on the arrival of Hill's brigades as stated. The above is a condensed account of the main features of this battle taken from the reports of both sides, and the figures in regard to the strength of McClellan's corps are taken from his own

report. Porter's corps of his army, numbering 12,930, was held in reserve.^*

        Late in the afternoon, after it had become apparent that no further attack on our left was to be made, I rode to the rear in search of the missing brigades and found about one hundred men of Lawton's brigade which had been collected by Major Lowe, the ranking officer of the brigade left, and I had them moved up to where my own brigade was, and placed on its right. We lay on our arms all night, and about light on the morning of the 18th, General Hays brought up about ninety men of his brigade, which were posted on my left. During the morning Captain Feagins, the senior officer left of Trimble's brigade, brought up about two hundred of that brigade, and they were posted in my rear.

        The enemy remained in our front during the whole day without making any show of an attack on our left, but there was some firing between the skirmish lines farther to right. The enemy in my immediate front showed a great anxiety to get possession of his dead and wounded on that part of the ground, and several flags of truce approached us, but, I believe, without authority from the proper source. However, a sort of informal truce prevailed for a time, and some of the dead and very badly wounded of the enemy and of that part of our army which had been engaged first on the morning of the 17th, were exchanged even while the skirmishers were firing at each other on the right. This was finally stopped and the enemy informed that no flag of truce could be recognized unless it came from the headquarters of his army. We remained in position on the 18th during the whole day, without any serious demonstration by the enemy on any part of our line, and after dark retired for the purpose of recrossing the

        * Walker's division of two brigades (his own and Ransom's) had reached the vicinity of the battlefield on the 16th and McLaws' division, and Anderson's, including the three brigades of Longstreet's with him, did not get up until after the battle had begun.

Potomac. I held my position until my skirmishers in front were relieved by a portion of Fitz. Lee's cavalry and then retired in pursuance of orders previously received from General Jackson, carrying with me Armistead's brigade under Colonel Hodges, which had received no orders from its division commander, and bringing up, I believe, the rear of the infantry of our entire army. We found a large number of wagons and troops massed at Boteler's Ford, and the division now commanded by me did not cross until after sunrise. After getting over the river, the division was formed in line of battle on the Virginia side, under direction of General Longstreet, and remained in position several hours, until the enemy appeared on the other bank and opened on us with artillery.

        I was subsequently ordered to leave Lawton's brigade, now increased to about four hundred men under Colonel Lamar of the 61st Georgia Regiment (who had returned after the battle of the 17th), at Boteler's Ford, under the command of Brigadier General Pendleton, who was entrusted with the defence of the crossing, and I was ordered to move with the rest of the division towards Martinsburg.

        Our whole army with its trains had been safely recrossed and this terminated the operations properly connected with the battle of Sharpsburg.

        In that battle, Ewell's division had lost in killed 119, in wounded 1,115, and in missing 38, being an aggregate loss of 1,352 out of less than 3,400 men and officers carried into action. The loss in my own brigade was in killed 18, and in wounded 156, and among the latter were Colonel Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Gibson of the 49th Virginia Regiment, both severely, and the former receiving three distinct wounds before the close of the fight, in which he was engaged. The loss in our whole army was heavy, but not so great as the estimate put upon it by the enemy.

        There has been very great misapprehension, both on

the part of the enemy and many Confederates, not familiar with the facts, about the strength of General Lee's army at this battle. The whole of the troops then constituting that army had belonged to the army which opposed McClellan in the battles around Richmond, except Evans' and Drayton's brigades, and such absentees as had returned, and there had been troops then belonging to the army, which had not left Richmond, exceeding the number in the said two brigades. There had been heavy losses in the battles around Richmond; and the subsequent losses at Cedar Run, on the Rappahannock, at Manassas and in the vicinity, at Maryland Heights and in Pleasant Valley--where McLaws had been severely engaged,--and at South Mountain, had very materially weakened the strength of the army. Besides all this, since crossing the Rappahannock we had been without regular supplies of food, and had literally been living from hand to mouth. Our troops were badly shod and many of them became barefooted, and they were but indifferently clothed and without protection against the weather. Many of them had become exhausted from the fatigues of the campaign, and the long and rapid marches which they had made while living on short rations and a weakening diet--and many were foot-sore from want of shoes; so that the straggling from these causes, independent of that incident to all armies, had been frightful before we crossed the Potomac, and had continued up to the time of the battle.

        Some idea of the diminution from these various causes may be found from the following facts: That Christian gentleman, and brave, accomplished soldier, General D. H. Hill, states that his division, which numbered ten thousand at the beginning of the battles around Richmond, had been reduced to less than five thousand which he had at the battle of South Mountain. Yet he had reached the army after all the fighting about Manassas, and he states that on the morning of the 17th of September he had but three thousand infantry. Ewell's

division, with Lawton's brigade, which was attached to it after the battle of Cedar Run, must have numbered, at the time they reached McClellan's right, north of the Chickahominy, eight or ten thousand, as Lawton's brigade was then a very large one, which had never been in action. Yet that division numbered less than three thousand four hundred on the morning of the 17th.

        General Lee says in his report: "This great battle was fought by less than forty thousand men on our side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and hardships in the field and on the march." This certainly covered our entire force of all descriptions, and I am satisfied that he might have safely stated it at less than thirty thousand. There were forty brigades of infantry in all in the army, one of which, Thomas' of A. P. Hill's division, did not cross the Potomac from Harper's Ferry, and the nine brigades of Ewell's and D. H. Hill's divisions, numbering in the aggregate less than 6,400 officers and men, were fully average ones.

        General D. R. Jones states that his command, consisting of his division of three brigades and three of Longstreet's, in all six brigades, numbering on the morning of the 17th, 2,430; General J. R. Jones states that Jackson's division of four brigades numbered less than 1,600; General McLaws states that he carried into action in his four brigades, 2,893; General A. P. Hill states that his three brigades actually numbered less than 2,000; D. H. Hill's five brigades numbered 3,000; and Ewell's four brigades numbered less than 3,400; which gives 15,323 in these twenty-six brigades, leaving thirteen other brigades on the field whose strength is not stated, to-wit: the six brigades of his own division and Longstreet's brought up by General Anderson; A. P. Hill's other two brigades; Hood's two brigades, both very small; Walker's two brigades; and Evans' brigade. General Anderson was wounded, and there is no report from his division or any of his brigades, but General D. H. Hill says that Anderson came to his support, which

was before Anderson's division became engaged, with some three or four hundred men, and that force consisted of five brigades, Armistead's having gone to the left. Averaging the thirteen brigades from which no estimate was given with the others and it would give a strength of 7,670, which would make our whole infantry force on the field, from the beginning to the end of the battle, twenty-three thousand at the outside. Our cavalry was not engaged, as it had merely watched the flanks, but six thousand would fully cover the whole of the cavalry and artillery which we had on that side of the river.

        McClellan states his whole force in action at 87,164 men present and fit for duty, and he estimates General Lee's at 97,445. As this estimate is a very remarkable one and contains some very amusing features, it is given here in his own language. He says:

        "An estimate of the forces under the Confederate General Lee, made up by direction of General Banks from information obtained by the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, etc., previous to the battle of Antietam, is as follows:

• General T. J. Jackson's corps. . . . . 24,778 men.
• General James Longstreet's corps. . . . . 23,342 men.
• General D. H. Hill's 2nd division. . . . . 15,525 men.
• General J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry. . . . . 6,400 men.
• General Ransom's and Jenkins' brigades. . . . . 3,000 men.
• Forty-six regiments not included in above. . . . . 18,400 men.
• Artillery, estimated at 400 guns. . . . . 6,000 men.
• Total. . . . . 97,445 men.

        It is to be presumed that this estimate was made by Banks when General Jackson was figuring around Pope's rear, as he did not have a command in McClellan's army, and it is well known that Banks always saw things with very largely magnifying glasses when "Stonewall" Jackson was about.

        That some of the affrighted civilians who magnified

one small company of cavalry at the first battle of Manassas, called the Black Horse Cavalry, into 20,000, might be misled by this estimate of McClellan's, or Banks', might well be believed, but that the Major General commanding the "Grand Army of the Potomac," should have so estimated the strength of General Lee's army at Sharpsburg, is perfectly amazing.

        Who commanded the "forty-six regiments not included in above," or where were the 400 guns to come from?

        This estimate of the relative strength of the two armies gives rise to some very curious reflections:

        It must be recollected that Bragg and Kirby Smith were at this time in Kentucky, moving north, and if the newly established Government at Richmond had been able to put in the field and send into Maryland from the comparatively small population of the Confederacy an army of nearly 100,000 men with 400 pieces of artillery, it showed a wonderful energy on the part of that government; while, the fact that the powerful Government at Washington, with its immense resources and its very large population to draw from, after a call for 300,000 more men, and after taking everything in the way of troops from the Ohio to the Atlantic, had been able to bring into the field, for the defence of the National Capital and to oppose the large invading army of "rebels," only a force numbering less than 90,000 men, displayed a weakness not at all flattering to the energy of the head of the War Department at Washington, or to the wisdom of the occupant of the White House, and a want of "patriotism" by no means complimentary to the people of the North.

        McClellan had stated that the troops in and about Washington and on the Maryland shore of the Potomac above and below, including those in Maryland and Delaware, amounted, on the 1st of March, 1862, to 193,142 present for duty and an aggregate present and absent of 221,987. This did not include the 13,000 brought by

Burnside from North Carolina, nor the troops brought by Cox from the Kanawha Valley, nor, is it presumed, the forces of Fremont under Sigel, a large part of which were probably brought from Missouri; and there had since been at least one call, if not more, for an additional levy of 300,000 men. Now the question very naturally arises, as to what had become of all that immense force, with the reinforcements and recruits, which had dwindled down to 87,164 men on the morning of the 17th of September, 1862.

        It will be seen from the account previously given that on the 15th and in the early part of the day of the 16th, McClellan's large army was confronted by a very small force under Longstreet and D. H. Hill. Jackson with two divisions numbering less than 5,000 men, and Walker, with his two brigades arrived on the 16th, and it was upon the force consisting of these reinforcements and D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's troops, including in the latter Hood's two brigades, and Evans' brigade, that McClellan's army had been hurled on the morning of the 17th. McLaws with his own and Anderson's brigades, ten in all, did not arrive until the action had been progressing for some hours. McLaws arrived at sunrise, and A. P. Hill, with his five brigades, did not come up until late in the afternoon.

        The 24,982 men under Hooker and Mansfield had attacked Jackson's division and Lawton's, Trimble's and Hays' brigades of Ewell's division, numbering in all 4,000 men. When they were compelled to retire, Hood with his two brigades supported by Ripley's, Colquit's and Garland's and D. H. Hill's division had withstood the enemy until Sumner arrived with his 18,813 men, and then Hood was also compelled to retire to the Dunkard Church. Sumner then with his corps and what was left of the other two, attacked my brigade of less than 1,000 men, a remnant of about two or three hundred of Jackson's division, and what was left of D. H. Hill's and Hood's divisions, when McLaws and Walker with

their six brigades came to our assistance immediately after the arrival of McLaws upon the field. Sumner was repulsed and then Franklin with his 12,300 arrived to his support, and the attack was renewed on Hill in the centre, when Anderson with three or four hundred men and one brigade of Walker's came to his assistance. This force of 56,095 men was brought against a force which with all its reinforcements, from first to last, amounted to less than 18,000 men. How it had been served will appear from the following extract from McClellan's report. He says: "One division of Sumner's corps, and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and much scattered; so that they were for the time somewhat demoralized. In Hooker's corps, according to the return made by General Meade, commanding, there were but 6,729 men present on the 18th, whereas, on the morning of the 22nd, there were 13,093 present for duty in the same corps, showing that previous to and during the battle 6,364 men were separated from their command."

        McClellan was not able to renew the attack on the 18th, and, according to his own showing, had to wait for reinforcements before doing so; yet he claims a great victory at Antietam, alleging that he had accomplished the object of the campaign, to-wit: "to preserve the National Capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland." This was a singular claim on the part of the General who, scarce three months before, had boastingly stated that the advance of his army was within five miles of the Confederate Capital.

        The truth is that the substantial victory was with us, and if our army had been in reach of reinforcements, it would have been a decisive one; but we were more than 200 miles from the point from which supplies of ammunition were to be obtained, and any reinforcements which could have been spared to us were much further

off, while large reinforcements were marching to McClellan's aid. We had, therefore, to recross the Potomac.

        The question had been mooted as to the propriety of the campaign into Maryland, and in regard thereto I will say: General Lee, on assuming command of the army at Richmond, had found that city, the seat of the Confederate Government, beleaguered by a vast army, while all Northern Virginia, including the best part of the beautiful valley of the Shenandoah, was held by the enemy. With a herculean effort, he had broken through the cordon surrounding his army, and with inferior numbers fallen upon the beleaguering enemy, and sent it cowering to the banks of the lower James. He had then moved north, and, after a series of hard fought battles, had hurled the shattered remains of the army that had been marauding through Northern Virginia, with all the reinforcements sent from the lately besieging army, into the fortifications around Washington. With the diminished columns of the army with which he accomplished all this, he had crossed the Potomac, captured an important stronghold defended by a strong force, securing a large amount of artillery, small arms, and stores of all kinds, and had fought a great battle with the newly reorganized and heavily reinforced and recruited army of the enemy, which later was so badly crippled that it was not able to resume the offensive for near two months.

        He now stood defiantly on the southern banks of the Potomac, the extreme northern limit of the Confederacy, and the result of all these operations, of which the march into Maryland was an important part, had been that not only the Confederate Capital had been relieved from the presence of the besieging army, a danger to which it was not subjected again for two years; but the enemy's Capital had been threatened, his territory invaded, and the base of operations for a new movement on Richmond had been transferred to the north banks of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, from which there was an overland route of more than two hundred miles. When that movement

did take place, General Lee was in a position to interpose his army, and inflict a new defeat on the enemy, as was verified by subsequent events.

        The following extracts from McClellan's report will give some idea of the results obtained. Speaking, as of the morning of the 18th, he says:

        "At that moment--Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded--the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. Our battle lost, and almost all would have been lost." And he subsequently says:

        "The movement from Washington into Maryland, which culminated in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a part of an offensive campaign, with the object of the invasion of the enemy's territory, and an attack on his capital, but was defensive in its purposes, although offensive in its character, and would be technically called a 'defensive--offensive' campaign."

        "It was undertaken at a time when our army had experienced severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the national capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland. These purposes were fully and finally accomplished by the battle of Antietam, which brought the Army of the Potomac into what might be termed an accidental position on the upper Potomac."^*

        It was a great deal gained to force the enemy into a "defensive--offensive" campaign in his own territory and place the "Army of the Potomac" in that accidental position, though we did fail in arousing Maryland, or getting any reinforcements from that State.

        * In a telegram to Halleck, dated September 22nd (Part II, Conduct of the War, p. 495), McClellan said: "When I was assigned to the command of this army in Washington, it was suffering under the disheartening influence of defeat. It had been greatly reduced by casualties in General Pope's campaign, and its efficiency had been much impaired. The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam Creek had resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers and many regimental and company officers, besides a large number of enlisted men. The army corps had been badly cut up and scattered by the overwhelming numbers brought against them in the battle of the 17th instant, and the entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable overwork, and want of sleep and rest." (See also his testimony same volume, pages 439, 440 and 441.)

CHAPTER XVII.

PREPARATIONS ABOUT FREDERICKSBURG.

        ON the afternoon of the 19th, after leaving Lawton's brigade at Boteler's Ford, I marched with the three other brigades on the road towards Martinsburg, about six miles from Shepherdstown, and bivouacked.

        During the night the enemy had succeeded in crossing the Potomac and capturing four of General Pendleton's guns near Shepherdstown, and on the morning of the 20th I was ordered to move back to Boteler's Ford. On arriving near there, by order of General Jackson, my three brigades were formed in line of battle in rear of General A. P. Hill's division which had preceded me, and were moving against the force of the enemy which had crossed over to the south bank. My three brigades were posted in pieces of woods on each side of the road leading towards the ford, and remained there within range of the enemy's guns on the opposite side until late in the afternoon. In the meantime Hill's division advanced, under a heavy fire of artillery from across the river, and drove the enemy's infantry on the southern bank pell-mell into the river, inflicting upon him a very severe punishment for his rashness in undertaking to pursue us and making him pay very dearly for the guns he had taken. One officer in my command, Captain Frazier of the 15th Alabama Regiment,--the only regimental commander in Trimble's brigade who had not been killed or wounded at Sharpsburg,--was severely wounded by a shell, which was all the damage I sustained.

        Late in the afternoon, I was ordered to move back, and that night we marched to the vicinity of the Opequon not far above its mouth. We remained at this position until the 24th, when we moved across the Opequon to the Williamsport pike, and on the next day to the vicinity of Martinsburg. On the 27th, General Jackson's whole

command was moved to Bunker Hill on the road from Martinsburg to Winchester, and went into camp in that vicinity. By this time our baggage wagons, which had been sent from Manassas to the valley, when we moved into Maryland, had reached us.

        We were now able to obtain supplies of flour, by threshing wheat, of which there was a good supply in the valley, and having it ground. While our camps were located at Bunker Hill, Jackson's command destroyed the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad from North Mountain to within five miles of Harper's Ferry, which latter place had been re-occupied by the enemy. More than twenty miles of the road was thus destroyed, and it was done effectively. The Winchester & Potomac Railroad was also destroyed to within a short distance of the Ferry. Previous to this there was a slight engagement between the Stonewall brigade of Jackson's division and a small force of the enemy on the railroad near Kearneysville, but the enemy did not make a serious effort to molest us, either while we were engaged in destroying the railroad or subsequently.

        The Army of Northern Virginia was now organized into two regular corps of four divisions each, General Longstreet being assigned to the command of the first corps, and General Jackson to the command of the second corps, both with the rank of Lieutenant General. D. H. Hill's division was attached to the second corps, and two divisions were formed out of Longstreet's, D. R. Jones' and Hood's divisions, under the command of Generals Pickett and Hood respectively, they having been promoted. The first corps consisted of the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, Pickett and Hood, and the second corps of the divisions of Ewell, D. H. Hill, A. P. Hill, and Jackson (Ewell's division being under my command and Jackson's under J. R. Jones).

        For some time the second corps remained camped near Bunker Hill, and the first corps was camped in the vicinity of Winchester.

        McClellan in the meantime had concentrated the

main body of his army on the north bank of the Potomac near Harper's Ferry, and was engaged in preparing for a new campaign into Virginia, while Maryland and Bolivar Heights were very strongly fortified by him.

        A short time after the middle of October, General Stuart, with a portion of his cavalry, made a successful expedition through Maryland and Pennsylvania to the rear of and around McClellan's army.

        Towards the last of October McClellan began to move across the Potomac on the east side of the Blue Ridge, with a view to another approach to Richmond. His army had been largely recruited, and superbly equipped. The army of General Lee had been considerably increased by the return of stragglers and convalescents, but it continued to be indifferently supplied with clothing and shoes, of which articles there was a great deficiency.

        As soon as McClellan's movement was ascertained, Jackson's corps was moved towards the Shenandoah, occupying positions between Charlestown and Berryville, and one division of Longstreet's corps was sent across the Blue Ridge to watch the enemy. When the enemy began to move eastwardly from the mountain, the whole of Longstreet's corps moved across the ridge for the purpose of intercepting his march. D. H. Hill's division of Jackson's corps was subsequently moved across the ridge to watch the enemy's movements. A. P. Hill's division had been put in position near Berryville, covering the Shenandoah, at Snicker's or Castleman's Ferry, where it had an engagement with a body of the enemy that had crossed the ridge as McClellan was moving on. Ewell's division (under my command) was at first posted on A. P. Hill's left, near a church, while Jackson's division was on the Berryville and Charlestown pike in my rear, but as the enemy's covered our front I moved above, first to Millwood, and then to Stone Bridge, near White Post, and Jackson's division moved to the vicinity of the Occoquon between the positions of the other divisions and Winchester.

        After the enemy had left the vicinity of the Blue Ridge, D. H. Hill's division recrossed the ridge and moved up on the east side of the Shenandoah to the vicinity of Front Royal. While my camp was at Stone Bridge, my division destroyed the Manassas Gap Railroad from Front Royal to Piedmont on the east side of the Blue Ridge, a distance of twenty miles, and D. H. Hill's division destroyed it from Front Royal to Strasburg.

        In the meantime McClellan's army had been concentrated in the vicinity of Warrenton, and McClellan had been succeeded in the command by Burnside. Longstreet had previously taken position at or near Culpeper Court-House.

        About the 15th of November Burnside began the movement of his army towards the lower Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg. When this movement was discovered Longstreet's corps was moved towards Fredericksburg to dispute the enemy's crossing, and orders were sent to General Jackson to move his corps across the Blue Ridge. This movement of the latter corps began about the 20th of November, and we moved up the valley to New Market and then across Massanutten Mountain, the Shenandoah and the Blue Ridge to the vicinity of Madison Court-House. The weather had now become quite cool, and our daily marches were long and rapid, and very trying to the men. On this march I saw a number of our men without shoes, and with bleeding feet wrapped with rags. We remained in the vicinity of Madison Court-House for two or three days, and it was here that General Jackson wore, for the first time, a new regulation coat with the wreath, and a hat, and his appearance in them caused no little remark and amusement among the men. His dress hitherto had been a rusty grey coat, intended for a colonel, and a little dingy cloth cap which lay flat on his head, or rather forehead.

        From Madison Court-House we moved past Orange

Court-House and along the plank road to the vicinity of Fredericksburg, arriving there on the 1st of December.

        Longstreet's corps was found guarding the Rappahannock against Burnside's army which had concentrated on the opposite bank. My division was moved to the vicinity of Guiney's depot on the R., F. & P. Railroad, as was Jackson's. After remaining here two or three days, I was ordered to move towards Port Royal to support D. H. Hill, whose division had been ordered to the vicinity of that place, to watch some gun-boats there and prevent a crossing. Port Royal is some eighteen or twenty miles below Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock. I first took position some six or eight miles from Port Royal on the road from Guiney's depot, but subsequently moved to the vicinity of Buckner's Neck on the Rappahannock a few miles above Port Royal, for the purpose of watching the river and acting in concert with General Hill. The latter, by the use of one Whitworth gun and some other artillery, had driven the enemy's gunboats from Port Royal, and in revenge they fired into the houses in the little village of Port Royal and some others below as they passed down the river.

        While I was watching the river at Buckner's Neck, which is in a bend of the river, and commanded by high ground on the opposite side, so as to afford a good position for forcing a passage, the enemy hauled some timbers to a place called the Hop Yard on the northern bank, as if for the purpose of constructing a bridge at that place, but this proved a feint. Jackson's division had been left near Guiney's depot, and A. P. Hill's had been camped in rear of Hamilton's Crossing for the purpose of supporting Longstreet's right, which rested at the latter place. The different divisions of Jackson's corps were thus posted, immediately preceding the battle of Fredericksburg.

CHAPTER XVIII.

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

        FREDERICKSBURG is located on the southern bank of the Rappahannock River at the head of tide water, and the river is navigable to that point for steamboats and small vessels. On the northern bank, opposite, above and below Fredericksburg, are what are called the Stafford Heights, which are close to the river, and completely command the southern bank. Fredericksburg's exact location is on a narrow strip of low land between the river and a range of hills in the rear. These hills leaving the river opposite the small village of Falmouth, which is a short distance above Fredericksburg and on the northern bank, diverge from it below, and gradually declining, extend nearly to the Massaponix Creek, which empties into the river four or five miles below the town.

        The river flats or bottoms immediately below Fredericksburg widen out considerably and continue to widen until they are from one and a half to two miles in width at the lower end of the range of hills, where they unite with similar but not so wide flats on the Massaponix, which extend back for some distance in rear of the range of hills mentioned. Below the mouth of the Massaponix there are other hills which approach near to the bank of the river, and extend down it for a considerable distance. Hazel Run, rising southeast of Fredericksburg, runs through the range of hills along a narrow valley, or ravine rather, and passing close on the east of the town, empties into the river. Deep Run rises below in the range of hills, and runs across the wide bottoms through a deep channel likewise into the river, something over a mile below the town. The hills just in rear of the town were, at the time of which I am speaking, nearly denuded of growing timber, but below, to the end of the range, they were for the most part covered with woods. The

bottoms were entirely cleared and in cultivation, furnishing several extensive farms, and up Deep Run to its sources is a valley making a large re-entering angle in the line of hills, which valley was then also cleared and in cultivation.

        From the town a road, called the Telegraph Road, runs south, crossing Hazel Run and then ascending the hills passes towards Richmond by the way of Hanover Junction. Another road called the Plank Road ascends the hills above Hazel Run and runs westward by Chancellorsville to Orange Court-House. A third road, called the River Road, runs from the lower end of the town, crossing Hazel Run and Deep Run, and, passing through the bottoms about half way from the river to the foot of the hills, in a direction very nearly parallel to the river, it crosses the Massaponix not far above its mouth, where it forks, one fork going to Port Royal below and the other by Bowling Green in the direction of Richmond. This is a wide road, and where it passes through the bottoms there were on both sides high, thick, and firm embankments thrown up for fences or enclosures to the adjacent fields.

        The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, leaving the Potomac at the mouth of Aquia Creek, crosses the river into Fredericksburg and then runs through the bottoms below the town between the river road and the hills, which latter it approaches closely at their lower end, and then passes around at their foot to take the direction to Richmond. Just at the rear of the foot of the lower end of the hills, a country road leading from the Telegraph Road and passing along the east of the ridge crosses the railroad to get into the River Road, and this is called "Hamilton's Crossing," from a gentleman of that name formerly residing near the place. A canal runs from the river along the foot of the hills above the town to the rear of it, for the purpose of supplying water to several mills and factories in it,

and this canal connects by a drain ditch with Hazel Run, over which ditch the Plank Road crosses.

        What is called Marye's Heights or Hill lies between Hazel Run and the Plank Road, and at the foot of it is a stone wall, behind which and next to the hill, the Telegraph Road runs. Above Marye's Hill on the east of the Plank Road are what are called, respectively, Cemetery, Stansbury's and Taylor's Hills, all overlooking the canal. In rear of these hills and overlooking and commanding them are higher eminences. On the east of Hazel Run and the Telegraph Road is quite a high hill farther back than Marye's Hill and overlooking it and nearly the whole ground, to which the name of Lee's Hill has been given, because it was the position generally occupied by General Lee during the battle.

        Burnside's army had taken position on and in rear of Stafford Heights, and the heights themselves, from Falmouth to a point very nearly opposite the mouth of the Massaponix, were covered with numerous batteries of heavy guns, while the nature of the ground was such as to afford easy access to the river by his troops. Longstreet's corps occupied the hills in rear of Fredericksburg to Hamilton's Crossing, and positions for some distance above, while strong pickets were established in the town and on the river bank above and below to watch the enemy and impede a crossing.

        It was impossible to resist successfully a crossing, as the river is only between two and three hundred yards wide, and the banks are so deep, and the river so accessible, on the north bank by means of ravines running into it, that our artillery, posted on the hills occupied by our troops, could not play upon the bridges either during the progress of the construction or afterwards, while the enemy's batteries were able, by a concentrated fire, to drive off the small bodies watching the river, or to prevent any aid being sent to them over the wide open plains formed by the bottoms. In addition to all

this, the bottoms towards the lower end of our lines were so wide that we had no guns which would do effective firing across them, while the enemy's heavy guns from the north bank of the river completely swept the whole of our front, and reached over beyond our line.

        On the morning of the 11th of December the enemy commenced his movement, and by the use of his artillery drove the regiments which were guarding the river from its banks after an obstinate resistance, and succeeded in laying down their pontoon bridges, one at the mouth of Deep Creek, and the other two at Fredericksburg. The first was laid early in the afternoon, but the latter two not until near night, and during night and the next day the enemy crossed in heavy force.

        On the afternoon of the 12th I received an order from General Jackson to move at once to the vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing, which I did by marching nearly all night, and a short time before day I bivouacked some two miles in rear of the crossing where the division had a little time to rest. At light on the morning of the 13th I moved up to the crossing, and found our army in position confronting the enemy. Longstreet's line had been constructed from the right, and General A. P. Hill's division, which was much the largest in Jackson's corps, now occupied the right of the line which rested near the crossing. He was in the front skirts of the woods which covered the hills, and on his left was Hood's division.

        On the right of Hill's line was a small hill cleared on the side next the enemy, on which were posted some fourteen pieces of artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Walker, which were supported by Field's brigade, under Colonel Brockenborough, while Archer's brigade was on the left of the guns. On Archer's left there was an interval of several hundred yards in front of which was a low flat marshy piece of woodland extending across the railroad out into the bottom which was supposed to be impracticable, and was therefore not covered by any body of troops, but Gregg's brigade was posted in

reserve in rear of this interval, without, however, being in the line of battle. On the left of the interval were the other three brigades of A. P. Hill's division, Lane's brigade being next to it, but in advance of the general line a considerable number of pieces of artillery were posted along the left of Hill's line, but they were on low and unfavorable ground, as there were no good positions for guns on that part of the line.

        On my arrival, my division was posted on a second line several hundred yards in rear of A. P. Hill's, with Jackson's, now under Brigadier General Taliaferro, on my left. My right rested on the railroad at the crossing, and extended along the ridge road, which here crossed the railroad, for a short distance and then into the woods on my left. Hays' brigade was on my right, with Trimble's brigade under Colonel R. F. Hoke immediately in its rear, Lawton's brigade under Colonel N. N. Atkinson in the centre, and my own brigade under Colonel J. A. Walker on the left. In this position there was a thick woods intervening between my division and the enemy, and the consequence was that he was entirely excluded from our view as we were from his. D. H. Hill's division, which had followed mine from below, was posted in a third line in the open ground in my rear beyond the hills.

        The weak point in our position was on our right, as there was the wide open plain in front of it extending to the river and perfectly covered and swept by the enemy's heavy batteries on the opposite heights, and to the right, extending around to our rear, were the open flats of the Massaponix, here quite wide and incapable of being covered by any position we could take. There was very great danger of our right being turned by the enemy's pushing a heavy column down the river across the Massaponix. The plains on that flank were watched by Stuart with two brigades of cavalry and his horse artillery.

        A heavy fog had concealed the two armies from each

other during the early morning, but about nine o'clock it began to rise, and then the artillery fire opened, which was just as my division was moving into position. The enemy's fire at first was not directed towards the place where my division was posted, but after a short interval the shells began to fall in our vicinity, and the division remained exposed to a random but quite galling cannonading for two or three hours.

        Shortly after noon we heard in our front a very heavy musketry fire, and soon a courier from General Archer came to the rear in search of General A. P. Hill, stating that General Archer was very heavily pressed and wanted reinforcements. Just at that moment, a staff officer rode up with an order to me from General Jackson, to hold my division in readiness to move to the right promptly, as the enemy was making a demonstration in that direction. This caused me to hesitate about sending a brigade to Archer's assistance, but to be prepared to send it if necessary, I ordered Colonel Atkinson to get his brigade ready to advance, and the order had been hardly given, before the adjutant of Walker's battalion of artillery came galloping to the rear with the information that the interval on Archer's left (an awful gulf as he designated it) had been penetrated by heavy columns of the enemy, and that Archer's brigade and all our batteries on the right would inevitably be captured unless there was instant relief. This was so serious an emergency that I determined to act upon it at once notwithstanding the previous directions from General Jackson to hold my division in readiness for another purpose, and I accordingly ordered Atkinson to advance with his brigade.

        I was then entirely unacquainted with the ground in front, having been able when I first got up to take only a hasty glance at the country to our right, and I asked Lieutenant Chamberlain, Walker's adjutant, to show the brigade the direction to advance. In reply he stated that the column of the enemy which had penetrated our line

was immediately in front of the brigade I had ordered forward, and that by going right ahead there could be no mistake. The brigade, with the exception of one regiment, the 13th Georgia, which did not hear the order, accordingly moved off in handsome style through the woods, but as it did so, Lieutenant Chamberlain informed me that it would not be sufficient to cover the entire gap in our line, and I ordered Colonel Walker to advance immediately with my own brigade on the left of Atkinson.

        The enemy's column in penetrating the interval mentioned had turned Archer's left and Lane's right, while they were attacked in front, causing Archer's left and Lane's entire brigade to give way, and one column had encountered Gregg's brigade, which, being taken somewhat by surprise, was thrown into partial confusion, resulting in the death of General Gregg, but the brigade was rallied and maintained its ground. Lawton's brigade advancing rapidly and gallantly under Colonel Atkinson, encountered that column of the enemy which had turned Archer's left, in the woods on the hill in rear of the line, and by a brilliant charge drove it back down the hill, across the railroad, and out into the open plains beyond, advancing so far as to cause a portion of one of the enemy's batteries to be abandoned. The brigade, however, on getting out into the open plain came under the fire of the enemy's heavy guns, and the approach of a fresh and heavy column on its right rendered it necessary that it should retire, which it did under orders from Colonel Evans, who had succeeded to the command by reason of Atkinson's being severely wounded.

        Two of Brockenborough's regiments from the right participated in the repulse of the enemy. Colonel Walker advanced, at a double quick, further to the left, encountering one of the columns which had penetrated the interval, and by a gallant and resolute charge he drove it back out of the woods across the railroad into the open plains beyond, when, seeing another column of the enemy crossing the railroad on his left, he fell back

to the line of the road, and then deployed the 13th Virginia Regiment to the left, and ordered it to advance under cover of the timbers to attack the advancing column on its flank. This attack was promptly made and Thomas' brigade, attacking in front at the same time, the enemy was driven back with heavy loss.

        As soon as Atkinson and Walker had been ordered forward, Hoke was ordered to move his brigade to the left of Hays, but before he got into position, I received a message stating that Archer's brigade was giving way and I ordered Hoke to move forward at once to Archer's support, obliquing to the right as he moved. Just as Hoke started, I received an order from General Jackson, by a member of his staff, to advance to the front with the whole division, and Hays' brigade was at once ordered forward in support of Hoke. The 13th Georgia Regiment which had been left behind on the advance of Lawton's brigade was ordered to follow Hoke's brigade and unite with it.

        Hoke found a body of the enemy in the woods in rear of Archer's line on the left, where the regiments on that flank, which had been attacked in rear, had given way, but Archer still held the right with great resolution, though his ammunition was exhausted. Upon a gallant charge, by the brigade under Hoke, the enemy was driven out of the woods upon his reserves posted on the railroad in front, and then by another charge, in which General Archer participated, the railroad was cleared and the enemy was pursued to a fence some distance beyond, leaving in our hands a number of prisoners, and a large number of small arms on the field.

        The movements of the three brigades engaged have been described separately from the necessity of the case, but they were all engaged at the same time, though they went into action separately and in the order in which they have been mentioned, and Lawton's brigade had advanced further out into the plains than either of the others.

        On riding to the front, I directed Lawton's brigade, which was retiring, to be re-formed in the woods--Colonel Atkinson had been left in front severely wounded and he fell into the enemy's hands. Captain E. P. Lawton, Assistant Adjutant General of the brigade, a most gallant and efficient officer, had also been left in front at the extreme point to which the brigade advanced, mortally wounded, and he likewise fell into the enemy's hands.

        I discovered that Hoke had got too far to the front where he was exposed to the enemy's artillery, and also to a flank movement on his right, and I sent an order for him to retire to the original line, which he did, anticipating the order by commencing to retire before it reached him. Two of his regiments and a small battalion were left to occupy the line of the railroad where there was cover for them and his other two regiments, along with the 13th Georgia, which had not been engaged, were put in the slight trenches previously occupied by Archer's brigade. Walker continued to hold the position on the railroad which he had taken after repulsing the enemy. Lawton's brigade was sent to the rear for the purpose of resting and replenishing its ammunition. Hays' brigade, which had advanced in rear of Hoke, had not become engaged, but in advancing to the front it had been exposed to a severe shelling which the enemy began, as his attacking columns were retiring in confusion before my advancing brigades. Hays was posted in rear of Hoke for the purpose of strengthening the right in the event of another advance. When I had discovered Lawton's brigade retiring, I sent to General D. H. Hill for reinforcements for fear that the enemy might again pass through the unprotected interval, and he sent me two brigades, but before they arrived Brigadier General Paxton, who occupied the right of Taliaferro's line, had covered the interval by promptly moving his brigade into it.

        The enemy was very severely punished for this attack,

which was made by Franklin's grand division, and he made no further attack on our right. During this engagement and subsequently there were demonstrations against A. P. Hill's left and Hood's right which were repulsed without difficulty. Beginning in the forenoon and continuing until nearly dark, there were repeated and desperate assaults made by the enemy from Fredericksburg against the positions at Marye's Hill and the one to our right of it, but they were repulsed with terrible slaughter, mainly by the infantry from Longstreet's corps posted behind the stone wall at the foot of Mayre's Hill, and the artillery on that, and on the neighboring heights. The loss to the enemy here was much heavier than that on our right, while our own loss at the same point was comparatively slight.

        My two brigades, Trimble's under Hoke, and my own under Walker, and the 13th Georgia Regiment held their positions on the front until night, while Hays retained his position immediately in rear of Hoke, but there was no further attack made on that part of the line, or on any part of Hill's front, except the demonstrations on his left which have been mentioned and which resulted in some skirmishing and artillery firing.

        When my division was first put in position on the second line as described, having no use for my artillery, I ordered Captain J. W. Latimer, my acting chief of artillery, to report to Colonel Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery for the Corps, with the six batteries attached to the division, to-wit: Carrington's, Brown's, Garber's, D'Aquin's, Dement's, and his own. Of these Brown's and Latimer's were posted on Hill's left, under the immediate charge of Captain Latimer, and did most effective service, and D'Aquin's and Garber's were sent to Major Pelham, Stuart's Chief of Artillery, on the right, where they likewise did good service, Captain D'Aquin losing his life while taking part in the artillery firing in that quarter. Just before sunset of the day of the battle, after having seen that all was quiet in my front, I rode

a little to the rear and discovered General D. H. Hill's division moving to the front through the woods.

        On my inquiring the meaning of the movement, General Colquitt, in command of the front brigade, informed me that orders had been given for the advance of the whole line and that Hill's division was ordered to advance in support. General D. H. Hill himself rode up in a few minutes, and confirmed the information. This was the first intimation I had received of the order, as it had not reached me. While General Hill and myself were speaking of the matter, Lieutenant Morrison, aide-de-camp to General Jackson, rode up and stated that the General's orders were that I should hold my command in readiness to advance; and immediately afterwards one of my own staff officers came to me with the information that General Jackson wished me to take command of all the troops on the right and advance, regulating the distance to which I should go, by the effect produced on the enemy by our artillery which was to open.

        I rode immediately to where Hoke's brigade was posted and found General Jackson himself, who repeated in person the orders to me, stating that I was to advance in support of some artillery which he was about to send forward. I informed him of the condition of my command, the separation of Walker from the rest, the fact of Lawton's brigade being in the rear, and that Hoke's and Hays' brigades and the 13th Georgia were the only troops immediately available. He told me to advance with the latter and that he would give me abundant support; I accordingly prepared to advance with Hoke's brigade and the 13th Georgia in front, followed by Hays brigade. The programme was that a number of pieces of artillery should be run out in front, and open on the enemy's infantry, when I was to advance and the artillery to be again moved forward, followed by my infantry.

        The movement with the artillery was commenced, and as soon as it left the woods the enemy opened with numerous batteries from the plains and from behind the

embankments on tile river road. This fire was terrific and many shells went crashing past us into the woods in our rear, where D. H. Hill's division was massed. Our own guns opened and continued to fire for a brief space, and a part of Hoke's brigade advanced to the railroad, but General Jackson soon became satisfied that the advance must be attended with great difficulties and perhaps disastrous results, and abandoned it. It was well that he did. The enemy had very heavy forces massed behind the embankments on the river road, the one nearest us being pierced with embrasures for numerous pieces of artillery. We would have had to advance nearly a mile, over an entirely bare plain swept by all this artillery, as well as cannonaded by the heavy guns on Stafford Heights, and if we had been able to force back the bodies of infantry and the artillery occupying positions on the plain between us and the woods, still when we reached the road itself we would have found a vastly superior force behind a double line of very strong breastworks.

        Nothing could have lived while passing over that plain under such circumstances, and I feel well assured that, while we were all ready to obey the orders of our heroic commander, there was not a man in the force ordered to advance, whether in the front or in support, who did not breathe freer when he heard the orders countermanding the movement.

        I have subsequently examined this ground with great care, and this examination has strengthened the position first entertained. It may perhaps be asked why our troops had not occupied the line of this road, to which I will reply that the road and the embankments on each side of it were perfectly commanded by the batteries of Stafford Heights, which rendered the position untenable for us, and the retreat from it most hazardous, while it afforded safe protection to the enemy from our guns.

        Shortly after the termination of this effort to advance, I received a notification from General Jackson to move

my troops to the rear for the purpose of resting and getting provisions as soon as they should be relieved by the troops of A. P. Hill's division which had at first occupied the positions now held by me, but no troops came to my relief, and I therefore, remained in position. Orders were received during the night for Taliaferro to relieve Hill's troops in the front line beginning from the left, and for me to occupy the remainder of the line on the right which Taliaferro could not fill out. In accordance with these directions, before dawn on the 14th, Paxton relieved Walker, Hays took the position which Paxton vacated, Hoke remained stationary, Lawton's brigade under Colonel Evans. was posted on Hoke's right, and Walker was moved from the left and placed in reserve behind Hoke. The evening before, Carrington's battery had relieved Latimer's and Brown's on the left, and still remained in position, and on the morning of the 14th, Dement's battery relieved one of the batteries on the right which had been engaged the day before.

        During the 14th the enemy remained in position on the plains and at Fredericksburg, an occasional shot being exchanged by the artillery and some firing from the skirmishers taking place on portions of the line, but none in my front.

        Before light on the morning of the 15th, D. H. Hill's division relieved Taliaferro's and mine on the front line, and we moved to the rear in reserve, A. P. Hill's division occupying the second line.

        There was quiet on the 15th, the enemy still retaining his position, but early on the morning of the 16th, as I was moving into position on the second line in accordance with previous orders, it was discovered that the enemy had re-crossed the river during the night, taking up his bridges, and I was ordered to move at once to the vicinity of Port Royal to guard against the possible contingency of the enemy's attempting to turn our right by crossing the river near that place; and I commenced the march immediately.

        The loss in the division under my command in this battle was in killed 89 and wounded 639, to-wit: in Hays' brigade, 5 killed and 40 wounded; Trimble's brigade (Hoke's), 8 killed and 98 wounded; Lawton's brigade, 55 killed and 369 wounded; my own brigade (Walker's), 17 killed and 114 wounded; and in the artillery of the division 3 killed and 18 wounded. Among the killed were Lieutenant Colonel Scott of the 12th Georgia Regiment, and Captain D'Aquin of the artillery, and among the wounded were Colonel Atkinson of the 26th Georgia Regiment (in the hands of the enemy), Captain E. P. Lawton, A. A. G. Lawton's brigade (Lawton mortally wounded and in the hands of the enemy) and Colonel Lamar, 61st Georgia Regiment.

        General Lee's entire loss in the battle was in killed 458, and wounded, 3,743, to-wit: in Longstreet's corps, 130 killed, 1,276 wounded; in Jackson's corps, 328 killed and 2,454 wounded; and 13 wounded in Stuart's cavalry.

        The enemy's loss was very much heavier, and over 900 prisoners, more than 9,000 stand of arms and a large quantity of ammunition fell into our hands.

        The failure of General Lee to attempt to destroy the enemy's army after its repulse has been much criticised, and many speculations about the probable result of an attempt to drive the enemy into the river have been indulged in by a number of writers. In the first place, it must be recollected that no man was more anxious to inflict a decisive blow on the enemy than General Lee himself, and none understood better the exact condition of things, and the likelihood of success in any attempt to press the enemy after his defeat on the 13th. That defeat was a repulse with very heavy loss it is true, but it was not a rout of the enemy's army; and candid persons ought to presume that General Lee knew what he was about and had very good and sufficient reasons for not sallying from his line of defence, upon the exposed plains below, to make the attempt to convert the repulse into a rout.

        If attention is given to the previous description of the ground on which the two armies were operating, it must be seen that an attempt to pass over the wide plain intervening between our line and the enemy's position below the town, while exposed to the fire of 150 heavy guns on the Stafford Heights, and the numerous field pieces securely masked in the River road, would inevitably have resulted in disaster, unless the enemy's forces had become so paralyzed as to be incapable of an effort at defence. Burnside's army was composed of about 150,000 men in the grand division under Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker, respectively.

        In none of the assaults on our lines were the whole of these grand divisions engaged, but when columns of attack were sent forward, there were always very heavy reserves for the attacking columns to fall back upon in case of repulse; Sumner's and Franklin's grand divisions had been mainly engaged and Hooker's scarcely at all. General Lee's army was not half as large as Burnside's and if he had at any time made an attempt to advance, any force that he could have massed for that purpose without abandoning his line of defence entirely would in all likelihood have still encountered a superior force of infantry behind a strong line of defence, in addition to the artillery.

        As I have stated, General Jackson made the attempt to advance on the right late in the day on the 13th, but he was compelled to desist, very fortunately, before any disaster happened. Above the town, the same canal, at the foot of the range of hills, which had furnished an insurmountable obstacle to any attack by the enemy on our extreme left, likewise furnished the same obstacle to an advance on our part. The only other quarter from which the advance could have been made was from the hills immediately in rear of the town upon the enemy in the town, and there the difficulties were greater even than below. Any attacking columns from that quarter must either have moved down the rugged face of the

base hills, or by flank along the Telegraph and Plank roads, and then they would have been so much scattered by the artillery from the north bank, which would then have had a more effective range than even on the plains, that it would not have required the reserves, posted behind the houses and defences in the town, to complete the repulse and disaster.

        As to a night attack, that is a very easy thing to talk about but a most hazardous experiment to try, especially on dark nights such as we then had. Such attacks cannot be ventured on with safety unless with the most thoroughly trained troops, and then not in large bodies, for fear of confusion and firing into each other, the very dread of which often paralyzes very brave troops.

        It has been said that General Lee might have inflicted tremendous damage upon the enemy by forcing hot shot and shell into Fredericksburg while the enemy's troops were massed there. The heroic and patriotic people of that town, when it was threatened with a bombardment by Sumner, had not appealed to the commander of their country's army to cause the danger to be removed from them by not resisting its occupation by the enemy, but had exhibited most commendable unselfishness by, in most cases, abandoning their homes without a murmur, while there were some too poor to move elsewhere, and others who chose to remain and share all the dangers of the approaching struggle; it was not in the heart of the noble commander of the Army of Northern Virginia to doom, by his own act, the remaining few of that devoted people and the homes of the absent to destruction, for the sake of killing and wounding a few thousand of the enemy, and causing dismay among the remainder.

        Is this forbearance one to be criticised with severity as a grievous military blunder?

        It is probable that if General Lee had known that the enemy was evacuating the town, his artillery might have inflicted considerable damage, but the enemy had

given no indication of such a purpose, and he took advantage of the darkness of the night and the prevalence of a storm and wind to make good his retreat, when the noise attending the movement could not be heard.

        General Lee accomplished all that was possible with the means under his control, except, indeed, the useless destruction of what the enemy had left of the town of Fredericksburg.

        There was a ridiculous story about General Jackson, to which currency was given by the newspapers, which represented that, at a council of war called by General Lee on the night after the battle, General Jackson fell into a doze while the very grave question of what ought to be done under the circumstances was being discussed, and after all the rest had given their opinion, General Lee turned to General Jackson and asked, "Well, General, what is your opinion?" to which the latter, waking out of his nap, replied, "Drive 'em in the river, drive 'em in the river." This story is by no means creditable to General Jackson, yet it obtained a wide circulation, and the narrators of it seemed to think it was very characteristic.

        General Jackson was a most able commander and heroic soldier, and it was not at all likely that he would have acted so much like a besotted member of a council of war called by his chief. I presume after the facts that I have before stated, it is not necessary to assert that no such incident occurred.

        Had Burnside moved down the river to the Massaponix, after crossing, or had thrown other bridges across at or near the mouth of that stream, and crossed one of his grand divisions there, he would inevitably have forced us to abandon our line of defence, and fight him on other ground.

CHAPTER XIX.

OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-63.

        ON the 16th of December, as soon as it was discovered that the enemy had recrossed the river, in accordance with the orders received, I moved to the vicinity of Port Royal, arriving by nightfall.

        The enemy was content with the experiment he had made, and did not attempt any further movement at that time. I proceeded the next day to picket the river from a place called the Stop-Cock, near the Rappahannock Academy, to the vicinity of Port Tobacco, below Port Royal, the river having been watched on this line previous to my arrival by some of Brigadier General Wm. H. F. Lee's cavalry, which I relieved.

        My division was encamped in the vicinity of Port Royal, on the hills back from the river, and when it was ascertained that the enemy was not preparing for a new movement in any short time, the different brigades built permanent winter quarters at suitable places. After a careful examination of the country, I proceeded to fortify the banks of the river at points likely to afford facilities for crossing, and I established a line of defence also along the main road running parallel with the river, where high embankments with cedar hedges on them afforded good cover for troops and excellent breastworks. This line commenced at the upper end of the Hazelwood estate, the former residence of that distinguished Virginian, John Taylor of Caroline, and with the defences on the river extending to Camden, the residence of Mr. Pratt, some distance below Port Royal, passing in rear of that town, which was now nearly abandoned on account of the depredations of the enemy's gunboats and the fear of their repetition. New roads were constructed in rear of the line of defence out of reach of artillery from the

opposite bank, for the purpose of facilitating communication between the different positions, and two Whitworth guns under Captain W. W. Hardwick were placed on a high hill in rear of Port Royal, for the purpose of preventing the gunboats which were below from ascending the river; and subsequently torpedoes were placed in the bed of the river some two or three miles below Port Royal under the superintendence of some one sent from headquarters.

        The enemy established a line of cavalry pickets on the opposite bank of the river as far down as ours reached, and the two were in sight of each other. The river at Port Royal is between six and eight hundred yards wide, and immediately opposite Port Royal is the small village of Port Conway, which was occupied by the enemy's pickets.

        We were compelled to haul our supplies in wagons from Guiney's depot on the railroad, and as the winter was a severe one with much snow and rain, the country roads, which we had to use, became almost impassable from the mud, and we were compelled to employ the men for a considerable time in corduroying them at the worst places.

        In the month of January, 1863, I was promoted to the rank of Major General and was assigned to the permanent command of Ewell's division, the name of which was now changed. Colonel R. F. Hoke of the 21st North Carolina Regiment, who had commanded Trimble's brigade since the termination of the Maryland campaign, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and assigned to the brigade he already commanded, and the name of that also was changed. The brigade had previously consisted of the 21st North Carolina, the 12th and 21st Georgia, and the 15th Alabama Regiments, and a North Carolina battalion of two companies. The 12th and 21st Georgia were now transferred to a Georgia brigade in D. H. Hill's division, and the 15th Alabama to a brigade in Hood's division,

the 6th, 54th, and 57th North Carolina Regiments from Hood's division, taking the place in Hoke's brigade of those transferred from it.

        The 25th and 44th Virginia Regiments were transferred from my own brigade to that of J. R. Jones, in Jackson's division, and subsequently Colonel William Smith of the 49th Virginia, who had been so severely wounded at Sharpsburg and had not yet returned, was appointed Brigadier General and assigned to my old brigade as it remained after the transfer of the two regiments. The organization of the artillery was now changed, and in the place of the batteries which had heretofore been attached to brigades, battalions were organized, which were to be under the general control of the Chief of Artillery for the Corps, and a battalion to be assigned to a division on an active campaign, or when required for defence. In consequence of this arrangement, a number of promotions took place among the artillery officers, and Captain J. W. Latimer, a youthful but most gallant and efficient officer, was made a Major of Artillery, a promotion which he had richly earned, though he was scarcely twenty-one years old. All the batteries heretofore attached to the division, except Latimer's, were sent to the rear of Bowling Green to winter, in order to be more convenient to forage. Latimer's battery was retained to be used in case of need, and it became Tanner's by virtue of the promotion of the first lieutenant.

        My assistant adjutant general, while I was a brigadier general, Captain F. Gardner, had resigned the previous summer, and my aide, Lieutenant S. H Early,^* had resigned while we were in the valley after the Maryland campaign, as he was over fifty years of age, and the condition of his family required his presence

        * Lieutenant Early, at General Early's request (and accompanied by his young son, John Cabell Early, aged fifteen years), rejoined the army in 1863 during its northern invasion, and was severely wounded at the battle of Gettysburg.

CAPTAIN SAMUEL H. EARLY

at home. I had had no regular personal staff since then. I found no assistant adjutant general with Ewell's division when I succeeded to the command at Sharpsburg, and Major Samuel Hale, who held the commission of a commissary, had been acting in that capacity for me while I commanded the brigade and, continued to do so while I commanded the division. I found with the division Major J. P. Wilson and Mr. Henry Heaton, who had been acting as volunteer aides to General Ewell and then to General Lawton, and they continued with me in that capacity until after my promotion.

        After I was assigned to the division as major general, Major Hale received the commission of adjutant general with the rank of major, and A. L. Pitzer and Wm. G. Callaway were commissioned as aides with the rank of first lieutenants.

        My division staff as then organized consisted of the following officers, all of whom except those above designated had been with General Ewell as members of his staff:

• Lieutenant Colonel J. M. JONES, Inspector General.
• Major SAMUEL HALE, Assistant Adjutant General.
• Lieutenant A. L. PITZER, Aide.
• Lieutenant Wm. G. CALLAWAY, Aide.
• Major C. E. SNODGRASS, Quartermaster.
• Major BEN H. GREEN, Commissary.
• Captain WILLIAM THORNTON, Assistant Commissary.
• Captain C. W. CHRISTIE, Ordnance Officer.
• Captain HENRY RICHARDSON, Engineer Officer.

        Subsequently, in the spring, Major John W. Daniel, who had been commissioned at my instance, was also assigned to me as an assistant adjutant general. Lieutenant Robert D. Early, who had been acting as aide In one of the brigades in D. H. Hill's division, also reported to me during the winter, as acting aide, and continued in that capacity until he was made an assistant adjutant general to a brigade in Jackson's old division.

        A company of mounted men organized as scouts, couriers and guides by General Ewell, had remained attached to the division under the command of Captain W. F. Randolph, but it was transferred in the spring to General Jackson's headquarters. My division, as it remained after the changes above mentioned, was composed of four brigades, to-wit: Hays' Louisiana brigade, Hoke's North Carolina brigade, Lawton's Georgia brigade (commanded by Colonel Evans), and Smith's Virginia brigade, organized as follows:

        Hays' brigade: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Louisiana Regiments.

        Hoke's brigade: 6th, 21st, 54th, and 57th North Carolina Regiments and Wharton's North Carolina battalion.

        Lawton's brigade: 13th, 26th, 31st, 38th, 60th, and 61st Georgia Regiments.

        Smith's brigade: 13th, 31st, 49th, 52nd, and 58th Virginia Regiments.

        In a few days after the battle, the other divisions of Jackson's corps were moved to positions above me, covering the river from the mouth of Massaponix to my left, Jackson's old division being on my immediate left, then A. P. Hill's division, and then D. H. Hill's. In January General Trimble, who had been severely wounded near Groveton on the 29th of August previous, was made a Major General and assigned to Jackson's division, which had always heretofore remained without a regular division commander, even while General Jackson was a Major General, as his command had included other troops.

        The enemy made no demonstration whatever on my front, and we had nothing to disturb our quiet during the winter, except a little incident by which two officers were captured by the enemy in rather a singular manner. There were a considerable number of ducks on the river, and Major Wharton, commander of the battalion in Hoke's brigade, and Captain Adams, the assistant

MAJOR JOHN WARWICK DANIEL

adjutant general of the brigade, took it into their heads to go shooting. There were several boats at Port Royal which I had directed to be hauled up on the bank with orders to the pickets to keep watch over them and not permit them to be launched.

        On the day the Major and the Captain took for their sport, the picket at Port Royal happened to be from their brigade, and they easily induced the sentinel on duty to let them have the use of one of the boats, to row into the mouth of a creek above, on our side, where the ducks were most numerous. The day was a very windy one with the wind blowing across towards the enemy. By keeping near the bank they avoided the effect of the wind until they got opposite the mouth of the creek, when it struck their boat and forced it out into the stream. Not being expert boatmen, and moreover being excited by the danger, they lost control of the boat and were driven helplessly to the northern bank into the hands of the enemy's pickets, and of course were made prisoners. The Major having an old newspaper with him, pulled it out when he reached the shore and proposed an exchange, a practice sometimes prevailing with the pickets in spite of all orders, but the Federal on post was rather too shrewd to have that game played on him, insisting that it was not exactly a case for exchange of such civilities. This was a caution to all persons disposed to sporting and to interfere with the orders to the pickets; and we had no more duck shooting in boats.

        Burnside made an abortive effort in January to advance again by flanking us on the left, but he stuck in the mud, and we were not put to any inconvenience by the movement. About the last of the month he was relieved of his command, and a new commander for the Federal Army was selected, in the person of Major General Joseph Hooker, called "Fighting Joe."

        Though we passed the winter without the excitement attending an advance of the enemy, still we were not

without some excitements of our own, and I may as well relate the following occurrence to show how men who had passed through the stirring scenes of the previous year, who had fought with Jackson in the valley, around Richmond, at Manassas, Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg, could amuse themselves in winter quarters.

        We had several severe snow storms during the winter, and after one of them, when the snow lay deep on the ground, Hoke's brigade challenged Lawton's for a battle with snow balls, which challenge was accepted. The two brigades were marshalled under their respective commanders --Hoke on the one side, and Colonel Evans on the other. Evans stood on the defensive in front of his camp and Hoke advanced against him. Evans' force was much the larger, but being Georgians who had been brought from Savannah in the beginning of the previous summer, his men were not accustomed to the fleecy element. Hoke's men were more experienced, and when they made a bold dash at the Georgians, pelting them most unmercifully with their well pressed balls, and giving the usual Confederate yell, there was no withstanding the shock of the onset. Evans' men gave way in utter confusion and rout, and Hoke's men got possession of their camp.

        The Georgians seeing that their camp and all their effects were in possession of the enemy, who seemed to be inclined to act on the maxim that "to victors belong the spoils," took courage, rallied, and came back with such vim that Hoke's men in their turn were routed, and retreated in utter dismay. No time was given for them to rally, but they were pursued to their own camp, their leader having been captured in the pursuit. Evans' men did not deem it prudent to press their victory too far, but retired, though in good order. They acted magnanimously and released the leader of their opponents on his parole of honor, not, however, without his having been well wallowed in the snow.

        There was no official report of this battle, but all the

particulars were related at division headquarters by one of the aides who happened to be present, and who was himself captured under suspicious circumstances on Hoke's retreat, but begged off on the ground that he was a neutral and a mere spectator. He was much joked by the other young men at headquarters, who charged him with skulking on the occasion, and there was some reason to suspect that he did not stand the storm of snow balls as well as he did that of shot and shell on many another occasion. Many, very many of the poor fellows who shared in this pastime poured out their life's blood on subsequent battlefields, and a small remnant were surrendered at Appomattox Court-House with arms in their hands, and tears rolling down their cheeks.

        About the first of March my division was moved to Hamilton's Crossing to take place of Hood's, which had been sent with Longstreet south of James River, and a body of cavalry took the place of my division on the right. In my new position, it was my duty to picket and watch the river from the mouth of Hazel Run at the lower end of Fredericksburg to the mouth of Massaponix, which was done with three regiments at a time, posted at different positions on the bank. These pickets were in full view of and in musket range of the enemy's pickets on the opposite bank, and also under the fire of the guns on Stafford Heights, but by a tacit arrangement there was never any firing from either side on ordinary occasions, but the picketing detachments on both sides were moved into position and regularly relieved without molestation.

        In the month of April the 31st Virginia Regiment of Smith's brigade, in company with the 25th Virginia of Jones' brigade, Trimble's division, was sent to the valley for the purpose of accompanying an expedition into Northwestern Virginia under General Imboden, and did not return until late in May.

        The growing timber on the range of hills which had constituted our line of defence at the battle of Fredericksburg

had been almost entirely cut down during the winter to construct tents, and furnish firewood for Hood's division, and there were left only a few scattering trees on the hills and a thin skirt in front. Shortly after my removal, General Jackson, whose headquarters had been below, near Moss Neck, removed also to the vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing.

        Brigadier General J. B. Gordon, who had been Colonel of the 6th Alabama Regiment in Rodes' brigade, D. H. Hill's division, and very severely wounded at Sharpsburg, was assigned in April to the command of Lawton's brigade, which took his name.

        There was perfect quiet along the river front until the night of the 28th of April, though Fitz. Lee's brigade of Stuart's cavalry had a fight with the enemy at Kelley's Ford in Culpeper in March, and there was another affair with the cavalry in April.

CHAPTER XX.

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

        BEFORE light on the morning of the 29th of April, the enemy, having moved three corps of his army up during the night, by taking advantage of a heavy fog that overhung the river, threw a brigade across in boats, just below the mouth of Deep Run, and the 54th North Carolina Regiment on picket at that point, being unable to cope with the force brought against it, was forced to retire, which it did without loss. The movement had been conducted with so much secrecy, the boats being brought to the river by hand, that the first intimation of it, to the regiment on picket, was the landing of the force. Bridges were then rapidly laid down at the same crossing used by Burnside at this point and a division of infantry with some artillery was crossed over.

        About a mile lower down below the house of Mr. Pratt, a similar crossing was attempted, but that was discovered, and resisted by the 13th Georgia Regiment under Colonel Smith until after sunrise, when that regiment was relieved by the 6th Louisiana under Colonel Monaghan going on picket in its regular time. The latter regiment continued to resist the crossing successfully until the fog had risen, when the enemy's guns were brought to bear, and by a concentrated fire that regiment was compelled to retire, not, however, without sustaining a considerable loss in killed and wounded as well as prisoners, the latter being captured in rifle pits at points below the crossing, which was effected by the enemy's coming up in their rear before they had received notice of his being across. The 13th Georgia had also sustained some loss in killed and wounded, and prisoners captured in the same way, who had not been relieved. The resistance made at this point delayed the enemy so that the bridges there were not laid until after 10 o'clock A.M.

        A little after light, information reached me of the crossing at Deep Run, and I sent notice of it at once to General Jackson. Without, however, waiting for orders, I ordered my division to the front, and as soon as it was possible put it in line along the railroad, with my right resting near Hamilton's Crossing and my left extending to Deep Run. Three regiments were sent to the front and deployed along the River road as skirmishers. The 13th Virginia Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Terrill, on picket between the mouths of Hazel and Deep Runs, was drawn back to the line of the River road above Deep Run, and remained there until relieved by McLaws' division, when it was brought up.

        As soon as the enemy had laid down his bridges at the lower crossing, a division of infantry and some artillery were crossed over at that point. When the fog rose, the slopes of the opposite hills were semi-covered with troops the whole distance from opposite Fredericksburg to a point nearly opposite the mouth of the Massaponix. The question was whether they were ostentatiously displayed as a feint, or whether they were massed for crossing. The troops which had crossed were seen throwing up breastworks covering the bridges and also epaulments for artillery; but it was impossible to discover the strength of the force already across, as below the deep banks of the river there was ample space for massing a large body of troops out of our sight. There appeared no attempt to make a crossing at Fredericksburg, or to move up towards the town.

        Some artillery was put in position on the hill near Hamilton's Crossing on my right, and in rear of my left. D. H. Hill's division, now under command of Brigadier General Rodes, was soon brought up, and put in position on my right, extending across the Massaponix, one brigade being placed below that creek across the River road, so as to guard the ford. A Whitworth gun, of very long range, was also posted below the

Massaponix out of range of the enemy's guns across the river and in position to partially enfilade them.

        The remaining divisions of Jackson's corps were brought up during the day, and A. P. Hill's was put in position in a second line in rear of mine. Trimble's division under the command of Brigadier General Colston arrived very late in the afternoon and was placed in reserve in the rear. Barksdale's brigade already occupied the town of Fredericksburg, and the remaining brigades of McLaws' division were brought up and placed in position on the left of my line, one of his brigades connecting with my left, which was now drawn back from the railroad, and a shorter line made across to Deep Run, to connect it with McLaws' right. For the greater part of the way the railroad track furnished a very good protection, and it was strengthened by throwing up embankments, the line being advanced a little in front on the left of my centre where there was a rise in the ground above the level of the road. In order to occupy the whole of the line my brigades had to be extended out, as the division was not strong enough to man it fully.

        During the day the enemy made no attempt to advance against us in force with his infantry, and his skirmishers were effectually kept from the River road by mine, and on the right Rodes' skirmishers, which extended from the right of mine around to the river above the Massaponix, prevented any movement in that direction. There was some artillery firing, and one Whitworth gun from across the Massaponix played with very considerable effect on the bottoms on the enemy's left. Large bodies of the infantry on the opposite slopes occasionally moved down towards the river, where they were concealed from our view by the bank on the south side, which is the highest.

        I retained my position on the front line during the night, which passed quietly. The next day there was

very little change in the appearances in front. The enemy had made strong tetes du pont covering his bridges, and was constructing a line of entrenchments connecting the two, passing in front of the Pratt and Bernard houses, and extending below the lower bridge.

        There was this day some apparent diminution of the infantry in view on the opposite slopes, but there were many heavy guns in battery on the heights and a very large force of infantry still visible. There were some demonstrations with the infantry on the north bank, some skirmish firing, and some artillery firing also, but the enemy on the south bank did not appear at all enterprising, and rather contracted his lines on his left, his skirmishers retiring before ours which were pushed forward on that flank. The indications were that it was a mere demonstration on our front, to cloak a more serious move in some other quarter, and so it turned out to be. When this was discovered, it is quite probable that we might have destroyed the comparatively small force on the south bank by a movement against it from our line, but this would not have compensated us for the loss we would, in all probability, have sustained from the enemy's heavy guns.

        General Lee had ascertained that by far the largest portion of Hooker's army had crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers above their junction, and were moving down on his left. He therefore determined to move up with the greater part of his own army to meet that force, which was watched by Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps and a portion of Stuart's cavalry. Accordingly late on the afternoon of the 30th I was instructed by General Jackson to retain my position on the line, and, with my division and some other troops to be placed at my disposal, to watch the enemy confronting me while the remainder of the army was absent. Barksdale's brigade occupying Fredericksburg and the heights in rear, was directed to retain his position, as was also a portion of General Pendleton's reserve artillery, which

occupied positions on Marye's and Lee's Hills, and the whole was placed under my command. In addition, Graham's battery of artillery of four guns, two twenty pounders and two ten pounders, Parrots, posted on the hill on my right, was left with me, and Lieutenant Colonel Andrews was ordered to report to me with his battalion of four batteries with twelve pieces, to-wit: six Napoleons, four three-inch rifles, and two ten pounder Parrots. A Whitworth gun under Lieutenant Tunis was also left at my disposal and posted on the right across the Massaponix. With the rest of the army near Fredericksburg comprising the other three divisions of Jackson's corps, and three brigades of McLaws' division, General Lee moved on the night of the 30th and the morning of the 1st of May towards Chancellorsville to meet Hooker.

        Before leaving, General Lee instructed me to watch the enemy and try to hold him; to conceal the weakness of my force, and if compelled to yield before overpowering numbers, to fall back towards Guiney's depot where our supplies were, protecting them and the railroad; and I was further instructed to join the main body of the army in the event that the enemy disappeared from my front, or so diminished his force as to render it prudent to do so, leaving at Fredericksburg only such force as might be necessary to protect the town against any force the enemy might leave behind.

        The force which had made the demonstration on our front consisted at first of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th corps of Hooker's army, under the command of Major General Sedgwick. The 3rd corps moved to join Hooker during the 30th, but the 1st and 6th remained in my front still demonstrating. In his testimony before the Congressional Committee on the war, Hooker stated that the 6th corps, according to the returns of the 30th of April, 1863, numbered 26,233 present for duty. Sedgwick says that the 6th corps numbered only 22,000 when it crossed the river. Taking the medium between them, the

effective strength may be put down at 24,000, which General A. P. Howe, commanding one of the divisions, says he was informed, at headquarters of the corps, it was. The first corps must have numbered at least 16,000 and perhaps more, so that I must have been left confronting at least 40,000 men in these two corps, besides the stationary batteries on Stafford Heights and Gibbon's division of the 2nd corps which was just above, near Falmouth, and, according to Hooker's statement, numbered over 6,000 for duty on the 30th.

        My division by the last tri-monthly field return which was made on the 20th of April, and is now before me, had present for duty 548 officers and 7,331 enlisted men, making a total of 7,879. It had increased none, and I could not have carried into action 7,500 in all, officers and men, and not more than 7,000 muskets, as in camp when everything was quiet, a number of men reported for duty, who were not actually able to take the field. I had already lost about 150 men in the resistance which was made at the lower crossing. Barksdale's brigade did not probably exceed 1,500 men for duty, if it reached that number. I had, therefore, not exceeding 9,000 infantry officers and men in all, being very little over 8,000 muskets; and in addition I had Anderson's battalion with twelve guns; Graham's four guns; Tunis', Whitworths, and portions of Watson's; Cabell's and Cutt's battalions under General Pendleton, not numbering probably thirty guns. I think 45 guns must have covered all my artillery, and these were nothing to compare with the enemy's in weight of metal.

        The foregoing constituted the means I had for occupying and holding a line of at least six miles in length, against the enemy's heavy force of infantry, and his far more numerous and heavier and better appointed artillery. It was impossible to occupy the whole line, and the interval between Deep Run and the foot of Lee's Hill had to be left vacant, watched by skirmishers, protected only by a cross fire of artillery. I could spare no infantry

from the right, as that was much the weakest point of the line, and the force which had crossed, and which exceeded my whole strength, was below Deep Run, and confronting my own division. Andrews' artillery was placed in position on the morning of the 1st as follows: four Napoleons and two rifles were placed under Major Latimer, near the left of the line occupied by my division, behind some epaulments that had been made on that part of the line; two Parrots were placed with Graham's guns on the hill on my right, and two Napoleons and two rifles were posted to the right of Hamilton's Crossing, near a grove of pines, the Whitworth gun being posted on a height across the Massaponix so as to have a flank fire on the enemy if he advanced, and it was without support. Colonel Andrews had charge of all of the artillery on this part of the line, that on Marye's and Lee's Hills was under the immediate superintendence of General Pendleton, and some of the batteries were so posted as to have a cross fire on the upper part of the valley of Deep Run.

        The enemy remained quiet on the 1st, except in demonstrating by manoeuvres of his troops, and there was no firing on that day. His line of entrenchments, covering the two bridges, had been completed, and he still displayed a heavy force of infantry, consisting of the two corps under Sedgwick. The ensuing night also passed quietly, and during it a battery of four Napoleons was sent by General Pendleton to report to Colonel Andrews, and was posted with the four guns near the pines on the right of the crossing.

        The morning of the 2nd opened with appearances pretty much the same as they had been the day before; if anything there was more infantry in view on the north bank than had appeared the previous day. Colonel Andrews was ordered early in the day to feel the enemy with his guns, and accordingly Latimer opened with his two rifle guns on the enemy's position near Deep Run, and Graham's and Brown's Parrots opened on the infantry

and batteries below and near the Pratt house. Latimer's fire was not returned, but Graham's and Brown's was responded to by two of the batteries on the north bank and some guns on the south side. Shortly afterwards the infantry and artillery at the lower crossing disappeared behind the bank of the river, and that crossing was abandoned.

        During the morning I rode to Lee's Hill for the purpose of observing the enemy's movements from that point, and I observed a considerable portion of his infantry in motion up the opposite river bank. While I was, in company with Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, observing the enemy's manoeuvre and trying to ascertain what it meant, at about 11 o'clock A.M., Colonel R. H. Chilton, of General Lee's staff, came to me with a verbal order to move up immediately towards Chancellorsville with my whole force, except a brigade of infantry and Pendleton's reserve artillery, and to leave at Fredericksburg the brigade of infantry and a part of the reserve artillery to be selected by General Pendleton, with instructions to the commander of this force to watch the enemy's movements, and keep him in check if possible, but if he advanced with too heavy a force to retire on the road to Spottsylvania Court-House--General Pendleton being required to send the greater part of his reserve artillery to the rear at once.

        This order took me very much by surprise, and I remarked to Colonel Chilton that I could not retire my troops without their being seen by the enemy, whose position on Stafford Heights not only overlooked ours, but who had one or two balloons which he was constantly sending up from the heights to make observations, and stated that he would inevitably move over and take possession of Fredericksburg and the surrounding Heights. The Colonel said he presumed General Lee understood all this, but that it was much more important for him to have troops where he was, than at Fredericksburg, and if he defeated the enemy there he could easily

retake Fredericksburg; he called my attention to the fact, which was apparent to us all, that there was a very heavy force of infantry massed on the slopes near Falmouth which had moved up from below, and stated that he had no doubt the greater portion of the force on the other side was in motion to reinforce Hooker. He repeated his orders with great distinctness in the presence of General Pendleton, and in reply to questions from us, said that there could be no mistake in his orders.

        This was very astounding to us, as we were satisfied that we were then keeping away from the army, opposed to General Lee, a much larger body of troops than my force could engage or neutralize if united to the army near Chancellorsville. It is true that there was the force massed near Falmouth and the indications were that it was moving above, but still there was a much larger force of infantry stationed below, which evinced no disposition to move. While we were conversing, information was brought me that the enemy had abandoned his lower crossing, and that our skirmishers had advanced to the Pratt house, but he still, however, maintained his position at the mouth of Deep Creek with a division of infantry and a number of guns on our side of the river.

        The orders as delivered to me left me no discretion, and believing that General Lee understood his own necessities better than I possibly could, I did not feel justified in acting on my own judgment, and I therefore determined to move as directed. It subsequently turned out that Colonel Chilton had misunderstood General Lee's orders, which were that I should make the movement indicated if the enemy did not have a sufficient force in my front to detain the whole of mine, and it was to be left to me to judge of that, the orders, in fact, being similar to those given me at first. It also turned out that the troops seen massed near Falmouth were the 1st corps under Reynolds, moving up to reinforce Hooker, and that the 6th corps, Sedgwick's own, remained behind.

        When Colonel Chilton arrived, General Pendleton was

making arrangements to move some artillery to the left to open on the columns massed near Falmouth, but the order brought rendered it necessary to desist from that attempt in order to make preparations for the withdrawal.

        My division occupied a line which was in full view from the opposite hills except where it ran through the small strip of woods projecting beyond the railroad, and the withdrawal had to be made with the probability of its being discovered by the enemy. I determined to leave Hays' brigade to occupy the hills in rear of Fredericksburg with one regiment deployed as skirmishers on the River road confronting the force at the mouth of Deep Run, and also to leave one of Barksdale's regiments, which was already in Fredericksburg and along the bank of the river, picketing from Falmouth to the lower end of the town.

        The orders were given at once and the withdrawal commenced, but it had to be made with great caution so as to attract as little attention as possible and therefore required much time. General Pendleton was to remain at Fredericksburg, according to the order's, and the withdrawal of such of his artillery as was to be sent to the rear was entrusted to him and executed under his directions. The Whitworth gun was ordered to the rear with the reserve artillery and Andrews' battalion and Graham's battery were ordered to follow my column, Richardson's battery, which was on the right, being returned to General Pendleton's control. When the withdrawal commenced, the enemy sent up a balloon and I felt sure that he had discovered the movement, but it turned out that he did not.^* It was late in the afternoon before my column was in readiness to move, and Barksdale was ordered to bring up the rear with the three regiments left after detaching the one on picket, as soon

        * Professor Lowe's balloon reconnaissances so signally failed on this occasion and in the operations at Chancellorsville, that they were abandoned for the rest of the war.

as he was relieved by Hays. As soon as the troops were in readiness the three brigades of my division moved along the Ridge road from Hamilton's Crossing to the Telegraph road, and then along a cross-road leading into the Plank road, Barksdale going out on the Telegraph road to join the column. Upon getting near the Plank road, a little before dark, I received a note from General Lee which informed me that he did not expect me to join him unless, in my judgment, the withdrawal of my troops could be made with safety, and I think he used the expression that if by remaining I could neutralize and hold in check a large force of the enemy, I could do as much or perhaps more service than by joining him.

        I had proceeded so far that I determined to go on, as the probability was that if the enemy had discovered my movement, the mischief would be done before I could get back, and that I would not be able to recover the lost ground, but might deprive General Lee entirely of the use of my troops. When the head of my column had reached the Plank road and moved up it about a mile, a courier came to me from General Barksdale, stating that the enemy had advanced against Hays with a very large force, and that the latter and General Pendleton had sent word that all of the artillery would be captured unless they had immediate relief. The courier also stated that General Barksdale had started back with his own regiments.

        I determined to return at once to my former position, and accordingly halted the column, faced it about and moved back, sending my Adjutant General, Major Hale, to inform General Lee of the fact. The fact turned out to be that just before dark Sedgwick had crossed the remainder of his corps and moved towards the River road below, called also the Bowling Green road, forcing from it the 7th Louisiana Regiment, under Colonel Penn, which occupied that road and fell back to the line on the railroad after skirmishing sharply with the enemy. There had been no advance against Hays at Fredericksburg,

and Sedgwick had halted with his whole force and formed line on the river, occupying with his advance force the road from which Colonel Penn had been driven.

        We regained our former lines without trouble about ten or eleven o'clock at night, throwing out skirmishers towards the River road. Barksdale occupied his old position and Hays' returned during the night to the right of my line. The night passed quietly on the right after my return except some picket firing on the front, but, just before daybreak on the morning of the 3rd, I was informed by General Barksdale that the enemy had thrown a bridge across at Fredericksburg and was moving into the town. The General had ridden to see me in person to request reinforcements, and I ordered Hays' brigade to return to the left as soon as possible, directing General Barksdale to post the brigade where it was needed, as he understood the ground thoroughly. In reply to a question from me, he informed me that the crossing had not been resisted by his regiment, which had retired skirmishing on the approach of the enemy, as the struggle was deemed useless, and it undoubtedly would have been. This was a mistake about the bridge being laid at that time, but it was a very natural one, as Sedgwick moved a portion of his force up the river into the town, while doubtless preparations were making for laying down the bridge early in the morning.

        Barksdale's brigade was then posted as follows: the 21st Mississippi Regiment occupied the trenches on Marye's Hill between Marye's house and the Plank road; the 18th, the stone wall at the foot of the hill, where it was subsequently reinforced by three companies from the 21st; the 17th, the trenches on the front slope of Lee's Hill; and the 13th, the trenches further to the right. Squires' battery of the Washington Artillery was posted in the works on Marye's Hill, and the rest of Pendleton's guns on Lee's Hill on the front crest and at positions further to the right, so as to cover the interval between the hills and the upper part of Deep

Run. There were no troops on the left of the Plank road along the crest overlooking the canal. Very soon after daylight, the head of Sedgwick's column, which had moved up during the night from below, emerged from the town and advanced against the defences at Marye's Hill, but was repulsed by the fire of Barksdale's infantry and the artillery posted there.

        When it became sufficiently light to see, it was discovered by us that the opposite bank of the river was bare of troops and it was very apparent that the enemy's whole force lately confronting us on that side was across for the purpose of a serious move, and the question was as to where it would be made. The heaviest force in view was in front of the crossing below the mouth of Deep Run, and there were at that point a number of pieces of artillery. The enemy, however, was also demonstrating against Marye's Hill with both infantry and artillery, but the mass of his infantry there was concealed from our view, and there were indications also as if he might attempt to pass up the valley of Deep Run on the left bank. The fact was that there was one division covering the bridge, one between Deep Run and Hazel Run, and one masked in Fredericksburg. The skirmishers from my division succeeded in getting to the River road on the right, but the position next Deep Run was held by too strong a force to be dislodged.

        Very shortly after light the enemy commenced demonstrating at Deep Run as if to turn the left of my division held by Hoke's brigade, and threw bodies of troops up the ravine formed by the high banks of the run, while there were demonstrations also on the left bank of the run. Latimer opened with his guns on the ravine and the advancing bodies of infantry where they could be seen; but a considerable body succeeded in getting up to that part of the railroad next to the run and took position behind it, where they were protected against the fire of our artillery. The enemy opened with two or three batteries on Latimer's guns, and there ensued a

brisk artillery duel. Andrews brought Graham's and Brown's guns from the right to replace Latimer's Napoleons, and also Carpenter's two rifles to take position with Latimer's two, and the firing was continued for some time, as well against the enemy's infantry as against his artillery. Finally Smith's brigade, which was on the right of Hoke's, moved out and dislodged the infantry which had taken position behind the railroad embankment, and as it retired the artillery played on it. This ended the demonstrations at Deep Run, and soon heavy bodies of infantry were seen passing up towards Fredericksburg, upon which Andrews' batteries opened.

        I had remained on the right with my division, as I knew that that was the weakest part of our line, and I was very apprehensive that the enemy would attempt to cut my force in two by moving up Deep Run, which would have been the most dangerous move to us he could have made. I, however, kept a lookout upon the movements above and was in constant communication with Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, from whom I received several reports that they had repulsed all the attacks upon their position, and thought they could hold it. Shortly after sunrise, and after the repulse of the first attack on Barksdale's position, Gibbon's division, of the enemy's 2nd corps, was crossed over into Fredericksburg on the bridge which had been laid there, and it was then moved above the town for the purpose of turning the position on that flank, but this effort was balked by the canal, over which there was no bridge; it then attempted to effect the movement by repairing a bridge over the canal, the planking from which had been torn up, but Hays' brigade had arrived by that time, and four of his regiments filed into the trenches on the left of the Plank road just in time to thwart this attempt, and another made shortly afterwards to cross the canal at the upper end of the same division.

        Hays' brigade had had a long distance to march in order to avoid the enemy, and when it arrived General

WALL (ON THE LEFT OF ROAD) AT MARYE'S HEIGHTS
CHANCELLORSVILLE AND FREDERICKSBURG BATTLEFIELDS

Barksdale placed one of the regiments, the 6th Louisiana, Colonel Monaghan, on his right in the trenches near what was known as the Howison house, and the other four were sent to man the trenches along the crest of the hills on the left of the Plank road, where they arrived just in time to thwart the attempt to cross the canal as before stated. The enemy's guns from the north side of the river, as well as from positions on the south side above and below the town, continued to fire upon the positions occupied by Barksdale's men and our artillery, but the latter generally reserved its fire for the infantry.

        An attempt to turn the right of the position by the right bank of Hazel Run was repulsed by Pendleton's artillery and every effort to get possession of the heights was baffled and repulsed until after 11 A.M., when two large attacking columns of a division each were formed, one of the divisions from below being brought up for that purpose. One of these columns moved against Marye's Hill and the other against Lee's Hill, both at the same time, while Gibbon's division demonstrated against the heights above with storming parties in front. The column that moved against Marye's Hill, consisting of Newton's division, made its attack on the famous stone wall defended by a regiment and three companies, and its storming parties were twice broken and driven back in disorder by the gallant little band that held that position, but constantly returning to the attack with overwhelming numbers the enemy finally succeeded in carrying the work, after having sustained terrible slaughter.^* Then passing around the foot of the hill a

        * Sedgwick, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee oil the War, says: " I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes' time in taking the heights of Fredericksburg."

        General Barksdale informed me that just before this final attack was made the enemy sent a flag of truce to Colonel Griffin, commanding the force behind the stone wall, asking permission to take care of his wounded lying in front under our fire, which permission was imprudently granted by Colonel Griffin, without his knowledge, and that the weakness of the force at that point was thus discovered, and immediately afterwards the assaulting columns advanced.

portion of the attacking column came up in the rear, capturing Squires' guns (which had been fought to the last minute), and along with them the Captain and his company.

        The column sent against Lee's Hill did not succeed in carrying it by assault, but was kept at bay until Marye's Hill had fallen, when the position being untenable, the regiments defending it were withdrawn up the hill, and the enemy was thus able to take possession of that also. The artillery on both hills had done good service in aiding to repel all the previous assaults and to resist this. The companies of the 21st Mississippi in the trenches on the left of Marye's Hill were compelled to retire to prevent being surrounded and captured, as were also Hays' regiments in the trenches further to the left, the latter being compelled to cross the Plank road higher up, as their retreat on the Telegraph road was cut off. The enemy got on Hays' flank and rear before he was aware the hill on his right was taken, and the consequence was that he lost a few prisoners. He succeeded, however, in making good his retreat.

        General Barksdale partially rallied his regiments and made obstinate resistance to the enemy's advance on the Telegraph road, falling back gradually before the large force opposing him. The greater portion of the guns on Lee's Hill were carried off, but some were lost because the horses belonging to them had been carried to the rear to be out of reach of the enemy's shells, and could not be got up in time to carry off the pieces. Ten guns were lost in all, including those taken at Marye's Hill, but two were subsequently recovered, making our final loss in that respect eight pieces.

        Wilcox's brigade was above at Banks' Ford, but not under my command, and was about to move up to Chancellorsville, but hearing that the enemy was advancing up the river, General Wilcox hurried to the vicinity of Taylor's house at the extreme left of the line with two pieces of artillery and sixty men, and putting his guns

in position, opened with effect on a portion of Gibbon's division when it was trying to effect a crossing of the canal at the upper end. He then detained his brigade, and subsequently started a regiment to Barksdale's assistance at his request, but before it arrived Marye's Hill had been taken and it therefore retired. General Wilcox subsequently did good service in resisting the enemy's advance up the Plank road.

        While these events were transpiring above, I was near the left of the line occupied by my division, and in a position from which I could observe a good deal of the movements, but could not see Marye's Hill very well. After what was supposed to be the enemy's effort to move up Deep Run and thus break our lines had been thwarted, and when I saw the infantry moving up towards Fredericksburg, I sent one of my aides, Lieutenant Callaway, to Lee's Hill, to give notice to Generals Barksdale and Pendleton and to ascertain how they were getting on. After he had been gone some time, I became uneasy and determined to ride up myself.

        While I was on my way some one came galloping up in my rear and stated that some person below had seen the enemy's troops and flag go up on Marye's Hill. I did not think this could be so, but rode on rapidly, hoping that the statement was untrue. I soon met a courier from General Pendleton with a note stating that they had so far repulsed any attack and could hold their position. This relieved me for an instant, but in a few minutes Lieutenant Callaway came galloping with the information that the enemy certainly had carried the heights, and that he had seen his attacking column ascending them at Marye's house, a very few minutes after parting with Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, who were on Lee's Hill and who had just stated to him that they thought they could hold the position.

        I at once sent an order to General Gordon, who occupied my right, to move up as soon as possible with three of his regiments over the road I was following, which was

the nearest practicable one. I then galloped to the Telegraph road, and soon met Pendleton's artillery going rapidly to the rear, and ordered it to be halted. Going on I found General Barksdale on the ridge immediately in rear of Lee's Hill rallying his men and skirmishing with the enemy who had ascended the hill, and before whom they were retiring gradually but obstinately. Barksdale's men were rather scattered, but the 6th Louisiana had retired in good order and I directed it to form a line, and Barksdale to halt and get his men in line, which he did. I also ordered a battery of artillery to be brought forward into action and soon one was by my side and unlimbered but did not fire.

        There was a line of the enemy in front a few hundred yards on the crest of the hill, and I turned to the officer commanding the battery and asked him why he did not fire, to which he replied, "I have no ammunition, sir." I ordered another to be brought forward, and a battery of Howitzers, from Cabell's battalion, was brought up and opened with canister. The enemy's advance had been checked by the demonstration, but he soon brought up some artillery and opened on us at short range with shrapnel and canister, and I ordered the line to retire a short distance, which it did in good order, taking up another position. In this manner we continued to retire along the Telegraph road from point to point, taking advantage of favorable portions of the ground to make a stand until the enemy ceased to pursue. I then ordered General Barksdale to take position at Cox's house, about two miles in rear of Lee's Hill, where the first cross-road leaves the Telegraph road to get into the Plank road, and to establish Hays (to whom I had sent a message to come around to the Telegraph road) on the line, as well as Gordon's regiments, when they arrived.

        By obtaining possession of Lee's Hill, the enemy bad obtained a position from which he could completely enfilade my line on the right, and as soon as the foregoing arrangements were made, I rode rapidly to the

right and threw back the troops there into a second line which had been previously prepared in the rear, and which was not enfiladed; and Colonel Andrews was ordered to take position with all of his guns on the ridge at the head of the Deep Run valley, so as to protect the left flank of my division and the right of Barksdale's line.

        All these movements were made without molestation from the enemy. Of course I did not know what the purposes of the enemy were, and took my measures to provide as well as I could for any emergency that might present itself. I had met Gordon with his three regiments immediately after leaving Barksdale, and directed him to join the latter. After making the dispositions on the right, I rode back to Barksdale's position and found his line established with Hays and Gordon in position.

        It had been now ascertained that the enemy was moving up the Plank road, and I rode out to a position across Hazel Run, from which I could see the moving columns and discovered that it was moving very slowly, and that it finally halted. Lieutenant Pitzer, one of my aides, had been at Lee's Hill when the heights were carried, and knowing the importance of the affair to General Lee, had gone at once to give him the information, as he knew that it would be some time before I could be informed so as to send a messenger myself, and thus judiciously anticipated me in putting General Lee on his guard.

        While the events thus detailed were transpiring on the line occupied by me, a great battle had been fought between General Lee's forces and the main body of, Hooker's army. Hooker had crossed the river above and concentrated four corps at Chancellorsville in a strong position, and Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps, Longstreet himself being still absent with two of his divisions, had watched the movement of the enemy and resisted his advance column, taking position on the Plank road at Tabernacle Church. McLaws' division and the

three divisions of Jackson's corps had moved up during the night of the 30th of April and the morning of the 1st of May and united with Anderson. Our troops had thus moved forward on the Plank road and the stone turnpike, Anderson's and McLaws' divisions in front, and Jackson's divisions following Anderson's on the Plank road, and had driven an advanced line of the enemy back to within a mile of Chancellorsville upon his main force.

        Early on the morning of the 2nd, Anderson's and McLaws' divisions, with the exception of Wilcox's brigade of Anderson's division, which had been sent back to Banks' Ford, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division which was at Fredericksburg, were left to confront the enemy on the side next to Fredericksburg, and Jackson moved with his three divisions, by a circuitous route to the left, to gain the rear of the enemy's right. Late in the afternoon, General Jackson reached the rear of the enemy's right flank about three miles beyond Chancellorsville, and with Rodes in front--followed by Colston with Trimble's division, and A. P. Hill,--advanced at once with great vigor, driving the enemy before him, carrying position after position, routing entirely one corps, and capturing a number of guns and prisoners, until his advance was arrested by the abattis in front of the central position near Chancellorsville. Night had come on by this time, and General Jackson ordered A. P. Hill's division, which was following in rear of the other two, to the front to take the place of the latter. He himself went to the front to reconnoitre for the purpose of ordering another advance, and, having sent an order to Hill to press on, while returning in the darkness was shot and dangerously wounded ^* under an unfortunate mistake, by a part of Hill's advancing troops. General

* Captain R. E. WELBOURNE: